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suggestions made this project a personally challenging and 
rewarding experience. Appreciation is also extended to Dr. 
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For reading the manuscript and serving on the examina­
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In conclusion, because of a recognition of the somewhat 
unfamiliar nature of this topic and in answer to questions 
raised by various individuals, a brief explanation is offered 
as to what motivated the author's interest in such a study.
It may be said that the writer's interest in methodology was 
the outgrowth of studies in the related fields of economic 
theory and general semantics. From the economists an appre­
ciation of the virtures of methodological discussion was 
obtained and from the general semantists a means of analyzing 
and conducting such discussions was discovered. This study, 
growing from personal interests in related fields, is an 
attempt to apply to management and organizations certain 
fundamental issues relating to the methods of social science.
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ABSTRACT
Little attention has been directed toward the method­
ological problems of management and organization theory.
It is likely that this neglect has resulted more from the 
scientific immaturity of the discipline than from academic 
unconcern. However, the sophistication of the subject has 
advanced to the point where immaturity is no longer a valid 
excuse. As a result, this study is an attempt to examine 
selected methodological issues with the objective of gaining 
some insight into the future of management science.
Initially, the opposing epistemological perspectives of 
empiricism and rationalism were analyzed through the use of 
secondary research. Utilizing the tenets of general seman­
tics, it was argued that neither perspective by itself is 
capable.of providing the answers that management and organi­
zation theorists seek. Only an elaborate deductive-inductive 
system making use of man-to-man understanding can provide such 
information.
Consideration was also given to the value-centric predica­
ment faced by all the social sciences. Bnphasis was placed on 
the necessity of explicit separation of judgments of value from 
statements of scientific fact. This proposition was advanced 
because of the abstract nature of value judgments which
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disqualifies them from entry into the confines of science.
In the final chapter an attempt was made to empirically 
determine why research in the area of management exhibits 
such a diversity of methodological approaches. It was hypoth­
esized that past and present environmental influences of the 
researcher account for these diversities. In an effort to 
test this proposition, a mail questionnaire was sent to 380 
management professors in 255 colleges and universities through­
out the United States.
It was determined, on the basis of the sample information, 
that geographical factors constitute the primary influences 
upon methodological convictions. Factors such as the area 
where the respondent's highest degree was received, area 
where he was reared and place of present residence seemed to 
be especially important. On the other hand, fac-tors such as 
age, teaching experience and religious preference appeared 
relatively unimportant in determining differences in method­
ological beliefs.
One particularly interesting result was noted relative 
to the epistemological perspective of management academia.
In general, differences of opinion with respect to epistemo- 
logical issues were deviations of magnitude, not direction.
In other words, on the average, the respondents exhibited a 
uniform favorable connotation relative to empiricism.
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On the subject of a positive as opposed to a normative 
approach to management and organizations, agreement was not 
so evident. Although no groups thought of either approach 
as entirely satisfactory in and of itself, there were obvi­
ous differences relative to the single most preferred alter­
native.
The implications of these findings to the future of 
management and organization theory are considerable. If 
one accepts the notion of self-projection, he would likely 
agree that today's academia, through their research and 
teaching, will influence the theoretical labors of tomorrow's 
scholars. Therefore, management research in the future will 
probably continue to exhibit a great deal of empirical con­
tent.
With respect to the value-centric predicament, projec­
tions are more difficult to make. The fact that some groups 
favored one approach and others favored another complicates 
the problem considerably. In view of this, methodological 
controversy seems sure to continue in this area. Although 
academic controversy is refreshing, it can also be destruc­
tive unless it is based on systematic analysis. For this 
reason, it is hoped that the future will witness more inter­
est in methodology than has the past.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: REFLECTIONS ON SCIENTIFIC,
PHILOSOPHICAL AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
If any problem in the social sciences is important 
enough to study, it should be studied with methods 
that will yield accurate and unbiased results.
--Rensis Likert
It is with some degree of anticipation that a student 
of management enters the domain of philosophy to seek to 
interrelate the two areas so that both may be better under­
stood. This anticipation is, to some extent, the result of 
the "paradox of methodological investigation"-'- which is no 
less apparent in management than in any other discipline.
If there is apprehension, however, it is overshadowed by a 
sense of challenge when one recognizes that the only route 
to understanding the substantive problems of any subject 
area is by way of an examination of the philosophical issues 
that provide the foundation for all knowledge. Undoubtedly,
■'■The "paradox of methodological investigation" exists 
because philosophers trained in methodology rarely possess 
a knowledge of management and managers generally lack the 
training necessary to philosophically examine their methods. 
See Sherman R. Krupp, editor, The Structure of Economic 
Science: Essays on Methodology. Prentice-HalT, Inc.,
Elnglewood Cliffs,-tTew Jersey, 1966, p. iii.
every student, either consciously or unconsciously, seeks 
the answer to such questions; but when he formally examines 
this area, a unique vocabulary must be mastered before much 
progress can be made.
Definition of Terms
Throughout the study an effort will be made to define 
any unfamiliar term at its point of usage. Some terms, how­
ever, are so basic to an understanding of the subject that 
they warrant special attention. The remainder of this section 
is devoted to the clarification of such words and phrases.
Philosophy
Philosophy, as it relates to an area of academic inquiry, 
involves an attunement with the ultimate nature of things--a 
speculative enterprise which penetrates for no practical pur-
ppose the structure of ultimate reality. In this context it 
assumes its literal meaning "love for knowledge." So defined, 
philosophy is the summation of at least four sub-areas of inquiry
^William Litzinger and Thomas E. Schaefer, "Perspective: 
Management Philosophy Engima," Academy of Management Journal,
Vol. IX, No. ^ (Dec., 1966), pp. 3ij.0-3ij.T7
3This particular scheme was obtained from J. Donald 
Butler, Four Philosophies and Their Practice in Education and 
Religion. Revised ed., Harper and Row Publishers, New ifork,
1^577 various pages.
3
Figure 1 offers an illustration of how these acadenic sub­
cultures combine to develop a general field of study. Moving 
clockwise from the top, one first encounters metaphysics or 
the theory of reality, which concerns itself with the cosmos 
and the nature of causality. Next is axiology, the general 
theory of value, which examines the sumroun bonum or "highest 
good" and naturally incorporates ethics and aesthetics. At 
the base of the diagram is epistemology, which relates to the 
theory of knowledge and is associated with questions regarding 
the possibility of knowledge, the kinds of knowledge and the 
instruments of knowledge. The final subclassification in 
this particular scheme is logic and is perhaps the most 
familiar of all the categories mentioned. Logic is the 
science of exact thought and as such includes methodology 
which is related to epistemology via its concern with valid 
knowledge. This then is a brief description of philosophy 
in its "purely classical" sense.
The preceding definition was formulated in an age of 
idealism when knowledge for the sake of knowledge was of 
paramount importance. In the present age of pragmatism or 
American vocationalism, it is not surprising that some 

















THE SUBCULTURES OF PHILOSOPHY
with the traditional meaning of the term. Today, "philos­
ophy" seems to describe the highest type of practical knowl­
edge, the knowledge to order other knowledge for human 
cpurpose. According to this interpretation, a philosophy 
of management must be a philosophy of business that will 
provide the techniques and value guidelines necessary for 
"effective" and lawful managerial action. Such a proposi­
tion raises doubt as to any relationship between the modern 
and traditional usage of the term. In fact, the pragmatic 
definition seems to be more closely related to science, 
ethics and jurisprudence than to classical philosophy thus 
creating a serious semantic confusion and raising the 
necessity for additional definitions.
Science
The objective of science is to describe, explain and 
predict. The first of these aims is basic and indispensable 
while the second and third are the most fruitful results of
^For example, R. C. Davis, "Philosophy of Management," 
Advanced Management. Vol. XXXIV, No. (Aprl, 1959), pp. 5-6 
and Oliver Sheldon, The Philosophy of Management, Prentice- 
Hall, Inc., 1923, pp7“Z7^3^
^Litzinger and Schaefer, loc. cit.
scientific l a b o r . ^ Description is common to both philosophy 
and science; only the plane upon which this description takes 
place is different. The objective of description in science 
is prediction; but scientific prediction has no counterpart 
in pure philosophy. The "scientific mentality" is the pro­
pensity to suspend belief until evidence of the appropriate 
kind is produced and believed only to the degree warranted 
by available evidence without excluding the possibility of 
future disconfirmation.^ The "philosophic mentality" on the 
other hand, seeks the cosmic nature of a perceived event and 
structures it within the philosophical framework one possesses. 
Therefore, philosophy and science are not and can never be the 
same. Management science has made significant progress in 
recent years, but the discipline seems no closer to developing 
a "true philosophy" than it was fifty years ago.
It is not unreasonable to speculate that at least one
cause of the present state of retarded management philosophy 
is the confusion between the functions of philosophy and
^Herbert Feigl, "The Scientific Outlook: Naturalism and
Humanism," in Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck, editors, Readings 
in the Philosophy of Science. Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc.,
New York, 1953, PP* 10-11. Also see Richard B. Braithwaite, 
Scientific Explanation, Cambridge University Press, London, 
1953, P. 1.
^Arthur Pap, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science.
The Free Press of Glencoe, itew YorIF7 1962, p. 3.
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science. Frederick Taylor himself drew a rather sophisticated
distinction between the two by stating that "the mechanism of
management must not be mistaken for its essense or underlying
philosophy" and concluded with a warning:
The very mechanism which will produce the finest 
results when made to serve the underlying prin­
ciples of scientific management will lead to 
disaster if accompanied by the wrong spirit in 
those who are using it.8
Thus, there is only one sense in which philosophy and science
are similar; they both seek knowledge even though it is a
fundamentally different type.
Philosophy of Science
Philosophy of science, as it is viewed today, is a part
of analytical philosophy in that it rejects the implicit
assumption that the sole task of the philosopher is the supra-
scientific description of reality. In fact, It expands the
philosopher's traditional task to include the logical analysis
9of concepts, laws and theories of a given science. Therefore, 
philosophy of science endeavors to analyze the validity of
Frederick W. Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Manage­
ment . Harper and Brothers Publishers, New York, 1917, pp. 12o- 
129. Here it seems the "mechanism of management" is used 
synonymously with applied science and is contrasted to philos­
ophy.
9May Brodbeck, "The Nature and Function of the Philosophy 
of Science," in Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck, Readings in 
the Philosophy of Science. Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc. ,~iTew 
York, 19^3, p. 5T
scientific inquiry and in doing so makes science, like any 
other activity of man, subject to examination on philosophical 
grounds.
Prom this standpoint, philosophy is both the forerunner 
and successor of science. Scientists are required to accept 
many concepts such as truth, time and space which they cannot 
stop to examine; yet, these are the very issues the philoso­
phers seek to explain.^ Once scientific investigations are 
initiated, the logic of the methods employed also requires 
examination; for until their validity is confirmed, any con­
clusions 30 obtained remain subject to extreme uncertainty. 
Thus, methodology is an important and integral part of the 
philosophy of science.
Methodology
Methodology is the logic of methods and as such its 
function is to judge the numerious variations of inductive 
and deductive systems as to their scientific validity. The 
objective of this type of inquiry is to standardize or at 
lea3t define the methods used in order to reduce or isolate 
that portion of total variation in scientific findings
•^Collier'a Encyclopedia. P. F. Collier and Son 
Corporation, New York, 1966, Vol. 15, PP* 312-313*
resulting from "methodological variance." A simple mathe­
matical (i.e. functional) formulation is perhaps the most 
concise way to illustrate the point.^ Suppose there exists 
the following relationship:
6q — ^(A q * M, Op)
where,
60 = the data observed 
A0 = actual acts of the observee 
M = methods of measurement--i.e . methodology 
Op ~ perception of the observer 
If it is possible to isolate and hold constant "methodological 
variation" ( ,  a more direct relationship will exist between 
60 and A0 . Although this would be extremely helpful, an 
additional source of variance is exposed by this functional 
formulation that is possibly more troublesome than "pure 
methodological variation" and might be labeled "perceptual 
variation" (°0p)* Idealistically, one would hope that the 
sum of methodological and perceptual variation would equal 
zero (oĵ  + oq = 0 ), but realistically speaking this would be
r
^ T h e  basic idea of a mathematical formulation was 
obtained from Stuart C. Dodd, "Scient-Scales for Measuring 
Methodology," The American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. IX,
No. 10 (June, 1956), pp. 38 although this formulation bears 
little resemblance to his treatment of the subject.
10
highly improbable. If, however, these sources of variation 
could be minimized so that the relationship between the data 
observed (60 ) and the action of the observee (Aq ) approaches 
unity, scientific investigation would have surely been 
accomplished. As will be noted later, this proposition 
forms the basic purpose of the study--to expose some of the 
causes of methodological variation and to better understand 
perceptual variation by making use of the tenets of general 
semantics and communication theory.
Purpose of the Study
This study proposes to examine the methodology of manage­
ment and organizations and to illustrate the contribution 
that at least one related field of study can make toward the 
resolution of management's methodological difficulties. The 
need for such an analysis is evident in the cries of manage­
ment writers for a systematic theory upon which they may 
unify their efforts.
Ques t for Management Theory
Many scholars have voiced the need for a theory of 
management and organizations, but few have made the point 
with the force of Henri Fayol when he stated "without theory 
no teaching is p o s s i b l e . I f  this is true, and to some
12Henri Fayol, General and Industrial Administration, 
translated by Constance Storrs, Sir Isaac Pitman and Son,
Ltd., London, 19^9, pp. 11+-15-
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extent it must surely be, management faces a tremendous 
challenge for a true philosophy to provide the necessary 
condition for a complete and systematically developed science. 
Such a science cannot be long in coming because no era has 
ever produced the need nor the urgency for coordinating vast 
combinations of productive factors as the current period.
No greater waste can be imagined than the ineffectiveness of 
technological discoveries because of the inability to effi­
ciently utilize modern innovations. But management and orga­
nization theory cannot solve its methodological problems in 
a completely esoteric manner. Yet, to think the answers will 
be supplied from without is equally erroneous. Therefore, 
methodology presents itself as an interdisciplinary problem 
and contains all the complications of such a discipline. 
Toward An Interdisciplinary Approach to Methodology
Methodology is first of all a problem of philosophy, but 
unlike metaphysics it is readily comprehendible to students 
of other fields. Management, by its very nature, requires 
of its students a knowledge of related disciplines that lend 
themselves quite easily to the examination of methodology.
The study at hand will make use of several ideas from general 
semantics in an effort to analyze and clarify certain 
methodological difficulties that presently exist in the
12
study of management and organizations. A further objective 
of this investigation is to survey the attitudes of manage­
ment professors with respect to these issues and project 
what affects, if any, such attitudes will have on the future 
development of the discipline. In spite of the ambition 
with which this subject is approached, certain limitations 
must be conceded.
Limitations of the Analysis
The first limitation is the scope of the study itself 
for although answers dealing with the questions of manage­
ment metaphysics and axiology would be a most significant 
contribution, such subjects must, by necessity, be left to 
the philosophers. Therefore, the present study will pursue 
a less ambitious, although it is hoped equally important, 
task by limiting its scope to the methodology and episte- 
mology of management and organizations. In addition to this 
limitation, one other should be noted.
The study at hand is directed toward the more philo­
sophical questions of management and as such faces a con­
straint relative to universal interest. Managers are doers-- 
they are accustomed to dealing with the realities of the shop 
and market place and in this capacity are not inclined to
13
13appreciate nor be extremely interested in philosophizing. 
Their essence is to exist, to decide and to act.-^ They may 
be compared to the fireman who is too busy fighting the fire 
to worry about the chemistry of ignition or the physics of 
his mechanical tools. Therefore, any contribution this study 
might make will be to academia who must shoulder the joint 
responsibility of seeking both a philosophy and science of 
management and organizations.
Comments on Research Design and A.
Preview of the Presentation
The research design used in this study is a combination 
of secondary and primary research. Chapters one through 
three make exclusive use of secondary research and provide 
the foundation for the survey of management professors which 
constitutes the final chapter. APPENDIX A contains a repro­
duction of the questionnaire sent to 3^0 randomly selected 
management professors at 255 colleges and universities.
^ 0 .  A. Ohmann, "Search for a Managerial Philosophy," 
Harvard Business Review, Vol. XXXV, No. 5 (Sept.-Oct., 1957) 
P. ^1.
^George S. Odiorne. "The Management Theory Jungle and 
the Existential Manager," Academy of Management Journal,
Vol. IX, No. 2 (June, 1966),“p. 110.
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However, since the first three chapters will be developed 
before the results of the survey are reported, further elab­
oration on the analytics of the empirical analysis will be 
postponed until chapter four.
In view of the fact that this study proposes to be a 
treatise on methodology, it will begin by analyzing in detail 
two methodological issues common to all social disciplines. 
Chapter two deals exclusively with the epistemology of manage­
ment and organization theory. Primary emphasis is given to 
the alternative epistemological perspectives most evident in 
the study of management and organizations. Empiricism 
resulting in & posteriori information is evaluated and con­
trasted to _a priori information as a basis for science. This 
methodological concept is discussed within the framework of 
the logic of a universal science of human behavior.
Chapter three relates communication theory to methodology 
through an examination of the language and semantics of science. 
In addition, abstraction analysis making use of Korzybski's 
structural differential is applied to the issue of value judg­
ments in teaching and researching the area of management.
The entire analysis is then combined into a discussion of 
the psychology of self-projection which provides a foundation 
for the hypotheses to be investigated empirically.
Basically, the idea of self-projection states that 
environmental factors are influential in the formation of 
one's system of values and beliefs. This value and belief 
system in return influences interpersonal communication via 
man's tendency to assume that his beliefs are typical of all 
humans. Therefore, in a sense, one always communicates to 
and about himself. The empirical study will attempt to 
determine the extent to which various environmental factors 
influence the formation of methodological convictions. Then, 
applying the results of the analysis, a speculation as to how 
contemporary attitudes will affect future management and 
organization theory through the self-projection of faculty 
to student will be offered. But, before continuing further, 
the methodological issues themselves must first be examined 
and explained.
CHAPTER II
EPISTEMOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MANAGEMENT 
AND ORGANIZATION THEORY
Human society is not merely a fact or an event in 
the external world to be studied by an observer 
like a natural phenomenon. Though it has exter­
nality as one of its important components, it is 
as a whole a little world, a cosmion, illuminated 
with meaning from within by the human beings who 
continuously create and bear it as the mode and 
condition of their self-realization.
--Eric Voegelin
Sciences are concerned with knowledge, and by virtue of
this concern, epistemology emerges as the most basic of the
scientist’s interests. The scientist qua epistemologist
concentrates his analysis on the relationship between the
perceptual images one constructs and the objective reality
1to which these images refer. From this it can be seen that 
epistemological and metaphysical conceptualizations of reality 
are fundamentally different. Within the theory of knowledge 
the "ways of knowing" refer to cognitive procedures for sub­
stantiating a belief which are justified on the grounds that 
they are more productive of objective knowledge than any
-1-William P. McEwen, The Problem of Social-Scientific 
Knowledge, The Bedminster Press, Totowa, New Jersey, 1963, 
p. 6 .
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2alternative cognitive procedure. In the field of organiza­
tions, individual members and their actions become the 
"knowable;" science is designated as the process of "knowing" 
and the causal relationships developed become "knowledge."
Through the activity of knowing, the knowable becomes
3knowledge.
Metaphysics, on the other hand, attempts to explain the 
nature of reality itself--what it actually is and how it came 
to be. Thus, the distinction becomes explicit; metaphysics 
takes cosmic reality as its subject matter, whereas reality 
relative to perception is the concern of epistemology. There­
fore, the primary questions of science are epistemological, 
not metaphysical, thereby placing upon the present chapter 
the responsibility of examining the epistemological founda­
tions of organization theory and analyzing the subject matter 
which it is designed to exrplain.
Logic of A Universal Science of 
Human Behavior
Perhaps it is too obvious to mention that management 
and organization theorists have voiced "scientific" concern
2Ibid., P. 63.
^James K. Feibleman, "The Scientific Philosophy," 
Philosophy of Science. Vol. XXVIII, No. 3 (July, 1961), p. 250.
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about their subject for decades. Attempts have been made to 
derive "principles of organization" from Biblical contexts 
and from the Kameralwissenschaft^- or Cameralistic science 
which developed in Germany around the doctrine of administra­
tion by the territorial prince. However, voiced concern and 
constructive action are often completely independent. Recog­
nizing this, the time has come for theorists of organizations 
to cease their lamentations and take time from their compila­
tion of data and theoretical labors in order that they may 
reexamine the nature of their subject and the logic of their 
methods.
Management and organization theory, like any other area 
of inquiry, assumes the responsibility of formulating generali­
zations from which consequences may be deducted and predictions
£made. Needless to say, no single theory thus far developed 
can boast that it has accomplished such a worthy objective 
with a high degree of accuracy. Nevertheless, the sum total 
of all efforts has led the study of organizations far from 
the reign of the once dominant "rule of thumb." Influential 
theories have evolved using a variety of approaches and
^-Joseph Schumpeter, Economic Doctrine and Method. George 
Allen and Unwin, Ltd. , London, I+’j pT 33.
^John G. Kememy, Â Philosopher Looks at Science. D. Van 
Nostrand Company, Princeton, pp"I ^ 7 - ^ 5 ^
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making necessary complex classification schemes. One such
£
scheme is noted below:
1. Classification -according to the sources of data.
This category ranges from a purely empirical 
classification to a completely mystical one.
Such a continuum might be called an "epistemo- 
logical scale."
2. Classification according to the purpose of the 
researcher. Those theories which propose to 
describe what actually "is" in organizations 
occupy one extreme and those attempting to 
prescribe how organizations "should be" occupy 
the other.
3„ Classification on the basis of the phenomenon 
studied. Macro theories observing or analyzing 
organizations in toto are distinguished from 
micro theories concentrating on the individuals 
who make up the whole. This continuum might be 
called a "macro-micro scale."
Since this scheme appears to the writer as the most 
productive available, it will be used to provide a structure 
for the analysis of the logic of organization theory. How­
ever, the items will be discussed in reverse order beginning 
with the purpose of a science of management and organizations 
and an examination of the phenomenon under study.
Albert Rubenstein and Chadwick J. Haberstroh, editors, 
Some Theories of Organization. Revised ed., Richard D.
Irwin, Inc., Homewood, 111. , 1966, pp. 22-21;.
Purpose of a_ Science of Management and Organizations
Any science, if it is to worthy of the name, accepts 
as its basic problem the discovery of invariant elements with 
respect to environmental conditions and differences in the 
sensory organization of different persons. Knowledge of such 
elements permits prediction of the sense phenomena that will 
most likely appear under a set of given conditions. There­
fore, the goal of science is the discovery of universal
7invariants and principles of covariation. Examples of 
attempts to accomplish this scientific objective are evident 
in every stage of the development of management theory. 
Scientific management and the traditional school found little 
objection to calling their concepts of covariation "principles 
while the advocates of the human relations approach, although 
less explicit, sought the same type of universal invariants. 
Other scholars interested in the science of society have made 
some most interesting observations such as Chase's "33 common 
patterns of mankind." Thus, science appears as an effort to
*^Felix Kaufmann, Methodology of the Social Sciences, The 
Humanities Press, New York, 195°, P* 8.
®Henri Fayol, General and Industrial Management. trans­
lated by Constance Storrs, Sir Isaac Pittman and Son, Ltd., 
London, 191+9, pp. 19-1+0.
^Stuart Chase, pie Proper Study of Mankind. Revised ed., 
Harper and Brothers Publishing Co., New York, 19$6, pp. 81+- 
93.
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add some type of structure to dynamic reality.
Management and organization theory, however, cannot be 
content with the unrestricted quest for universal invariants 
since the search must take place according to rigorous rules 
if the enterprise is to be characterized as scientific. These 
standards or criteria may best be formulated in terms of ideals 
to be approximated but perhaps never fully attained. The more 
important of these are as follows:10
1. Intersubjective testability or simple objectivity. 
Knowledge claims must be subject to examination by 
the properly equipped individual. Cognitive 
meanings are sought, not just claims accessible
to selected mystics.
2. Reliability of confirmation. Discernment between 
chance and law is an absolute necessity of science.
3. Coherence and systematic structure. Mere collec­
tion of data is not science. A well connected 
account of facts is the ultimate end of science.
L|.. Comprehensiveness of knowledge. Science acquires 
a reach far beyond unaided senses and requires 
that any unifying hypothesis remain open to 
revision. The ability to live with an unfinished 
world is a sign of the maturity of science since 
the concepts of science are confirmed but never 
verified.11
10Herbert Feigl, "The Scientific Outlook: Naturalism
and Humanism," in Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck, editors, 
Readings in the Philosophy of Science, Appleton-Century- 
Crofts, Inc., New York. 1953T PP* 8-20. Also Olaf Helmer 
and Nicholas Rescher, "On the Epistemology of the Inexact 
Sciences," Management Science, Vol. VI, No. 1 (Oct., 1959), 
pp. 25-27-
11Robert J. House and Alan C. Filley, "Science, Theory, 
Philosophy and the Practice of Management," Management 
International Review. 6 (1956), pp. 97-107.
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It is unadvisable to speak of the science of organiza­
tions in the same sense as the science of physics. Prediction 
of events one might expect at a given moment is impossible
within the organizational framework where only probabilistic
12and limited range conclusions are possible. However, as
Scott points out, the usefulness of such predictions may be
great in the long run even though they provide no real basis
13for short run decisions. In addition, theories developed 
with this limited utility may eliminate the practical possi­
bility of certain events and thereby narrow the range of 
alternatives to be considered. But this is not sufficient 
for physics. This inconsistency between the socio-behavioral 
and natural sciences has troubled philosopher and scientist 
alike for centuries. What unique characteristics exist with­
in the "inexact sciences" and create the "penumbra of uncer­
tainty" that makes them so different from the natural disci­
plines .
12F. A. Hayek, Degrees of Explanation," British Journal 
of the Philosophy of Science. Vol. VI. No. 23 INov. . 195*3) . 
pT 255.
^William G. Scott, Organization Theory. Richard D.
Irwin, Inc., Homewood, 111.7 1967, p. 13.
23
On Unique Problems and "Obligations of Faitfri"
The question has been raised as to whether explanations 
of social phenomena require a logic different from those of 
the natural e v e n t s . B e f o r e  becoming involved in this con­
troversy, the effects of which will be evident throughout the 
forthcoming discussion of epistemology, it might be helpful 
to briefly itemize and illustrate some of the unique problems 
of management and organizations.
Object of Study. Objection has been raised to Mill's 
dictum that "men are not, when brought together, converted 
into another kind of substance." In fact, Roethlisberger 
has quite adequately raised the question as to what is the
proper unit of analysis in organization theory; man, organi-
1 9zations or man-in organizations. There is no denying that
the macro-micro-macro cycle has been evident in organizations
X 6just as in many other sciences. Scientific management
^ Ernest Nagel, "Problems of Concept and Theory Formation 
in the Social Sciences," in Maurice Natanson, editor, Philos - 
ophy of the Social Sciences, Random House, New York, 1963, 
p T 2 0 3 .
19Fritz J. Roethlisberger, "Contributions of the Behav­
ioral Sciences to a General Theory of Management," in Harold 
Koontz, editor, Toward & Unified Theory of Management, McGraw 
Hill Book Company, Inc. , 1^61^, p . 1̂ 2.
^•^William G. Scott, "Organization Theory: An Overview
and An Appraisal," Academy of Management Journal, Vol. IV,
No. 1 (April, 1961), p. 23.
2k-
attempted a macro approach in pursuit of the efficient whole. 
Human relations ushered in a micro orientation which concen­
trated its analysis on the smallest unit comprising the organi­
zation- -man. Macro concepts are once again emerging with 
consideration being given to the 3ocial, political and tech­
nical systems within which both man and organizations exist. 
Micro propositions are formulated around reductive principles 
which assert the notion that things are as they are because 
of the elements that compose them. Macro concepts rest on 
holistic principles which require an account of the subject
matter in terms of the combinations of qualities which, when
17organized, distinguish that subject matter from all others.
With economy being a desirable characteristic of science (i.e. 
the ability to explain much with little), the micro approach 
appears to the writer to be the most capable of producing 
significant results. The reason for this position is that 
knowledge of and ability to predict individual action can 
enable one to project, to some extent, the behavior of organi­
zations. Imputation of individual characteristics into organi­
zations is essentially the basis for numerous theories con­
cerning the "organizational society. The reverse of this
^ J o s e p h  j, Schwab. "What Do Scientists Do," Behavioral 
Science. Vol. V, No. 1 (jan., I960) pp. 3-13*
1 ftFor an example see Robert Presthus, The Organizational 
Society. Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1962.
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proposition, however, is not true. It is extremely doubtful 
that knowledge of organizational behavior alone would provide 
the equipment necessary to predict individual action. It can 
be seen that a detailed analysis of the platform and perfor­
mance of the Republican party since its inception would reveal 
little about Mr. Republicans^.
Therefore, this study will take the position that 
methodological individualism is the most productive course 
for management and organization theory. In the words of 
Alexander Pope (Essays on Man), "Know then thyself, presume 
not God to scan; the proper study of mankind is man."
Testing and Selecting Multiple Hypotheses. Social . 
theories face a special problem in that several hypotheses 
may be available for explaining a given event. The most 
obvious cases that come to mind are the motivational theories 
advanced by Herzberg, Maslow, McGregor, e_t. &1. When such a 
situation develops, the choice among alternative hypotheses 
(or theories), which are equally consistent with existing 
information, is admittedly somewhat arbitrary. However,
there is general agreement that the criteria of "simplicity"
19and "fruitfulness" are helpful in making the choice. A
!9c. West; Churchman and Russell L. Ackoff, Methods of 
Inquiry. Educational Publishers. Inc.. St. Louis. 1950. p.
10.
theory is simplier the less additional knowledge needed to
make a prediction, and it is more fruitful the more precise
the prediction, the greater its application and the greater
its future usefulness. Although it is often possible to
measure simplicity, the test of fruitfulness is a different
matter and immediately confronts complications. Perhaps
the most often encountered difficulty is the inability to
establish controlled experiments. Part of the problem is
that the exercise of power to modify social conditions for
20experimental purposes is itself a social variable. As a
result of this difficulty, Nagel suggests the use of "con-
21trolled investigation," which does not require, as does 
experimentation, either reproduction at will of the event 
or overt manipulation of variables. It does, however, 
require a deliberate search for contrasting occasions in 
which phenomena are either uniformly manifested or mani­
fested in some cases but not in others. It also necessi­
tates subsequent investigation in order to determine what 
factors are related to the differences in the various 
events. Controlled investigation is nothing more than the 
scientific attitude and is the absolute minimum requirement 
for any systematic scientific analysis.
20Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science. Harcourt, 
Brace and World, Inc. , New York, T95T, P • i+^1.
21Ibid., p. 252.
Other problems distinguishing the social sciences include 
the fact that it is not uncommon to find assumptions about the 
subject matter (i.e., Theory X and Theory Y) resulting in a 
"self-fulfilling prophecy" whereby the assumptions become at
least a partial cause of the resulting situation. The oppo-
??site may also be true in which case a "suicidal prediction" 
results. For example, a prediction of pending labor prob­
lems may influence both labor and management to reexamine 
their positions in order to avoid prolonged loss of work, 
thus averting a strike and rendering the prediction false.
No such problems of unintended causation exist in the physi­
cal realm.
Social Causation. A causal law in the physical sciences
is usually stated in precise mathematical terms. Such an
unambiguous law presents quite a contrast to a commonly
known "fundamental psychological law" which states:
. . . men are disposed, as a rule and on the aver­
age, to increase their consumption as their income 
increases, but not as much as the increase in their 
income.
The ambiquity of such a formulation illustrates that social 
facts are 1 ) more complex, 2) less repeatable, 3 ) often only
^ Ibid. , pp. I4.68-I4.69.
^3john Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, 
Interes t and Money, Harcourt, Brace and World, TTew York, 1^3°, 
p. % .
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indirectly observable, ) exhibit greater variability, and 
£) are extremely difficult to isolate.^ Thus, an extremely 
interesting idea appears that is far from obvious. Laws are 
ex post conceptualizations that report historical fact. 
Physical events are simply more regular and have fewer 
exceptions than social events. As a result, their ex post 
laws are more exact.
These problems, along with associated difficulties such 
as the value-oriented bias to be discussed in chapter three, 
make exact predictions impossible in the social sciences. 
Therefore, management and organization theory must define 
its criteria for accurate prediction allowing for a wider 
range of error than physics. This argument may be hypothet­
ically illustrated by allowing X̂ . +  ̂ to be the actual value 
of variable X in time period t + l. Then, the prediction of 
X t + i will be considered correct if
Xt - e < X t + X t + e 
where X^ is the prediction made at time t and e is an arbi­
trary variable chosen by the predictor to indicate the
^Morris Cohen, "Reason in Social Science," in Feigl 
and Brodbeck, cit. . pp. 663-6614.,
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25maximum allowable error. In a "closed" physical system the 
magnitude of the variation between Xt and + ^ is usually 
quite small. Unfortunately, the same statement cannot be 
applied to essentially "open" social systems.
Thus, the unique nature of the social, and therefore 
management, sciences requires that the arbitrarily small 
maximum allowable error (e) be somewhat larger than in the 
natural sciences. Nevertheless, there is nothing inherently 
ascientiflc about the subject matter of management and organi­
zations. As Gulick ha3 noted, such an assertion involves cer­
tain "obligations of faith." If the social sciences are to 
be considered scientifically structured fields, obligations 
are heaped upon them to mark the boundaries of their appli­
cation, define their terms, gather and organize relevant 
facts and elaborate fundamental and subordinate theories sub- 
ject to the tests of fact and logic. Because of these 
"obligations," the theorists of organizations have sought
2^Emile Grunberg, "The Meaning of the Scope and External 
Boundaries of Economics," in Sherman Roy Krupp, editor, The 
Structure of Economi c Science t Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey, I960, p. llj.9 and Morris Cohen, "Reason in 
Social Science," in Piegl and Brodbeck, o£. cit. . p. 669.
Luther Gulick, "Management Is A Science." Academy of 
Management Journal. Vol. VIII, No. 1 (March, 1965}, P . 13•
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assistance via physical and biological analogies to social 
27phenomenon. The following section will discuss one of the 
most influential attempts at analogy and point out the prom­
ises and dangers of such measures.
Behaviorism and Scientism
Modern interest in the "behavioral sciences" has created
a serious semantic problem for the student of management and
organizations. Lest there be any such confusion in the present
study, it is necessary to make clear initially how the term
"behaviorism" is used in this paper. Behaviorism is not the
psychological, sociological and anthropological acts of man.
Instead it is a methodological reaction against traditional
introspection. Emile Durkheim summarizes the behaviorist.'s
position as follows:
The social realm is a natural realm which differs 
from others only by a greater complexity. Now 
it is impossible that nature should differ radi­
cally from itself in one case and the other in 
regard to which is most essential. The funda­
mental relations that exist between things . . . 
cannot be essentially dissimilar in the differ­
ent realms.
^?For an interesting biological analogy see Waino W. 
Soujanen, "Management Theory: Functional or Evolutionary,"
Academy of Management Journal. Vol. VI, No. 1 (March, 1963), 
pp. 7-17.
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In other words, behaviorism contends that sense experi­
ence, which conveys to man information about physical events, 
provides all the necessary data concerning the behavior of 
one's fellow man. Analysis of the way one's fellows react
to various stimuli does not differ essentially from the way
28inanimate objects react to stimuli. Therefore, stimulus-
response and behaviorism are synonymous. Behaviorism is a
natural science that takes the whole field of human adjust-
29ment as its own. Certainly this formulation bears little 
similarity to the contemporary usage of the term "behavioral 
s cience."
Although the major influential thrust of behaviorism 
came in psychology in the early 1900's, the basic concepts 
of scientism, from which behaviorism evolved, is a rather 
old methodological problem of the social sciences. Scientism 
may be regarded as the dogmatic application of the scientific 
method. Ironically, scientism is not necessarily inclusive 
of all that is scientific. In other words, the scientistic, 
as opposed to the scientific viewpoint, is very prejudiced
^°Ludwig Von Mises, Theory and History. Yale University 
Press, New Haven, Conn., 1957, p~ ^U3*
^9john B. Watson, Behaviorism. Revised ed., W. W. Norton 
and Company, Inc., Publishers, New York, 1930, p. 11.
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in that before it considers the subject, it claims to know
30the most appropriate means of investigating it. Professor 
Hayek, in what is perhaps the most detailed historical analy­
sis of scientism on record, accuses a body of scientists 
and engineers of Paris and specifically those of the Ecole
31Poly technique as being the major force of its development.-^ 
The more instrumental individuals in the scientistic move­
ment were the well known quasi-philosophers Henri de Saint- 
Simon and a young polytechnician, Auguste Comtei
Although science is a worthy objective of academic 
endeavor, there has arisen serious doubts as to the univer­
sal applicability of dogmatic scientism. Human beings, >*hich 
form the basis for organizations, are objects to be sure; but 
they are fundamentally different from any other physical ob­
ject. Thus, the question arises as to the suitability of
A. Hayek, "Scientism and the Study of Society,"
Part 1. Economica. Vol. IX (New Series). No. 35 (Aug.. 19(j-2) . 
p. 269.
31Hayek*s treatment of the subject consists of two 
series of articles in Economica. The first series is, "The 
Counter Revolution of Science,,T Parts 1, 2 and 3 in Vol.
VIII (New Series), Nos, 29, 30 and 31 dating from Feb., 19(4.1 
to Aug., 19I4-I. The second series was entitled "Scientism 
and the Study of Society," Parts 1, 2 and 3 in Vols. IX, X, 
and XI (New Series), Nos. 35, 37 and l|.l dating from Aug.,
1914.2 to Feb., 19(4(4.. A treatment of the philosophy Hayek 
opposed may be found in Raymond Bayer, Epistemologie et 
Logique. Presses Universities de France. Paris. 195k. pp.IFT2H.
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using identical methods in the analysis of inorganic objects 
and human beings.
Human!stic Sui Generis. Although several problems con­
sidered to be unique to the social sciences were discussed 
in a previous section, the most challenging has been reserved 
until now. This issue is no less than the basic nature of 
man himself. Man has purpose to his action; inorganic objects 
do not. The objects of the natural sciences react to stimuli 
according to regular patterns. A ball dropped from a high 
position will fall according to definite and determinant laws 
of gravitation and physics. There is no such regularity in 
the actions of man. The most general prerequisite of human
behavior is a state of dissatisfaction and the possibility
32of removing or alleviating it by taking action. Therefore, 
the subject matter of the study of management and organiza­
tions is fundamentally different from the subject matter of 
physics, chemistry and astronomy.
Although purposeful human action vis-a-vis nonpurposeful 
physical object response to stimuli is complicating enough,
3^Ludwig Von Mises, Epistemological Problems of Economics. 
D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc. , New York, i960, pT and 
John Neville Keynes, The Scope and Method of Political Economy 
l4.th ed. , Kelley and Mi liman, Inc., New YorIT7 1955, P- 85"̂
there is an additional problem that must be discussed briefly. 
This is the problem of expectation.-^ Individuals do not 
exist within a vacuum. The actions of man are influenced, 
to some extent, by one's evaluation of the possible reactions 
of others to his anticipated behavior. In spite of the 
increasing use of "game theory," one often wonders if the 
full importance of this assertion is appreciated. If a true 
understanding of human action requires, as this writer believes 
it does, an understanding of the "psychic state"^ of others, 
then it becomes necessary to impute one's expectations into 
his fellow man. In other words, action is co-determined in 
that the behavior of one individual is influenced by the 
prior and expected action of others. Therefore, for any true 
predictive science of human and organizational behavior, one 
must consider the effects of changing expectations upon pre­
dicted action.
The doctrine that man is the one unique object in the 
universe whose behavior cannot be explained within the frame-
33}jerbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior, 2nd ed., 
Macmillian Company, New York, 1957, p.
3^-Ernest Nagel, Logic Without Metaphysi cs . The Free 
Press, Glencoe, 111., 1956, pp. 3^2-363.
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35work for all others is, of course, a rather old contention. 
Within the area of management this very point has been 
argued by Oliver Sheldon who stated "Where human beings are 
concerned scientific principles may be so much waste paper." 
Admittedly, it is the faith of science that sufficiently 
general and objective principles can be found to cover all 
situations and that through these principles "reasonable" 
predictions can be m a d e . ^  One wonders, however, if the 
imputation of subjective expectations is sufficient cause to 
disbar the study of human behavior, in and out of organiza­
tions, from the domain of science. In fact, it seems that 
the prohibition of expectation imputation would severely limit 
such a science.
Limitations of Pure Behaviorism. Any methodological 
position that reduces the actions of man to a simple stimulus- 
response relationship is questionable. Behaviorism offers no 
explanation which may be tested; it simply describes and must,
35George A. Lundberg, "The Postulates of Science and Their 
Implications in Sociology," in Natanson, o£_. cit. , p. [̂ 7.
^Oliver Sheldon, The Philosophy of Management. Sir Isaac 
Pittman and Son, Ltd., New York, 1930, pp~ 35-36 and Elton 
Mayo, The Social Problems of An Industrial Civilization. 
Graduate School of Business Aclministration of Harvard Univer­
sity, Boston, Mass., pp. 3-33*
37Lundberg, loc. cit.
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1 fttherefore, be satisfied with the mere recording of events.
Scientism is not only limited but extremely dangerous
assuming that the preservation of individual freedom is one
objective of systematic organization theory. Hayek points
out that in addition to the limitations imposed via the
transferability of natural methods to the social areas
39scientism breeds "social engineering."-^ Comte's own state­
ment that "the purpose of the establishment of social philos­
ophy is to reestablish order in society" reveals the dangers 
involved. Scientific management provides all too clear a 
picture of the limitations and dangers discussed. Taylor 
assumed that science provided solutions to all the problems 
of man. He made it clear that his objective was:
To prove that the best management is a true science 
resting on clearly defined laws, rules and princi­
ples as a foundation. And further to show that the 
fundamental principles of scientific management are 
applicable to all kinds of human activity.^
f̂t ̂ Von Mises, Epistemological Problems of Economics, op. 
ci t., p . 66.
^Hayek, "The Counter-Revolution of Science," Part 2, 
op. cit., p. 31^*
^Frederick W. Taylor, The Principles of Scientific 
Management. Harper and Brothers Publishers, New York, 1923, 
p. 77
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Dwight Waldo in an outspoken manner states that:
Measurement is in fact the criterion of genuinely 
scientific research and . . .  in the spirit of the 
scientific maxim, when we can measure, then we know, 
the assumption is made that measurement solves prob­
lems .^1
Morris Cooke also voices a rather dogmatic statement:
We shall never fully realize either the visions of 
Christianity or the dreams of democracy until the 
principles of scientific management have permeated 
every nook and cranny of the working world.
And finally, Harrington Qnerson proclaims "it is not men, 
materials, money, machines and methods that count, but far 
more potently theories and principles. "̂ -3
Taylor, his followers and scientific management were 
guilty of applying their own form of "methodological scien­
tism," whereby the insights of science were applied suc-
U4cessively to metals, materials, men and society. Although 
tremendous advances toward efficiency were made during this
^Dwight Waldo, The Administrative State . The Ronald 
Press Company, New York, 194-8, p .
L. Cooke, "The Spirit and Social Significance of 
Scientific Management," Journal of Political Economy. Vol.
XXI, No. 8 (June, 1913), P- 493-
^Harrington Emerson, The Twelve Principles of Efficiency. 
The Engineering Magazine Company, New York, 1913, p. 8.
^4-Robert T. Golembiewski, Men. Management and Morali ty. 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 19657 P* 32 and E. H. 
Anderson, "The Scientific Revolution and Its Impact on Modern 
Economics." The Southern Economic Journal, Vol. XXIII, No. 3 
(Jan., 1957), p.~Z3T-
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era, one cannot help but wonder what the present state of 
management knowledge might be today if a less dogmatic route 
had been followed.
Perhaps the picture painted is too dark and the case 
against scientism too strong. Stuart Chase, fortunately, 
has stated a position that is undoubtedly the most desirable 
of all, given the nature of social subject matter. Chase 
rejects dogmatic scientism in favor of what one might call 
the ’’scientific attitude" which is simply the epitome of 
skepticism. This attitude requires that all scientific 
findings be developed in a manner open to examination by all.^ 
It is the attitude which allows one to accept those techniques 
which prove valuable and reject those which do not.
What then is the proper methodology for the science of 
management organizations and what elements can it select 
from associated disciplines? Must the development of such a 
science await a Francis Bacon of its own to light its way? 
Fortunately, organization theory need not grind to a halt 
and await such a man primarily because it can borrow from the 
methodological experiences of other areas of study. It has 
been argued that the methods of the physical sciences are not 
especially useful in dealing with problems of society. But
^Chase, o£. cit. . pp. 6-7.
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the study of management and organizations is a synthetic
k6discipline which obtains its concepts from many areas. 
Therefore, the methodology of any single science, regardless 
of what it may be, is inadequate for the problems management 
must face. The following section will attempt to expose the 
issue of organizational membership as an economic problem, 
not economics in the fashionable terminology associated with 
monetary inducements, but rather as a problem of choice and 
allocation of limited resources among competing demands.
Economics of Organizational Memberships
Economic decisions {referring once again to problems of 
choice) are the fundamental decisions men and organizations 
face. From the viewpoint of the individual, the contention 
that man is more than an "economic man" is so obvious that 
it needs little explanation.^"® gut to argue or concede that 
man is motivated by more than money does not invalidate the
^ N e i l  H. Jacoby, "The Role of the University in Manage­
ment Research," in Koontz, ojd. cit. , p. 208.
^ S o m e  basic work has been done in this area by Rocco 
Carzo, Jr. and John N. Yanouzas, Formal Organizations, Richard 
D. Irwin, Inc., and the Dorsey Press, Homewood, 111., 1967, 
pp. i4.76-l4.86. However, the analysis in this paper bears only 
slight resemblance to their formulation.
^"®J. J. Spengler, "Generalists Versus Specialists in 
Social Science: An Economist's View," The American Polltical
Science Review. Vol. XLIV, No. 2 (June, 1*550) , pT 3^T*
^0
basic truth that man must choose between competing ends such
as economic prosperity and uninhibited personal freedom.
Alternatively, organizations may be looked upon as a collection
of scarce means of production fit for alternative uses. It is
the function of management, then, to use these resources in the
h.9most responsible way possible. Therefore, a prospective 
organization member and an organization may be viewed as two 
parties, each of which possess certain "goods" the other 
desires.
The individual seeks economic, security, status and ego 
need satisfaction, some of which may be satiated within an 
organization while others must be satisfied without. By 
entering an organization, one may find wealth and security, 
but leisure obtained by a restriction of organizational partic­
ipation may provide status and self-realization. Thus, one 
must choose between membership and nonmembership, leisure and 
work.
The organization must also make a choice. Its choice is 
between the contributions the prospective member can make and
h.9^ J. L. Meij, "Management, A Common Province of Different 
Sciences," Management International Review. No. 5 (1962), pp. 
39-ij.O and Paul J. Gordon, "Transcend the Current Debate on 
Administrative Theory " Academy of Management Journal. Vol.
VI, No. ij. (Dec., 1963), pp. ^90-'j^l.
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the corresponding dysfunctional consequences such as risks 
of premature forced retirement as a result of disability, 
etc. Organizational membership becomes a problem of exchange-- 
exchange between the prospective member and the organization 
with respect to the advantages and disadvantages of membership 
as opposed to nonmembership.
In order to develop the analytics of the proposed model, 
the following assumptions are advanced:
1. Both the prospective member (P) and the organiza­
tion (L) are utility maximizers.
2. P has limited energy (E) that can be expended in 
the pursuit of work and leisure or membership (M) 
and nonmembership (N). L has limited resources 
with which to obtain the services of P.
3. A uniform time period spent in membership requires 
twice the energy expenditure as that spent in non­
membership. A unit of energy is signified by the 
symbol (U).
i|.. The order of preference between membership and non­
membership is determinant.
Figure 2 reveals the preference map (system of indifference
curves) for the perspective member. Curve Ij shows the locus
of all points along which the individual's utility is constant.
Curve I2 shows a constant but higher level of utility while
Iq reveals a constant but lower utility level. Curve 1-̂  also
illustrates that P is indifferent between a combination of
Mi, N-l and M2 , N2 units of "membership" and nonmembership"







to reach the highest curve possible (I2 ). Unfortunately, 
this is easier said than done because of the energy constraint 
noted in assumption two. In other words, the I curves show 
what P is willing to do while line E/U, E/2U shows what he 
is able to do. The construction of E/U, E/2U is quite simple 
in that point E/U shows the obtainable quantity of "non­
membership goods" if all energy were expended on leisure 
while E/2U represents exactly the same situation if all 
energy were expended on work. The slope of the line illus­
trates the fact that each unit of "membership goods" requires 
twice the energy as a unit of "nonmembership goods."
The slope of an I curve at any point represents the 
amount of N that P is willing to sacrifice for an additional 
unit of M and will be called the marginal rate of substitu­
tion of M for N or (MRSĵ j). The slope of the "energy con­
straint," E/U, E/2U, represents the amount of N that P would 
have to give up for an additional unit of M or
f ^ j  = (E/U) (2U/E) = 2U/U
Once again referring to Figure 2 it may be noted that 
at point A the amount of N that P is willing to give up 
( M R S ^  is greater than the amount it is necessary for him 
to sacrifice (2U/U) as measured by the slopes of the respective 
lines. Being a utility maximizer, P would gladly give up the
kk
necessary units of N at this point for an additional unit of 
M because by doing so his utility would be increased. Only 
at point B where MRSj^ - 2U/U is P at equilibrium for at this 
point, the amount of N he is willing to give up is equal to 
the quantity he must give up for an additional unit of M.
Thus, P obtains an equilibrium, but what about the organiza­
tion? What additional conditions are necessary before both 
parties reach a point of exchange or simultaneous equilibrium?
It has been previously noted that P can join the organiza­
tion (L) if and only if L has a need for his services. To 
illustrate this "exchange reciprocity" an "organization 
Edgeworth-Bowley box," which is familiar to economic theory, 
may be constructed. In Figure 3 the same preference map shown 
in Figure 2 is illustrated while a corresponding organization 
preference map is rotated l80° and superimposed on P's map 
forming a box. The indifference curves of P are convex to 
0 and the curves of L are convex to 0*. Also, the "box" has 
been constructed so that the quantities 0M and ON represent 
the combined holdings of "membership" and "nonmembership" 
goods for both parties.
Assuming that the "goods" are distributed initially at 
point K*, it can be seen that P possesses On-̂  units of N and 
Om^ units of M while L holds n^N of N and m^M of M. At this 
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MRSmn for L is less than the MRSj^j for P, as indicated by 
the slopes of the respective curves. Individual P can sac­
rifice more units of "nonmembership goods" for an additional 
unit of "membership goods" than bhe organization requires. 
Because of this, either one or both of the parties may bene­
fit from exchange. If exchanges of N 1s by P for M's from L 
followed IQ , P would be no worse off because he would remain 
on a curve of constant utility (I0 ), but the organization 
would become increasingly well off as it is moved from curve 
JQ to higher curves J-̂  and finally J2 as exchange advanced 
toward point X.
An example of such an exchange would be the young shift 
worker who, by virtue of his lack of seniority, is required 
to work the "extra board." In many cases the individual does 
not work an entire forty-hour week. However, jobs are avail­
able on "undesirable" shifts and operations, and it is well 
known that those "extras" who accept these assignments are 
placed in regular positions sooner than those who do not. As 
a result, P might accept the "dirty" jobs although leisure 
may be worth just as much due to the extreme inconveniences 
such jobs create. His total utility is not decreased because 
the increased utility of additional M is just offest by the 
decreased utility of fewer N with resultant change in 
utility equal to zero. The organization in this case receives 
all the benefit of P's increased work.
U7
It is also conceivable that the exchange may take place 
along JQ in which case P would receive all the benefit and 
the total utility of the organization would remain constant.
The first example that comes to mind of this type of exchange 
relates to the faculty member who leaves a teaching position 
to complete his terminal degree. The disutility of resched­
uling classes, temporary appointments and a salary increase 
sufficient enough to insure his return upon completion may 
be just enough to equal the increased utility of an additional 
terminally qualified faculty member. Thus, the faculty mem­
ber receives the benefits of the exchange.
These are extreme theoretical examples because the dis­
utility of a sacrifice will seldom, if ever, exactly equal 
the utility of attainment. In most cases exchange will pro­
ceed from K to Y; the exact path of which is determined by 
the relative bargaining powers of the two parties. Regardless 
of the path between these extremes, both parties will increase 
their total utility until some point on XYZ is reached. At 
any point along this line the MRSj^ for one party is equal to 
the MRSĵ jjj of the other so that no additional exchange may take 
place without at lea3t one party's total utility being reduced. 
Thus, XYZ is the line toward which exchange progresses, but 
once it is attained, exchange will cease and an equilibrium 
will be established. Therefore, the equilibrium condition
for exchange is that the MRSj^ of one party be equal to the 
MRSj^ of the other or that an indifference curve of one is 
tangent to an indifference curve of another. At this point, 
the maximum amount of N that P is willing to sacrifice for 
an additional M is just equal to the minimum amount of N 
that L would accept in exchange for an additional M. Sub­
jectively, this is the point that is reached when P applies 
for membership in L and L accepts P ’s employment. For this 
reason the writer refers to line XYZ as the "organization 
membership contract curve."
In spite of the fact that this model is abstract and 
extremely theoretical, its ramifications are evidenced daily 
in organizational life. But the point to be made is the 
underlying similarity between the concept of rational choice 
so familiar in micoreconomic theory and the psychological 
decision to become associated with an organization. It is 
a matter of economics and the allocation of limited resources 
among competing uses. A choice must be made between the rela­
tive advantages and disadvantages of membership and nonmember­
ship. In this case, the choice is no different than the deci­
sion to purchase good^ or good2 « The process is psychological 
and the choice sociologically influenced, but the problem is 
economic, and organization theorists would seriously err to 
forget this fundamental formulation.
1*9
No doubt social research has done much to destroy the 
concept of the "economic man," but it has left undamaged the 
rationale of the utility maximizer and the basic theorems of 
resource allocation. In view of this, the methodology of 
economics should provide many interesting analogies from 
which management and organization theory may borrow.
General Semantists As Epistemological Dualists
To this point several epistemological problems of manage­
ment and organizations have been noted; yet, the issues devel­
oped dealt with the nature of the subject matter Itself (the 
"knowable") and with the inexact or probabilistic nature of 
the resulting examinations in social theory (the "knowledge"). 
Thus, there remains the process of knowing, which to this 
point has remained untouched by the analysis. Initially, it 
becomes necessary to theoretically examine the actual process 
by which objective phenomena come to be known to man while 
postponing topics relating to the merit of the specific pro­
cesses until the next section of the paper.
At one time many philosophers advanced a position that 
has come to be known as episteraological monism. Basically, 
this argument asserts that when things are known they are 
identical, element for element, with the content of the 
knowing state. Although few subscribe explicitly to this
-^McEwen, o£. cit.. pp. 7-8.
position today, it is all too obvious that everyone from 
time to time confuses the perception of an object with the 
object itself. In other words, one often acts as if percep­
tual reality is identical to objective reality. What is more 
obvious perhaps is the confusion of the words (symbols) used 
to describe perceived events and the reality that actually 
exists.
The general semantists have labored long searching for 
the relationship between language, thought and action and 
have taken a position counter to empistemological monism.
One might call their argument epistemological dualism which 
asserts that whatever knowledge one has of real objects or 
occurrences is only indirect and representative of objective 
reality. Thus, the datum whereby one knows any object is 
not identical with the object known. Obviously, the logical 
extension of this argument is that if the sense datum differs, 
the symbols used to represent the object are even more dif­
ferent. This is as one would expect since if perception 
varies from reality, symbols explaining perceptual images 
must vary from the image which is already at variance with 
the existing event. Dualism reveals that in all situations 
the scientific context in which objects are found is a tri­
adic relationship involving 1 ) a "mind" which interprets,
2) some specific objective occurrence and 3 ) some "sign”
51
51which represents the occurrence. Such a relationship is
not at all unfamiliar to the general semantists. Figure k
52is representative of their argument.
Deviating somewhat from the traditional explanation, 
suppose the referent is an objective occurrence, either 
physical or social. It is the thing that actually happens; 
Korzybski's "mad dance of electrons."^5 Although there is 
objectiveness, it must pass through the observer's perceptual 
process before it becomes known. This so called "fact" that 
is observed is not as concrete as it may seem. When percep­
tion takes place, thought occurs; and although it is uncon­
scious, only certain characteristics of the occurrence are 
retained. To fail to recognize this is to commit the "fallacy 
of misplaced concreteness."^ All such "facts" are detached 
from their context by an abstraction process so that it is 
not possible to grasp all the aspects of any given event.
Abstraction does not stop here, however, because phenom­
ena recorded only in one's mind are of little use to anyone,
^ Ibid. . pp. 8-9 .
^ C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning. 
Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., New York, 1$23~ pp. 11-15*
^ A l f r e d  Korzybski , Science and Sanity, 3rd ed. , The 
Institute of General Semantics, Lakevilie, Conn., 194-8, PP* 306-^12.
-^Alfred Schultz. "Common Sense and Scientific Investiga­






SOURCE: Diagram obtained from C. K. Ogden and I. A.
Richards. The Meaning of Meaning, Harcourt. Brace and World, 
New York, 1^23, P. 11.
FIGURE k 
TRIADIC NATURE OF SYMBOLS
save the recorder. The observer must, therefore, report the 
recorded data which requires additional abstraction. One 
must select the proper symbols to report perceptual ideas and 
no symbol is capable of representing all the characteristics 
of an event recorded in one's mind just as perception is not 
capable of sensing all there is about an objective occurrence. 
In the final analysis, the report of a physical or social 
event is at least three steps removed from the process being 
described. Only an imputed relationship exists between the 
referent and the symbol. This abstraction cannot be pre­
vented, but a lack of awareness of the process can. So, when 
the scientist accepts epistemological dualism, he abandons 
the search for "absolute truth" and seeks instead an emend- 
able system of reasonably acceptable constructs concerning 
the referent.
Philosophically there remains additional questions.
Given that abstractions are necessary and even desirable in 
some cases and assuming further that perfect knowledge about 
any "mad dance of electrons" is impossible, what is the most 
accurate route to knowledge? How does one know what causes 
conflict in organizations, and furthermore how does one report
^McEwen, loc. cit.
Sk­
ills findings once a hypothesis is formed? Some argue that 
basic truths about man provide the foundation via deductive 
logic for all knowledge. At the moment when man began to 
argue such points and to raise questions as to the most 
accurate span of the triangle from referent to symbol, 
epistemology was born.
Observations on Epistemology
Reported accuracy is the final stage of science. The
inclination of man to treat words as materially connected
with objects rather than simply the symbols, as in
principia m a t h e m a t i c a causes untold intellectual and
academic problems. Identification via similarities, even
at the expense of important differences, is perhaps the
heart of the confusion between SCIENCEnatura-|_ and
SCIENCEe . .  s o c i al
It is equally erroneous, however, to neglect the simi­
larities between the two "SCIENCES" since there are only two 
starting points for the acquisition of knowledge: deduction
^Merle B. Turner, Philosophy and the Science of 
Behavior, Appleton-Century-Crofts. Publishers. iJew York. 
1967, p. 107.
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57and induction. The following diagram, Figure 5, illustrates 
the logically valid epistemological positions. Noting first 
the right half of the diagram, one observes the deductive 
method. The initial step is to abstract certain theoretical 
propositions from the real world in order to simplify the 
complexity of reality. For instance, one might decide to 
deal with only the economic aspects of the motivation of man. 
Of course, it is possible to recognize that motivation is 
more than economic, but in order to simplify this very com­
plex situation, only certain aspects are explicitly analyzed. 
After establishing the basic premises and constructing the 
necessary "abstract propositions," a logical model is con­
structed on the basis of which a deductive argument is formu­
lated. Although realism is important, the logical argument 
often places a greater emphasis on the logical consistency 
between premise and conclusion than on correspondent prac­
tical reality. The deductive method moves from the general 
propositions of theoretical abstraction to the specific 
phenomenon to be described or explained.
Inductive reasoning also begins with the real world.
However, its abstractions are experimental in that experi­
ments are designed to observe only certain aspects of reality.
57Feibleman, op. cit. . p.
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NOTE: C. E. Ferguson, Microeconomic Theory. Richard
D. Irwin, Inc., Homewood, 111. , 1966, p. l(..
FIGURE 5 
THE LOGICAL METHODS OF SCIENCE
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It should be noted that the word "abstraction” is used because 
the process of experimentation necessarily attempts to hold 
certain things constant while concentrating on others deemed 
to be of primary interest. By way of the experiment, numer­
ous observations are made and the results are given statis­
tical or probabilistic interpretation. Thus, one refers or 
projects the characteristics of the "whole" based on observa­
tions of its "parts" and correspondingly moves from the spe­
cific to the general.
With a stated objective of this paper being the rela­
tionship between general semantics and methodology, it 
becomes necessary to translate the above distinction into 
a psychic process so that the association between the refer­
ent and thought may be noted and the stage set for the
following discussion. Figure 6 represents the structure of
science regardless of one's epistemological sympathies.
In the illustration, sensory elements are labeled
"protocal experience” which form a P-field, and any purely
rational constructs are designated as concepts forming a 
58C-field. Protocals are given from without and are cap­
able of perception. Rules” for passing from the protocal to
^®Henry Margenau, "What Is A Theory," in Krupp, op.







Range of Rationalism J
NOTE: The above diagram was adapted in part from Henry
Margenau, "What Is A Theory?" in Sherman Roy Krupp, editor, 
The Structure of Economic Science. Prentice-Hall, Inc., Engle- 
wood Cliffs, New Jersey, 19b6, p. 30.
FIGURE 6 
THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE
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the concepts or constructs are called "rules of correspon­
dence. In the diagram, double lines designate rules of
correspondence, circles are concepts, and single lines 
between concepts depict logical connections relating one 
concept with another. Measurement proceeds along double 
lines while reasoning and theoretical analysis move along 
the single ones. A theory, therefore, becomes a complex 
of circles (concepts) together with the double lines (rules 
of correspondence) that connect them to the P-field.*"^
This, then, is the critical point from the position of the 
general semantists qua epistemological dualist; one's con­
ception of the material world is subjective; but not 
entirely so, for there would be no such subjective impres­
sions unless there was an objective process to which it 
r e f e r r e d . k1 This objective-subjective relationship creates 
a duality which lies at the base of numerous communication 
di ffi culti es .
Appealing as it may be, the above explanation is not 
acceptable _in toto to one group of philosophers known as the 
rationalists. Their fundamental point, which is well taken, 
is that observations would be nothing but clumsy accumulations
5^Ibid., p . 29.
60Ibid., p. 30.
>̂1Peibleman, oja. cit. , p. 252.
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of disconnected occurrences, a heap of confusion if it were
not clarified, arranged and interpreted by the systematic
6 2prior rationality of man's mind. This basic rationality 
is represented by the small circles and comes before experi­
ence or the P-field. It is this logic that makes the P-field 
meaningful so that the rules of correspondence may be con­
structed in order to relate the C and P-fields. Although 
this is not inconsistent with the dualistic contention 
(since, according to the rationalists, reality is not neces­
sarily material but may be manipulations of the mind), it 
does raise serious questions concerning the strictly empirical 
nature of a science of management and organizations. In view 
of this, the remaining portion of this section is devoted to 
an analysis of the basic epistemological positions most evi­
dent in the contemporary study of organizations.
Constructs of Empiricism
Like any other philosophical position, empiricism is 
simply a name used to represent a whole series of arguments; 
but for purposes of illustration, an extreme position known 
as ultra-empiricism will be examined. Perhaps the most
k^Ludwig Von Mises, Human Action, Yale University Press, 
New Haven, Conn., 191+9, p . 1+1.
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informative testimony of this position is given as follows.
If one designates the process of science to consist of 
assumptions (A), theory (B), and consequences (C), there 
must exist no empirical difference between the three. In 
other words, empirically A = B = C. If one takes the set of 
assumptions (A+) in which A + D A  (meaning A is a proper subset 
of A+ or that there are some elements in A+ not present in A), 
one would reject that part of A+ not present in A since A+ ^
B ^ C. Also, if C O C -  the authenticity of C- does not vali­
date A and B because not all of C is confirmed. In Samuelson's 
own words:
If C has complete empirical validity then bully for 
it, and bully for B and its assumptions A. But we 
cannot say bully for A+ in the same sense unless i s  
full content A+ = B+ = C+ is also empirically valiu.°M-
A1though more will be said concerning the empirical vari­
ability of assumptions, the above quotation serves the purpose 
of illustrating the argument of the ultra-empiricists. Indi­
viduals who advocate this position are not content with logi­
cal tests resulting from a deductive process, but insist upon 
direct empirical verification. To them testability means
6 ̂̂ The content of the argument was taken from Paul A. 
Samuelson, "Comments on Ernest Nagel's Assumptions in Economic 
Theory," in Joseph E. Stiglitz, editor, The Collected Scientific 
Papers of Paul A. Samuelson. Vol. II, The M.I.T. Press, Cam- 
bridge, Mass., 1966, pp. 1775-1777.
6^-Ibid.
direct confirmation of objective data obtained by sense obser- 
vation. Concepts are based on sense impressions and theories 
result from the inductive process consisting of the generali­
zations of propositions on the basis of the examination of 
specific cases.^ Such is the extreme position of ultra­
empiricism. Epistemologically, it argues that perceptual 
knowledge is the ultimate datum standing in need of no expla­
nation whether with reference to the heteronomous activity of
ZL <7
the mind or in any other manner. However, before examples 
of such a position can be applied to concrete examples in 
organization theory, it is necessary to provide a brief his­
torical perspective of its development.
AftHis torical Perspective. Empiricism has a long history. 
For Protagoras {1+50 B.C.) knowledge and sensation were identical
^Fritz Machlup, "The Problem of Verification in Economics, 
The Southern Economics Journal. Vol. XXII, No. 1 (July, 1955),
p. 8.
Herbert G. Hicks and Friedhelm Goronzy. "On Methodology 
in the Study of Management and Organizations," Academy of 
Management Journal. Vol. X, No. 1+ (Dec., 1967), p. 373,^. 
Cornelius Benjamin, "Is the Philosophy of Science Scientific?" 
Philosophy of Science. Vol. XXVII, No. 1; (Oct., I960), p.
356 and MarTo Bunge, "The Place of Induction in Science," 
Philosophy of Science. Vol. XXVII. No. 3 (June. I960), p.
67Nikunja Vihari Banerjee, Language. Meaning and Persons, 
George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London, 19o3, p. llj-.
AftMost of the historical background may be found in 
Churchman and Ackoff, o£. cit. , pp. 50-71+.
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and Aristotle after "solving the problems of deduction" in 
Prior Analytics. turned to inductive problems in his 
Posterlori Analytics1 But the first systematic effort to 
establish empiricism as a philosophy of science was made by 
John Locke (1632-170^4-) *
Basically, Locke's argument began by defining "simple 
ideas" which are supplied to the mind directly by sensation, 
because reason, according to him, could not manufacture but 
only manipulate ideas. Thus, as the argument goes, these 
simple ideas precede all rational processes. Later modifi­
cation of his theory allowed for "compounding" which made 
possible the union of simple ideas into more complex ones.
George Berkely questioned Locke's "simple ideas" and 
argued that they depend on experinece, not sensation, with 
experience being the more complex of the two because it 
contained memory and generalization. Thus, according to 
Berkely, one sees only a "variety of light and colors." 
Based on these arguments, the idea that man's mind is a 
tabula rasa (blank tablet) upon which experience writes was 
developed.
John Stuart Mill rejected in principle "any supposed 
modes of philosophizing, which do not profess to be founded
6U
69upon experience." He obviously made an exception in the
case of logic and mathematics. More recently, Karl Marx
objected to rational or logical sciences arguing that logic
70was class determined and advocating a form of polylogism.
Although he offered no empirical alternative to the rational
methodology of science, Marx is mentioned because of his
extreme distrust of reason. Historically, one might say
that the empiricists of management and organization theory
have a rather rich heritage.
A Posteriori Organization Theory. Recent advances
toward a theory of organizations have brought with them an
increased interest in empirical research and a profound
distrust of "armchair reasoning." As one writer states:
One reason why management has not further devel­
oped as a science is because so far it has relied 
on deductive logic. It has adopted generaliza­
tions developed by educators and practitioners, 
then disseminated them to students as universals 
. . . what is needed to close the gap between 
reason and the real world is inductive logic.?-*-
k^John Stuart Mill, A Systern of Logic. 8th ed., Longman, 
Green and Company, London, 1919, Book VI, Chapter 9, Sec. 3.
70Von Mises, Human Action, op. cit., p. 31-
^Maneck S. Wadia, "Management Education and the 
Behavioral Sciences," Advanced Management, Vol. XXVI, No.
9 (Sept., 1961), p. 9.
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Roethlisberger, through hia action and by explicit state­
ment, advocates "grass root empiricism" until more facts and 
relationships are uncovered. Thus, he maintains that "the
quest for knowledge through the accumulation of facts ought
72to be the paramount objective of the behavioral sciences."
The Harvard Business School's studies at the Hawthorne 
Works of Western Electric, in which Roethlisberger partici­
pated, is praised as one of the most influential studies in 
management history. In order that some appreciation may be 
gained of the magnitude of this study, a few brief details 
will be elaborated to illustrate its empirical foundation.
The Hawthorne Studies in Chicago took place over a five- 
year period between 1927-1932 during which time over 20,000 
individuals were studied. In the beginning the general 
interest was primarily directed toward an analysis of the 
relationship between working conditions and incidents of
73fatigue and monotony. Experimental conditions were estab­
lished and many of the methods of empirical research were 
utilized including observation, personnel interview and
^Roethlisberger, "Contributions of the Behavioral 
Sciences to a General Theory of Management," in Koontz, op. 
cit., p. 6 5 .
7,JF. J. Roethlisberger and William J. Dickson, Manage­
ment and the Worker. Harvard University Press, Cambridge7 
Mass., 1956.
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modified questionnaires. On the basis of these efforts, the 
original hypothesis was found to be relatively insignificant, 
and the true importance of the social nature of man came to 
be appreciated, thus ushering in the Human Relations Era.
Another rather influential empiricist, by virtue of his 
research, is Frederick Herzberg who, after making use of a 
secondary "survey approach" in Job Attitudes: Review of
Research and Opinion. entered upon a "fresh approach" in 
The Motivation to Work. ^  In the latter work, Herzberg con* 
ducted a semi-struetured survey of 200 professional workers 
in the immediate area of Pittsburg. From this he postulated 
that the factors involved in producing job satisfaction are 
separate and distinct from the factors leading to job satis­
faction. In a later study, Work and the Nature of Man, he 
further tests his hypothesis in an effort to form "a general 
theory of work and the nature of man." Thus, Herzberg stands 
as one of the true champions of empiricism in management and 
organization theory. Like so many others, his advocation is 
not explicit but is easily inferred by the methods of his 
research.
^Frederick Herzberg, Bernard Mausner, Richard 0. Peter­
son and Dora F. Capwell, Job Attitudes: A Review of Research
and Opinion. Psychological Service of Pittsburg, 19^7 and 
frhe Motivation to Work. 2nd ed., John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 
New York, 1959.
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If one desires an explicit advocation, a somewhat emphatic 
one comes from Harold Koontz. Koontz strongly asserts that the 
principles developed by Fayol e_t. al. were not _a priori but 
based upon _a posteriori information developed through a life-
75time of experience. The assumption is that anything a 
priori is "bad." This assertion equates "a lifetime of 
experience" to "empirical knowledge" and raises some serious 
questions of its own. Specifically, need ji pos teriori informa­
tion be simply lived or must it be controlled. This analysis 
assumes that at least some systematic control must be attempted 
before such empirical data are recognized as constituting 
scientific knowledge. For unless some effort is expended 
toward control, there is no check on the selective percep­
tual processes of the observers. Therefore, the "principles" 
proposed by the traditional school, with a few exceptions, 
may be recognized as hypotheses based on experience, but the 
limited and unique experiences upon which they are founded 
hardly support their claims of universally applicable princi­
ples .
7 5̂Harold Koontz, "Making Sense of Management Theory," 
in Koontz, ojo. cit. , p. 12 and William V. Muse, "The Univer­
sality of Management," Academy of Management Journal, Vol. X, 
No. 2 (June, 196?), pp. 179-10*4-.
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Many individuals associated with the study and practice 
of management have recognized the empirical foundations of 
scientific management while others have chosen to criticize 
it as "untestable. Regardless of its testability, the 
research into "hard facts" is conceded to have been the 
underlying principle of this school of thought.^7 Emerson 
as well as Taylor referred often to observations which were
7 Ato provide the foundations of the science of management.'
There is little doubt that it was the disciples of scientific
management that initiated the systematic empirical test or
experiments in management that had for a long time been common
place in the physical sciences. The following statement by
Taylor gives some idea of the importance he attached to the
gathering of data.
The manager assumes the burden of gathering informa­
tion and all the traditional knowledge which in the 
past was possessed by the worker and then classifying, 
tabulating and reducing this knowledge to rules, laws 
and formulae.79
^Herbert A. Simon and James G. March, Organizations,
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York, 1958, p . 32.
^Lyndall Urwick, The Elements of Administration. Sir 
Isaac Pittman and Son, Ltd., London, 19^.2, p. 17.
^Emerson, o£. cit. . p. 195 and Taylor, o£. cit..
PP. 57-59.
"^Taylor, ojd. cit. . p. 36.
As pointed out previously, one of the results of the 
development of the social sciences was a serious reevaluation 
of the applicability of scientific procedures to the study of 
man. One would expect, therefore, that little empirical in­
vestigation would accompany the development of the sciences 
of society. Fortunately, or unfortunately, depending upon 
how one views such matters, a notion of this type is incorrect 
as the Hawthorne Studies illustrate. Since these studies, 
many investigations have been conducted and names like Mayo,
Likert, Cyert, Herzberg and others have become almost com-
finpletely identified with empirical methodology. As a matter 
of fact, the before mentioned attitude of Koontz concerning 
the importance of empirical investigation is most likely not 
atypical at all in the area of organizations. But, in spite 
of empiricism's appeal, one must recognize the adage "con­
temporary fashion does not alone an adequate methodology 
make."
Historicism and Problems of Bnpirical Theory. Some 
would deny altogether the possibility of deriving & pos teriori
For examples see Richard M. Cyert and James G. March,
A Behavioral Theory of the Firm. Prentice-Hall, Inc., Engle- 
wood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1963, pp. 14-7, 67, 1^9-239 and Renis 
Likert, New Patterns of Management. McGraw-Hill Book Company, 
Inc., New York, 1961.
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laws from historical experience. Empirical data, according 
to this group, deals only with the past and can never turn 
to the future. Von Mises summarizes this group's feelings 
by stating "history makes man wise, but not competent to 
solve concrete problems of the future."®^ The argument con­
tinues to call for a method that will transcend the individ­
ualistic and temporal characteristics of the fallacies of 
human perception and time.
General semantics has long attempted to make man aware 
of the perceptual problems evidenced by one's limited ability 
to recognize differences. Although perceptual variation is 
seriously denied by only a few monists, an empirical episte- 
mology must certainly contend that a significantly large 
amount of such variation does not exist. The following state­
ment should suffice to confirm this contention.
. . . Yet it is plain, the ideas they (the qualities
of the objects that affect one's senses) produce in 
the mind enter by the senses are simple and unmixed.
And there is nothing can be plainer to a man than 
clear and distinct perception, he has of those sim­
ple ideas; which being each in itself compounded, 
contains in it nothing but one uniform appearance 
or conception of the mind. ^
O nVon Mises, Epis temological Problems of Economics t op. 
cit., p. xv.
flPJohn Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Unders tanding. 
abridged and edited by Raymond Wilburn, Iih F. Dutton and 
Company, New York, 19k7, P* 3̂4-•
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This statement, postulating absolute perceptual uniformity 
with the observed, appears extremely objectionable to a gen­
eral semantist and is fundamentally at odds with current 
psychological research. The idea of the ’’mental filter"®^ 
is too well recognized to accept such a proposition. Thus, 
the first objection to a purely empirical theory of organiza­
tion-perceptual problems of observation.
Another problem area of pure empiricism could be labeled 
difficulties of "evolution and flux." Prom the viewpoint of 
general semantics, this might be called a methodological "is 
of identification" because, as Hayek so adequately argues, 
it is useless to think that observed information at a given 
moment will yield anything of use beyond that particular 
time and place.^ This appears as a relatively radical view­
point, yet, one is forced to appreciate it when one recalls 
the relative meaning of MOTIVATION]_q]_^ and MOTIVATION1933 - 
In 1913, because of the economic position of the average 
worker, the relationship between monetary incentives and 
positive motivation was more direct than it is in 1968. How­
ever, the theory is still "motivation theory" and to many the
^ R a y m o n d  v. Lesikar, Business Communication. Richard D. 
Irwin, Inc., Homewood, 111., 1968, pp. Jj.8-59.
®^Hayek, "Scientism and the Study of Society," Part. 2, 
op. cit. , p. 14.9 .
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mere similarity of the label is confusing. Motivation, then, 
as general semantics points out, is not a thing but simply a 
label. It can be defined or given meaning only in terms of 
the relationship between man and the factors in his economic, 
social, political and psychological environment.
Temporal factors are, however, not the only ones re­
quiring respect of the position of historism. Ernest Dale 
points out that universal empirical theories contact diffi­
culties when applied to the multiplicity of economic, social 
and religious organizations. As a solution he offers a rather 
"historic" answer in the form of the "comparative approach." 
This approach is concerned with a recognition of fundamental
81similarities among different situations within a given class. ' 
For instance, a theory might be developed for economic organi­
zations and another for religious organizations. It is really 
quite simple--only comparable situations should be comparedJ 
Dale's argument would contend that the Hawthorne Studies were 
interesting and adequately revealed what happened in a Western 
Electric Plant at one time and in one place. However, this 
tells one little about the administration of a university or
®^Ernest Dale, The Great Organizers. McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, Inc., New York, I960, pp. 7-12.
hospital. Of Herzberg's study in The Moti vation to Work. it 
would accept the results relative to the 200 Pittsburg accoun­
tants and engineers but would question their applicability to 
west coast dock workers. In all fairness it must recognized 
that Herzberg has expanded the universe in later studies, but 
the point is basically the same.
And finally, one further justification of this approach 
comes in the form of a renewed interest in international 
business organization. Only time will tell what type of
limited applicability problems different cultures and mores 
86will present.
Does the variability of perception disqualify empiricism 
as an adequate epistemology for the science of management and 
organizations? And even more basic, what alternative is there 
that might be employed?
Rationalism and the Theory of Organizations
The fundamental thesis of rationalism, to which school 
of philosophy the a_ prior is ts belong, is that the key to true 
knowledge is not by the evidence of sense but pure thought
87and logic. They argue as follows.
ft AWinston Oberg, "Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Manage­
ment Principles," Academy of Management Journal. Vol. VI, No.
2 (June, 1963), p . 1^2.
®7Kaufmann, o£. cit., p. 10 .
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1. Logic is not subject to the illusions of sense.
2. Results of logical reasoning from "truth" state­
ments are universally and eternally valid.
3. The only observations that are precise and inter­
sub jectively valid are those that can be formu­
lated in mathematical terms.
An epistemology founded on propositions such as these might 
be labeled the antithesis of empiricism. But, like empiricism, 
rationalistic philosophers can be seen to occupy a whole con­
tinuum, one extreme of which actually approaches empiricism.
The extreme anti-empiricists will be called "radical 
rationalists" or "extreme a priorists." Actually this group 
has an almost theological foundation in that they conceive 
the world as perfectly attributable to the order of a Divine 
Rational Being in Whose image human reason is created. Man, 
having been created in the image of God but lacking omni­
potence, is capable of understanding only part of the rational
88plan.
The impact and logic of the rationalistic or si priori 
position can be appreciated only when one recognizes what is 
actually being stated. Succinctly it is this: if one begins
with certainty and following the rules of logic deduces valid
88lbid.
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consequences, the consequences must be as certain as the
89axioms upon which they are based. Therefore, a priorism 
is more abstract in its approach than empiricism. It moves 
fr >m the general to the specific in direct opposition to 
empirical induction. However, for a mode of inquiry to be
said to be abstract from raw experience, it need not be
90thought of as taking abstract entities as its objects. In 
other words, there are no methodological reasons why explana­
tions concerning the nature of "reality" cannot be approached 
deductively although the success of deduction is predetermined, 
to some extent, by the nature of its abstract premises.
On Ultimate Givens. This section proposes to examine the 
starting point of deductive reasoning. The point of departure 
may, for lack of a better term, be called a premise. _A 
priorists have long claimed that economics and various other
sciences are based upon certain fundamental truths which are
91not subject to empirical verification. The argument
®^Rollo Handy, Methodology of the Behavioral Sciences. 
Charles C. Thomas, Publisher, SprTngfTeld, 111., 1961|, p. 25.
^Israel Scheffler, "Explanation, Prediction and Abstrac­
tion." British Journal of the Philosophy of Science, Vol.
VIII, No. 28“(Feb., 1̂ 571, p. 30TI
91por adequate support see Machlup, op. cit. , p. 5,
C . I . Lewis, Mind and the World Order, Scribner and Sons,
New York, 19^2, p. 293 and Arthur Pap, The A Priori in 
Physical Theory. King's Crown Press, New York, 19^, p. 5.
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continues that new experience can only force one to modify
or discard inferences drawn from previous experience. But
experience cannot require discarding or extensive modification
of ^  priori theorems which are not derived empirically; they
are logically prior to sense observation and can neither be
proved by corroborative experience nor disproved by exper-
92ience to the contrary. Contradictory observations can
i
force reevaluation of the logic, but if the'logic is not in 
err, it must be considered valid. But what is the nature 
of the undisputable ja priori truth and how does one recog­
nize such a truth when one sees it?
A priori truths are difficult to discuss from any point 
of view, but they are absolutely impossible to examine scien­
tifically. The reason for this is, quite frankly, that these 
"truths” are irrational, by definition. However, they are 
not irrational in the sense that is commonly associated with 
abnormality; they are simply incapable of rational examina­
tion. They are the irrational starting point of the rational 
process and are prior to rationality, thus not rational. Be­
cause of the impossibility of a logical examination of these
927 Von Mises, Epistemological Problems of Economics. 
op. cit., p. 27.
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irrational elements, some writers have chosen to call these
truths "ultimate givens."
Science, in attempting to trace every event to its cause,
acknowledges that there are limits to the human mind in search
for knowledge. Specifically, it fully recognizes that certain
phenomena cannot be traced to other phenomena. These are the
93ultimate givens. Physical science can offer no scientific 
explanation as to the cosmic existence of the basic elements 
of which everything is composed. Yet, elements do exist, 
irational (in the sense mentioned above) as they may be. All 
that can be said is that to deny their existence appears to 
the human mind as nonsense and that thinking based on such 
elements has led to satisfactory theories. "All man's actions 
are purposeful" is a proposition not subject to empirical veri­
fication since an overt action may appear as a S -+R pattern. 
Yet, purposeful behavior is a truism and psychological theories 
based upon it have proved satisfactory. Therefore, scientific 
inquiry cannot proceed beyond the limits drawn by the ineffi-
91*ciency of man's senses and the narrowness of his mind. In 
fact, the human mind is not capable of conceiving a kind of 
knowledge not limited by an ultimate given inaccessible to
^ V o n  Mises, Human Action, op. cit. , pp. 17-10.
^ V o n  Mises, Theory and History, op. cit. , pp. 8-9.
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further analysis. Thus, the scientific method that safely 
escorts man to the ultimate givens is entirely rational,
95but the ultimate given can only be termed irrational.
This, then, is the nature of the ultimate givens strongly 
supported by some and jokingly rejected by others. Assuming 
such a system, however, rather elaborate deductive formulations 
have been constructed.
Deductive Nature of the A Priori. The contemporary vogue 
in management and organization theory is empirical research.
Of this there can be no question. Yet, the rationalists speak 
of empirical theories as little more than inductive generali­
zations or simple "correlational statements" and observed
96links among protocal data. Data collection to them simply 
do63 not constitute a theoretical system. Some of these, 
while recognizing the importance of induction in physical 
analysis,reject the method when applied to the study of human 
behavior because of the unique characteristic of purposeful 
human action. Since a human may react to a stimulus one way 
at one time and in a different manner at another, inductive 
generalizations are approached with extreme skepticism.
7;?Von Mises, Human Action, op. cit. . pp. 20-21.
^Fritz Machlup, "Operationalism and Pure Theory in 
Economics," in Krupp, o£. cit. , p. 60.
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Therefore, it is evident that the rationalistic or & 
priori approach is fundamentally deductive. It is a procedure 
that begins with a base of self-evident truths and applying 
the rules of logic obtains solutions or consequences of these 
truths that may be used in prediction. Now that the philo­
sophical nature of this argument is understood, one most 
likely is asking himself questions concerning the origin of 
such an argument and is seeking a theory of organization that 
proceeds along such a route.
Historical Perspective. The basis for the empiricists’ 
reaction against rationalism can be found in history. As Von 
Mises states, "Although there was a long line of Utopians who 
drafted earthly paradises where pure reason was supreme, the 
real truth seekers never pretended reason would make man omni­
potent . "
Aristotle, in his Metaphysics. defines the striking 
importance and uniqueness of reason. Both men and animals 
have the abilities of perception and memory. Therefore, 
intelligence, defined as the ability to recognize similarity 
and difference as well as the ability to bring experience 
together in a manner so as to regulate behavior, is a pos­
session of both man and beast. But man is capable of more 
than intelligence; only he is capable of reason or that 
ability which allows one to know why things operate as they
80
do. Rational knowledge is the knowledge of why things act 
as they do, not just the knowledge that things do operate.
The practical function of such knowledge is the ability to 
anticipate experience--being able to foresee, and therefore, 
better able to consider the consequences of action before it 
is taken.^
Plato's idealism or "world of forms" would also be con­
sidered rationalistic. To Plato what is ultimately real is 
the "ideas" or forms beneath appearances which are immaterial 
entities not themself existent in the world of sense perception.
The idea, which is perfect, is the ultimate reality; whereas
98one's perception of it is not reality and is imperfect.
In addition to Plato, Aristotle and St. Thomas Acquinas
(12^0 A.D.), the main stimulus to rationalism came from the
philosophic thinkers of the l£th and 16th centuries. It
came in the form of a reaction against the dictates pressed
upon them by others whose logic could not be checked by their
99own faculties. And more recently, a less general treatment 
comes from Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason. Kant distin­
guished between the "noumenon" or the unknowable thing itself
" M a r x  W. Wartofsky, Conceptual Foundations of Scientific 
Thought. The Macmillian Company, New York, 1968, pp. 313.
" ibid. . pp. 86-87.
"churchman and Ackoff, o£. cit. . pp. 11^-17.
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and the "phenomenon" or that which is known by virtue of 
transcendental unity of apperception.^-00 His great lesson 
is that the flux of raw data would remain an unperceived 
process were it not for prior structuring according to cer­
tain categories of understanding which reify events on a 
space-time frame.'1'0'' His ja priori element of structuring 
signifies only that a conceptual framework is prior to 
experiencing an event.
But what about contemporary management theory? Are 
there examples of rationalism in its theoretical foundation?
Rationalistic Tradition in Management and Organizations- 
The study of management and organizations is like many other 
sciences in that various theories have been developed using 
the rational as well as the empirical alternative. Herbert 
Simon has developed several primarily rational and completely
deductive theories of executive compensation as well as group
102conformity and interaction.
100Turner, o£. cit. . p. 195*
101Ibid.
-| QQSee Herbert A. Simon, "Compensation of Executives," 
Sociometry. Vol. XX, No. 1 (March, 1957), pp. 32-35, "A 
Formal Theory of Interaction in Social Groups," American 
Sociological Review. Vol. XVII, No. 2 (April, 1952), pp. 
202-211 and Herbert A. Simon and Harold Guetzkow, "A Model 
of Short and Long Run Mechanism Invovled in Pressures Toward 
Uniformity in Groups." Psychological Review. Vol. LXII,
No. 1 (Jan., 1955), pp. 56-b«.
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However, the most influential formulation which utilizes 
this method is Maslow's theory of motivation.^3 jn its 
original and general formulation, it assumes the form of a 
rational theory. Initially, it makes several basic assump­
tions which could be considered quite self-evident.^^ These 
are the ultimate givens of Maslow's theory for which no empiri­
cal Justification is required.
1. Man Is a wanting animal--he always wants and 
wants more. {a priori true)
2. A satisfied need is not a motivator of behavior.
(_a priori true)
3. Man's needs are arranged in a series of levels-- 
a hierarchy of importance. (ja priori true)
Prom these three self-evident _a priori truths a complex 
and extremely general (in the sense of wide applicability) 
theory may be developed. Maslow's theory is, at least, a 
moral victory for the rationalists since no theory in the 
social sciences, either empirical or rational, comes to the 
writer’s mind as being influential.
It should also be noted that a great deal of current 
systems analysis is fundamentally deductive although it relies
103A. H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality. Harper and 
Row, Publishers, New York, 195>k-t PP* 62-106.
^^Herbert G. Hicks, 'Hie Management of Organizations. 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York7 1967, PP~ 237-238.
heavily upon empirical studies for confirmation and verifi­
cation. Why, then, is not the a priori rationalistic method 
the answer to all the methodological problems of the social 
and organizational sciences?
Limitations of Rationalism. Needless to say, the ratio­
nalists made a most respectable point of the limitations of 
empiricism in dealing with the variability of purposeful 
human action. Paradoxically, empiricism occupies a more 
"respectable" position today than does rationalism. It is 
the contention of the writer that the reason for the unpopu­
larity of rationalism is a direct consequence of contemporary 
scientific skepticism. No science enjoys the intellectual 
status of mathematics, in spite of the fact that its founda­
tions are completely a priori and its content absolutely 
abstract. No one can testify as to the existence of a 
Euclidian point (which has no magnitude) or line (with only 
length and no width) because man is unable to physically 
perceive such abstract concepts. If they are not capable of 
perception, they are certainly not capable of test. Although 
science can accept the logical perfection of mathematics, no 
other area of study has developed such precision. Therefore, 
the scientific community has been reluctant to accept any con­
tention in social areas that cannot be supported by concrete 
empirical fact.
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But why must an area in its methodological infancy such 
as management and organization theory, establish empirical 
verification as one of its scientific criteria? Surely meth­
odological infancy imposes enough limitations without con­
structing and creating additional ones.
Why An Epistemological Dichotomy?
As the general semantists have often pointed out, either 
or reasoning has caused untold communication difficulties for 
man. Dichotomous thinking has been no less destructive in 
methodology. One cannot prevent wondering why a social- 
scientific investigation must either be empirical, in which 
case the rationalists disregard it; or purely rational, 
whereupon the empiricists reject it as unfounded "armchair 
philosophizing."
It seems almost too obvious to mention that both 
systematic reasoning and sense perception are capable of 
suggesting hypotheses to be examined. After the hypotheses 
are clearly defined it may become necessary to make certain 
assumptions for the purpose of simplicity or fundamental 
underlying premises may be suggested by actual observation 
of existing conditions. Based upon these premises, deductive 
reasoning may develop a systematic explanation of cause and 
effect relationship that logically results from the set of 
assumptions or axioms, or one may infer theoretical general-
85
izationa from observed events. Once the theory becomes 
structured, observations of actual events provide a valuable 
check or test as to the validity of the theory. Obviously, 
certain premises such as those of Maslow's are not empirically 
verifiable, but the results of reasoning from such a postula­
tion may be tested. Figure 7 illustrates this iterative 
nature of deductive and inductive methods.
This "iterative approach," as the writer has chosen to 
call it, may be traced to Galileo. It contends that a hypoth­
esis is a rational idea or empirical fact to be tested by 
experience and rejected if it cannot stand the test. Such 
an argument is anti-rationalistic in that it does not accept 
the derivation of propositions from rational ideas as con­
stituting final proof. However, it is rationalistic in that 
it recognizes reason as the guiding principle in making p r e ­
dictions. Thus, it is critical of sense unguided by reason
105and critical of reason unchecked by sense. This approach
utilizes induction modestly in the framing of scientific 
hypotheses, but makes it mandatory for their test. Funda­
mentally, it redefines science as reason tempered by obser­
vation and observation impregnated by thought; it is an
^ ^ K a u f m a n n ,  ojd. ci_t. , p. 10.
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orderly construction fitted to the world of the senses, an
106experimental search for a world of order.
A bipolar orientation to epistemological alternatives 
is limiting to say the least. The value of the empirical and 
rationalistic approaches is a relative concept that may occupy 
almost any point along a continuum between the two. This state­
ment does not contend, however, that the selection between them 
and the relative weights applied to each is arbitrary. Such a 
choice requires some of the most detailed analysis that the 
social scientist is called upon to accomplish. In making this 
choice, one will find that selection is a function of certain 
variables which are:
1. The nature of the subject matter. For instance,
the fact that man's actions are purposeful com­
plicates the formation of theories based on a 
few limited observations.
2. The specific topic under consideration. A study
concerning the effect of rest periods on physical 
fatigue requires detailed observation. However, 
a theoretical question involving the psychic 
motivation of man might be examined quite success­
fully via deductive reasoning from "self-evident" 
truths.
3 . The purpose of the study. If universal theories
of organizations applicable to all forms is the 
stated purpose of an organizational science, 
deduction may be the most suitable method since
10^V. Edwin Bixenstine, "Empiricism in Latter-Day 
Behavioral Science," Science, Vol. CXLV, No. 8 (July 31, 
196J+), P. 467.
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its results are more general. Bnpirical observa­
tions of specific cases raises questions concerning 
the applicability of any single empirical theory.
[*.. Etc.
It must be noted that an emphatic etc. is included as the 
final element since there are numerous other situations that 
can influence one's exact position along the deductive- 
inductive scale.
The recommendation of methodological tolerance does not 
answer the traditional epistemological questions concerning 
the ultimate source of knowledge which has been discussed at 
length above. Obviously, there are no scientific answers to 
such questions; yet, after some deliberation, the author is 
prepared to venture an opinion which has been found to provide 
some personal satisfaction to this most frustrating issue.
If the question is concerned with ultimate knowledge, it seems 
that the rationalists do indeed possess a theoretical victory 
since "observation unilluminated by reason is sterile."107 
It seems doubtful that anyone would equate science with the 
accumulation of data since it is the inherent logical struc­
ture of the mind of man that gives initial meaning to sense
^■°^Morris R. Cohen, Reason and Nature, 2nd ed. , The 
Free Press, Glencoe, 111., 1953, P* 17, Tjalling C. Koopmans, 
"Measurement Without Theory," The Review of Economic Statis­
tics . Vol. XXIX, No. 3 (Aug., 151+7) , P ■ 151+ and W. Stanley 
Jevons, The Theory of Political Economy, Kelley and Millman, 
Inc., New York, 19577 P* 22.
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perceptions.
However, to expect scientific skepticism to accept 
unchallenged any theoretical report is equally erroneous.
Even if reason does precede experience, it is experience 
that provides the test and determines validity for modern 
management and organization theory. In other words, the 
results or consequences of a deductive theory must coincide 
with observed reality in order to be scientifically mean­
ingful. This conclusion applies only to the consequences of 
the theory, for the empirical validity of the assumptions 
upon which the theory is based is an entirely separate 
methodological question and will be discussed in the 
following section.
Now that a plea for a complementary rather than com­
petitive relationship between induction and deduction has 
been made, an additional question comes to mind. If one 
accepts, as the writer does, the proposition that human 
action is fundamentally different from any other object of 
science, one is inclined to inquire into the possibility of 
the existence of methods more suited for the analysis of man.
Toward An Adequate Eplstemology of 
Management and Organizations
Although criticized by Nagel, Maclver makes an inter­
esting point in his book Social Causation when he states:
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In the social realm the scientist enjoys the incom­
parable advantage of being immersed in the striv­
ings, purposes and goals that constitude the pecu­
liar dynamics of this area . . .  We must supple­
ment experiment and the "objective evidence" pro­
vided by the observable and measurable behavior by 
the admittedly precarious but valuable process of 
imaginatively reconstructing the hidden systems of 
thoughts, attitudes and desires to which causal 
efficacy is imputed.10°
Other influential individuals have voiced similar ideas
109relating to this unique position of the social scientist.
As a result, scientist and philosopher alike have sought 
new methods and alterations in existing ones which would be 
more clearly associated with the uniqueness of the social 
s ci ences.
The Logic of Verstehen
Referring once again to the datum labeled "ultimate 
givens" it may be seen that when the natural sciences 
encounter such data the logic of their methods is exhausted. 
Perhaps this is not true when one human being studies other 
human beings because of the simple fact that he himself is
^°®Nagel, Logic Without Metaphysics, op. cit.. p. 372.
^ ^See Paul P. Lazarsfield, "Philosophy of Science and 
Empirical Social Research," in Ernest Nagel, Patrick Suppes 
and Alfred Tarski, editors, Logic. Methodology and Philosophy 
of Science. Stanford University Press7 Stanford, Calif., 1962, 
p. 4.73 and Prank H, Knight, Freedom and Reform: Essays in
Economics and Social Philosophy. Harper and Brothers, New York, 
191+7, p. 221+.
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human. When knowledge is obtained via this process an act 
is performed which was described initially in German episte- 
mology as das spezifische Verstehen der Geisteswissenschaften 
or simply Verstehen.110 Vers tehen means understanding, but 
it is a "specific type of understanding" possible only in 
the social sciences where the observer is a member of the 
same class as the observed. Therefore, Vers tehen is the 
postulation of an intervening process located inside the 
human organism by means of which an observed event is made 
meaningful.111 According to this, the reaction or response 
to any stimuli supposes the existence of mental determinants 
or intervening variables such as memory, expectations and 
desires.11^ The physicist need worry little about the con­
scious reactions of an aircraft to a wind current. Such an 
uninvolved relationship does not exist between the inter and 
intraorganizational relations of man.
Cogni tion from Wi thin and Cogni tion from Wi thout. Nat­
ural phenomena are approached from without. The result of 
such observations is the establishment of laws of dependence
iinVon Mises, Human Action. op. cit. , pp. t|.9-50.
111Theodore Abel, "The Operation Called Verstehen," 
in Feigl and Brodbeck, ojd. cit. , p. 682.
11^Arthur Pap, An Introduction to the Philosophy of 
Science, The Free Press, Glencoe, 111. , 196"^ p"! 383.
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by which one explains the phenomena of n a t u r e . B u t  in the 
social arena cognition comes from within since the observer 
is able to understand the meaning of an act to the actor. .
Although there is no specific example of such a process 
that can be drawn from organization theory, the writer is 
inclined to believe that any theory of organization, save a 
purely behavioristic one, makes use of Verstehen. Man simply 
is incapable of "understanding" the action of others without 
at least projecting himself to some extent. An attempt to 
understand human action in organizations by observing man's 
responses to various stimuli would result in an extremely 
limited understanding if understanding resulted at all.
Imagine trying to explain interdepartmental conflict solely 
on the basis of the observed evidence of overt resentful acts 
and slowed intercommunication. Such a theory could provide 
only a description of effects with absolutely no explanation 
of causes. The predicament of the management and organization 
theorist is quite adequately expressed by Simon upon intro­
ducing a particular study.
H ^ V o n  Mises, Epistemological Problems of Economics . 
op. ci t.. p. 130.
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Lacking the kinds of empirical knowledge of the 
decisional process that will be required for a 
definitive theory, the hard facts of the world, 
can enter the theory only in a relatively unsys­
tematic way . . . but none of us are completely 
innocent of acquaintance with the gross char­
acteristics of human choice . . .  I shall feel 
free to call on this common experience as a 
source of hypothesis .-^h-
Actually, the process by which Vers tehen takes place 
or is accomplished is purely psychological and to a large 
extent quite structured. Briefly, then, an analysis of 
the process will be undertaken.
The Process. Vers tehen consists of three steps
1. Internalizing of the stimulus. At this stage the 
observer attempts to describe a situation or event 
by categorizing it and evoking personal knowledge 
which fits into this category.
2. Internalizing the response. One infers the motive 
of the act from the known or observed modifications 
it produces.
3. Behavior maxims. Certain maxims link two feeling 
states together in a uniform sequence and implies 
a functional dependence between them. The func­
tional dependence consists of the fact that the 
feeling state ascribed to a given human action is 
directed by the feeling state one presumes is 
evoked by an impinging situation or event. These 
maxims can be constructed ad hoc and be acceptable 
not because they are experimentally verifiable but 
because they are somewhat "intersubjectively self- 
evident. "
^■^Herbert A. Simon, "A Behavioral Model of Rational 
Choice," Quarterly Journal of Economics. Vol. LXIX, No. 1 
(Feb., 1955)7 p. 100.
■*-^Abel, o£. cit. . pp. 683-68I4..
9i+
Obviously, Verstehen is a product of the SGIENCEsoc^al 
rather than the SCIENCEna-t;ura]_. If, however, it is not 
purely "scientific" in the SCIENCEnaturai sense, what possi­
ble function does it perform? An example will be used to 
illustrate its usefulness.
Suppose that stimulus Sx has resulted in three differ­
ent responses R ^ , R2 and R^ with equal regularity and sev­
eral other responses (...Rn ) have occasionally occurred.
If Hi is used to designate the hypotheses which postulate 
a causal relationship between Sx and the various R.. , one 
can see that the probability of any given mutually exclu­
sive hypothesis being confirmed is:
n=3P(H-, ) = P(H? ) = P(H->) and Z P(Hi)<l
J 1=1
n=3where 1 - Z P(Hj) = uncertainty 
i=l 1
Uncertainty must be considered since the set of responses 
(R-̂ , R 2 , R-̂ ) is not collectively exhaustive of all possible 
responses. A behavioristic description can only take the 
R^ that actually occurred and relate it to Sx . However,
Vers tehen offers not only an explanation of why a given R^ 
took place but is fully capable of recognizing the possi­
bility of other R^'s and may even provide subjective prob­
abilities as to their likelihood. Thus, Vers tehen appears,
95
from the viewpoint of SCIENCE . , , to be much more fruit-3 O C X Gl-L
ful than pure behaviorism. As one would expect, however,
Vers tehen has not received universal acceptance.
Cri ti cisms of Vers tehen. Criticisms have been directed
toward -Verstehen on several counts ranging from charges of
its ascientific subjectivity to referring to it as nothing
more than empathy. As for the ascientific argument, there
116is little question as to its justification. Certainly,
if publicly testable data is the necessary condition for 
science then Vers tehen is ascientific. But this argument 
equates ascientific methods and subjectivity and requires 
that the validity of the "argument rest upon the definition 
of subjectivity. The opponents of Verstehen say it is sub­
jective because the understanding of another person's action 
depends upon private, uncontrollable and unverifiable intu­
ition on the part of the observer. However, Weber, e_t. al... 
admit it is subjective only in the sense that its goal is 
to find what the observee "means" in his actions, in con-
117trast to the meaning which the action has for the observer. 1
•^^Arthur j)anto, "On Explanation in History."
Philosophy of Science. Vol. XXIII, No. 1 (Jan., 1956), p.
IB and H. M. Blalock, Jr., "Theory, Measurement and Repli­
cation in Social Sciences," The American Journal of Sociol­
ogy . Vol. LXVI, No. I4. (Jan., 1^61), pp. 3M-3-3̂ 4-3 -
H ^ S c h u t z , Oja. ci t. . p. 214-0 .
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In the latter sense Vers tehen is simply an alternative
epistemological position, not a subjective interpretation.
Therefore, its ascientific character refers only to its
relationship with SCIENCEnaturai „ Recognizing, however,
the impossibility of complete sCIENTIFICnatura^ analysis of
purposeful behavior, Vers tehen offers an improvement upon a
purely behavioristic analysis of man.
The proposition that Verstehen is nothing more than
empathy is also a matter of definition. It seems, at least
3.3.0to the writer and others, that empathy and undeTstanding 
are two different things. It is one thing to understand the 
psychic motivation of a factory owner in early America, but 
it is quite another to appreciate or empathize with the 
"sweat shops" he created. Thus, there is a fundamental dif­
ference between understanding and approval as is quite obvious 
from the above statement.
Verstehen offers to the theorists of management and orga­
nizations an alternative to the purely scientific methods which 
have been so successful in physical analysis, but leave much 
to be desired in dealing with the unique characteristics of 
the purposeful behavior. However, one would commit the 
"fallacy of epistemological dichotomy" to advocate Vers tehen
H  6Von Mises, Human Action. op. cit.. p. 50.
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as a sole methodology; yet, its use in the formulation of 
testable hypotheses should not be discounted. The insight 
such a method gives lends dynamic meaning to observed re­
sponses and removes the "shell of uncertainty" around many, 
because only man can understand man.
On Ideal Types
Regardless of the actual method one might select for 
the analysis of socio-scientific data, more often than not 
one is faced with more variables than desired. As a result, 
something is needed to enable the social scientist to con­
centrate on the more important determinants of effects.
One particular method of concentrating on a limited 
number of variables is known as the "theory of ideal types" 
and was advocated enthusiastically by Max Weber. Weber 
s tates:
An ideal type is developed through the one-sided 
intensification of one or several aspects by 
integrating them into an immanently consistent 
conceptual representation of a multiplicity of 
scattered and discrete individual phenomena.
Ideal types are used to simplify complex situations. They
are especially useful in detecting and abstracting specific
•̂■'■̂ Von Mises, Epistemolo £k cal Problems of Economics, 
o p . cit., p. 76.
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characteristics from a complex whole and organizing them into
120a coherent scheme. In addition, they may be used to place
hypothetical rational actors in some simplified situation so 
that the consequences of their action may be deducted. There­
fore, the fundamental purpose of an ideal type is to develop 
skills in logical research and to assist in the construction
of hypotheses by noting how the main forces act upon a given
121situation. Although few recognize it, Vers tehen and ideal
types are quite complementary. As a matter of fact, Vers tehen
assumes that human action displays certain typical patterns
so that the meaning an "actor" attaches to an action can be
understood by the observer. Thus, it assumes an intersub-
jective character of commonsense knowledge.
But what exactly does the construction of "ideal types"
122accomplish? Specifically, it allows three things.
1. The arrangement of ideal types makes possible the 
analysis of standardized behavior in isolation.
That is to say, certain factors such as social 
norms or rationality may be analyzed within a 
logical framework.
1^ J .  W. N. Watkins, "Ideal Types and Historical Explana­
tions," in Peigl and Brodbeck, o£. cit. , pp. 732-733.
l^-Carl G, Hempel, "Typological Methods in the Social 
Sciences," and Max Weber, "Objectivity in Social Science and 
Social Policy," in Peigl and Brodbeck, op. cit., pp. 219 and 
396.
122Nagel, "Problems of Concept and Theory Formation in 
Social Science," ojd. cit. . p. 209.
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2. It becomes a device for ascertaining deviating 
behavior in the real social world. In other words, 
the ideal may be used as a norm from which reality 
deviates and toward the accomplishment of which 
managerial action is directed.
3 . By varying certain elements numerous rational models 
may be constructed and compared. In doing this, one 
can vary or rotate the dominant factor and deductively 
ascertain the consequences.
J4.. In addition to the three noted above, the writer thinks 
an additional factor should be mentioned. An ideal 
type may provide the framework for a more general 
theory of management. Any general theory must be 
abstract because the more closely it approximates a 
specific situation the less applicable it is to many 
varying circumstances.
Thus, ideal types are an effort to develop a more consis­
tent and complete scientific system. Obviously, scientific 
systems are never complete in that the door always remains 
open to test so that no absolute scientific knowledge is 
possible. By constructing an ideal type, however, the 
scientist, whether he be economist or organization theorist, 
is able to insure the internal consistency of his logic and 
improve his understanding of the subject matter.
Unfortunately, a theory may be internally consistent and 
false which creates special problems of its own. In other 
words, how realistic are ideal types?
Ideals and Reali ty. The construction of a representa­
tive Ideal to describe an event is essentially a search for
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"limiting or strategic factors m123 which are the primary 
determinants of the observed phenomena. There is, therefore, 
a most important question concerning how closely an ideal 
must approach reality in order to be considered a valid 
representation of the observed event. Weber maintained that 
ideal types cannot be defined as genus proximum or differentia 
specifica and that concrete cases cannot be subsumed under
T ̂  Ithem as instances. They are purely mental constructs
which have no counterpart in reality. They are a type of 
utopia that simplifies analysis. To consider them as real 
is to be guilty of the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness,"12 *̂ 
that is, the identification of theoretical constructs as 
purely perceivable occurrences. Ideal types are specifically 
designed to abstract certain elements from a set of "all" 
possible elements, therefore, a perfect description of reality 
via this method is impossible, by definition.
12^Ches ter I. Barnard, "The Environment of Decision," 
in Harold Koontz and Cyril O'Donnell, editors, Management:
A Book of Readings. McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. , 19614., 
ppl .
12^Hempel, 0£. cit. . p. 211.
12^Sherman Roy Krupp, "Theoretical Explanation and the 
Nature of the Firm," The Western Economics Journal. Vol. I,
No. 3 (Summer, 1963), p. 20l±.
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In view of this, explanation by way of an ideal type will 
at best define a range of phenomena that may result in a given 
situation; thus establishing an "applicability" theorem.
The applicability theorem, by virtue of its delineation of 
the range of possibilities, eliminates many things which are 
logically impossible under the established conditions. There­
fore, ideal types are not exhaustive descriptions of reality 
and if they were, their complexity would offer no theoretical 
improvement over the analysis of dynamic reality itself.
Ideal Types and Organizations. Herbert Simon, after 
denying the ideal economic man of classical theory, replaces 
it with an ideal satisficing model while Likert emphasizes:
. . . in working situations a wide variety of moti­
vational forces influence the behavior of man. How­
ever, in developing an integrated theory of manage­
ment it is necessary to use primarily one assump­
tion as to the character of the most pervasive moti­
vational force affecting human behavior in working 
situations.127
But perhaps the best example of an ideal type in manage­
ment and organizations is provided by Douglas McGregor's 
Theory X and Theory Y. Initially, McGregor criticizes an
1 pi’Martin Bronfenbrenner, "A Middlebrow Introduction to 
Economic Methodology," in Krupp, The Structure of Economic 
Science. op. cit., p. 10.
127 Renis Likert, "A Psychological Foundation for a 
Modified Theory of Management," Acta Psychologica, Vol.
XI, No. 1 (1955), P. 171.
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"ideal type" based on the following assumptions about indus- 
128trial man.
1. The average human being has an inherent dislike
of work and will avoid it if he can.
2. Because man dislikes work he must be coerced,
controlled, directed and threatened with punish­
ment to get him to work toward organizational
objecti ves.
3 . The average human being prefers to be directed,
wishes to avoid responsibility, has little 
ambition and desires security above all.
Based on this ideal construction, classical theory
created many dysfunctional situations. As an alternative,
129McGregor offers an ideal which assumes:
1. The expenditure of physical and mental effort in 
work is as natural as play or rest.
2. Man will exercise self-direction and self-control
in the service of objectives to which he is committed.
3 . Commitment to objectives is a function of the rewards 
associated with their achievement.
The average human being learns, under proper condi­
tions, not only to accept but to seek responsibility.
f>. Creative ability is widely, not narrowly, distributed 
in the population.
6 . Under modern industrial life, the intellectual po­
tentials of the average human being are only par­
tially utilized.
T oftDouglas McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise. McGraw- 
Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, I960, pp. 3
129Ibid. . pp. ^7-57.
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It is obvious that neither set of extreme assumptions truly 
describe man in reality. However, either set can be used, 
within certain limits of applicability, to predict the 
result of various managerial behavior.
Therefore, in using ideal types if one allows "I" to 
be the ideal, phenomenon "a" cannot be said to be either 
"I = aM or "I t a." It can only be "more or less I." But 
to be "scientific," there must be objective criteria for the 
"more or less" comparison which may be either purely compara­
tive (ordinal) or numerical (cardinal). Thus, any given 
situation in industry may be described as more Theory X or 
more Theory Y, but never situation a = Theory X or a =
Theory Y.
The "Managerial Grid" in Figure 8 offers a convenient 
means of illustrating this "more or less" comparison. If the 
management of a hypothetical firm is described by point A with 
coordinates (1,9), they may be said to over subscribe to The­
ory Y and create a "country club" environment. On the other 
hand, a management team located at B (9,1) might be too much 
Theory X and practice task management or mechanistic manipu­
lation. As in many cases the most desirable situation is 
neither extreme but some point which displays characteristics 
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Limitations of Utopia. Nagel argues against any form
of intuitive understanding such as the logical model based
131on "intuitive" premises. His primary objection seems to
be a plea for more empirical content in the assumptions of
the ideal types.
Essentially, such objections attempt to make clear the
distinction between argumentative validity and "truth" since
it is quite possible for an argument to be valid (internally
consistent) yet empirically untrue (as it relates ex post 
132to reality). Argumentative validity is nothing more than
a consistent relationship between premise (s) and conclusion. 
The following syllogism is a perfect example of this situa­
tion.
All men are motivated solely by money. (Premise)
All employees of Organization X are men. (Premise)
All employees of Organization X are motivated solely 
by money. (Conclusion)
l^Hicks, The Management of Organizations, op. cit., p.
335.
131Schutz, "Concept and Theory Formation in the Social 
Sciences," ojd. cit. , p. 233*
1-^^David K. Berio, The Process of Communication. Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, New York, I960, p. 239.
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Thus, the argument progresses quite validly from premise(s) 
to conclusion, and is, therefore, argumentatively valid; 
yet, one has every reason to suppose that the conclusion is 
untrue based on empirical evidence. An interesting character­
istic of this type of syllogism is that if the premises are 
true and the argument logically valid, the conclusion must 
be true.
All men are mortal. (Premise)
All members of Organization X are men. (Premise)
All members of Organization X are mortal. (Conclusion)
In a sense, the case of the ideal type appears somewhat at 
variation with "truth" if its assumptions are not empirically 
valid, thus bringing up another question. Is it possible for 
a conclusion to be considered useful if its conclusions ap­
proach reality but its premises are untrue or void of empiri­
cal content?
Homo Oeconomicus and Ceteris Paraibus: Comments on Assumptions
Classical management and organization theory has been 
criticized on the basis of its economic man (homo oeconomicus) 
assumption. Usually the criticism consists of a detailed 
proof of the nonexistence of such a creature followed by an 
advocation of an equally unreal alternative.
In addition to the economic man assumption, almost every 
social science has faced ridicule for its use of a ceteris
1*07
paribus clause (all other things equal) made necessary by the 
complexity of social data. In view of this, it would seem 
benefical for social theory to reexamine its traditional 
position to insure that the use of such assumptions is 
entirely necessary.
The Pragmatic Tradition. It was illustrated in an 
earlier section that the ultra-empiricists maintain the 
necessity of independent empirical verifiability of assump­
tions, theory and consequences.
However, one group of scholars often called the "Chicago 
School" rejects this empirical requirement with respect to 
assumptions altogether. To them the only test of the validity 
of a theory is how well it predicts.^33
The pragmatic position is established as separate from 
the empiricist in that it requires no test of the assumptions; 
yet, it cannot be termed _a priori because it strongly advo­
cates the empirical testing of conclusions. Therefore, the 
ideal type finds a champion in the pragmatic philosophy, where­
as those who require that theories have 1) empirical reference, 
2) logical interconnection, and 3) admission of possibility
-^Milton Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics, The 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1953, pp. 12-13.
108
of rejection-1-^- must obviously reject the theoretical estab­
lishment of ideal types on points one and three.
No doubt many may find the position of the pragmatists
questionable since its logical extreme is "no matter how
unrealistic the assumptions may be, if it enables useful
predictions, the theory is valid," However, one should
recognize that assumptions are abstractions by definition
and must always lack empirical justification to a greater
135?or lesser extent, ^ In spite of this, those who attack on 
the basis of assumptions rather than the predictability are 
not difficult to find. Some members of this group actually 
admit that various theories would result in essentially the 
same conclusions if empirically verifiable assumptions were 
used. If this be true, one is tempted to sympathize with 
the pragmatists and ask why it is necessary to shoulder the 
expense and trouble of empirical verification when the results 
are the same without it. And even more fundamentally, one 
might ask if empirical verification is the only test of 
realism?
Criteria of Unrealism. Nagel argues that unrealism of
^-^Rubens tein and Haberstroh, ££. cit., pp. 16-18.
^■^Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch, translators 
and editors, Max Weber On the Methodology of the Social 
Sciences. The Free Press, Glencoe, ill.J l W 9 ,  pp. i^-1^5.
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1assumptions can assume one or more forms. They may be:
1. Unrealistic because they are not an ’’exhaustive 
description of reality" or designed for the 
"ideal case."
2. Unrealistic in that they are false or highly 
improbable based on the existing evidence avail­
able concerning the subject matter.
With reference to the first, the tenets of general semantics 
and intellectual commonsense tell one that any statement is 
unrealistic in the sense that it is not an exhaustive de­
scription of reality. Words can never say "all" there is 
about any objective process or event in the "real world." 
Whereas the above discussion has shown that ideal cases are 
not exact reproductions of reality, they are far from mean­
ingless. In fact, as long as one remains fully cognizant 
of the fact that one is dealing with an ideal case, they may 
prove quite useful in analyzing complex situations.
To this point Nagel does no serious damage to the prag­
matic tradition. However, he finds it impossible to accept 
an assumption which is counter to empirical evidence although 
he does at times seem somewhat sympathetic with Friedman's 
position on this point. Thus, Nagel occupies the middle 
ground between dogmatic ultra-empiricism and dogmatic
136grriest Nagel, "Assumptions in Economic Theory," 
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings. Vol. LIII.
N“  2 W y 7 "1 9 W , _ PP^ 2l^-2TF:--------------------
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pragmatism at the other.
One thing appears certain, however, the more general 
the theory the less realistic are the assumptions because 
generality requires that a theory specifically describe no 
particular case. McGregor's Theory Y is general because no 
specific man is categorized by its assumptions. Maslow's 
need hierarchy applies to many cases simply because it 
describes no particular man's set of needs. Thus, a signifi­
cant theory explains much by little. A theory consists of an 
assertion that certain forces are, by implication, important 
and others are not for a particular class of phenomena. There­
fore, in speaking of the "crucial assumptions" one is trying
117to state the key elements in an abstract theory. ^
Thus, it seems that the criteria of unrealism is a func­
tion of one's objective. The avowed pragmatist is perfectly 
correct in proclaiming that the empirical reality of the 
assumptions is irrelevant as long as the theory derived from 
them provides a sufficient degree of predictive accuracy. His 
objective is practice and predictive validity is what he seeks. 
To the pure scientist, however, a theory is more than a tool 
for prediction. It is a work of logical beauty which aims
137priedman, o£. cit. . pp. 21^-26.
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at the systematic perfection of universally acceptable knowl­
edge. As a result, predictive validity for practice is not 
his sole objective. For the scientist of management and 
organizations a choice is available; will he be content with 
supplying the practitioner with a tool for prediction or does 
he aim at a completely perfect logical science. The first 
alternative gives him a general (once again meaning wide 
applicability) yet imperfect description of many situations 
while the second gives him a more perfect description of a 
few limited cases. This is basically the choice that Ernest 
Dale’s "comparative approach" offers. But such a question 
as this can only be answered from the viewpoint of the indi­
vidual theorists considering their personal objectives and 
the conditions under which they work.
One thing appears quite clear in the writer’s opinion: 
if a "general theory" is the objective of management and 
organization theory, empirical equality of assumptions, 
theory and consequences does not provide a satisfactory basis 
for such a formulation. The results of A = B = C can only 
provide a series of "comparative theories" exhaustively 
descriptive of specific cases but universally applicable to 
none.
Some Examples. Perhaps the best known and most often 
criticized assumption of management theory found its inception
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in economics and was used extensively in classical theory. 
This, as mentioned before, was the idea that man 1) knows 
all the choices available to him, 2) considers the result 
of the alternative consequences of choosing various courses 
of action, and 3) has & complete utility ordering (cardinal) 
for all possible sets of consequences."^® Taylor, ^t. al. , 
in developing their theory obviously considered that the 
economic motives were the most important motivators of man.
It is on the basis of this assumption that many have attacked 
scientific management. It hardly seems necessary to under­
score the "unrealism" of this proposition, but from a prag­
matic viewpoint this is completely irrelevant. Within this 
framework only the consequences of classical theory need be 
examined. If the theory enables sufficiently accurate pre­
dictions, good for it. If not, it should be rejected, not 
because its assumptions are unrealistic, but because the 
theory itself provides unsatisfactory predictive results.
Another assumption that has been used explicitly in 
economics and often implicitly in management and organiza­
tion theory is the condition of ceteris paribus. This is a 
convenient means of analyzing the effects of a change in a
^®March and Simon, 0£. cit. . p. 138.
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given variable while holding all other influencing forces 
constant. In other words, ceteris paribus enables one to 
clear away the complexities of a multi-variable situation so 
that a greater insight may be o b t a i n e d . T h e  assumption is 
obviously a complement to the theory of ideal types. It is 
important to note that ceteris paribus is not an absolute con­
cept. The holding constant of all variables other than the 
one under consideration does not mean that others show no 
change at all. It simply means that the sum total of their 
change is not significantly large to constitute an influencing 
force. As Grunberg has s h o w n : l e t  Pt be the value of 
variable P at time^; Pt +1 then is the value of P actually 
observed at t + 1; if X^ is the ith variable in an infinitely 
large set of irrelevant variables covered by ceteris paribus. 
effective fulfillment of the clause means:
{dPt+1/bX1)6X1 + (8Pt+1/9X2)dX2 + ...(3Pt+1/3Xn )dXn Se 
where e is an arbitrary variable such that if
pt " e “ pt+l “ pt + 6 
the prediction is accepted as sufficiently accurate.
With the current emphasis on total and partial systems 
analysis, it will no doubt be necessary for management and
James M. Buchanan, "Ceteris Paribus: Some Notes on
Methodology," The Southern Economfc Journal, Vol. XXIV,
No. 3 (Jan., 1^58) , P- 269.
^°Grunberg, o£. cit. , p. 151.
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organization theory to rely more heavily on the explicit use 
of ceteris paribus. Theorists will find it impossible to 
analyze the composition and operation of the technical or 
power subsystems of a formal organization without assuming 
away or holding constant the influence of other subsystems.
The limitations of man and the tools available for analysis 
make such measures absolutely mandatory. In doing so, no 
serious problems will be encountered so long as there is a 
conscious awareness of the limitations of such an analysis 
and management theorists do not fall prey to the "fallacy 
of mistaken concreteness."
Summary
This chapter has embarked upon a rather ambitious journey 
in quest of explanations relative to the epistemological founda­
tions of management and organizations. The verbal travels have 
led to an examination of several diverse yet strategically 
interrelated topics. Succinctly, the major propositions 
advanced may be itemized as follows:
1. Management belongs to the SCIENCESsoĉ a2_ rather than the SCIENCESnatural• By virtue of this association, the study of organizations faces several unique problems not adapted to the methods of physical science. The primary unique problem emerges as the purposeful behavior of man which distinguishes him from any other cosmic object.
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2. The basic problems of any "SCIENCE," management and 
organizations being no exception, are epistemological 
in that they deal with the relationship between per­
ceived and objective reality. Two opposing schools 
of philosophy have offered explanations of this re­
lationship. The epistemological monists argue that 
objective reality and the knowing state are identi­
cal, item for item. True to the tenets of general 
semantics, this study has concluded that an alter­
native argument known as epistemological dualism is 
more productive of realistic knowledge. This philos­
ophy contends that perception abstracts only certain 
items from objective being, thus denying the possi­
bility of perfect knowledge.
3 . Subclassified under dualism are two additional epis- 
temological positions. Although they exist on a 
separate plane, they apply only to the most accurate 
methods of obtaining knowledge. The first position, 
known as empiricism, maintains that only knowledge 
capable of perception is valid. Within organiza­
tions, the works of Herzberg, Likert and Cyert ex­
hibit excellent examples of such a philosophy. The 
alternative position may be referred to as ratio­
nalism and contends that there are basic a priori 
truths concerning human behavior which, aTthough 
true, are not subject to empirical verification. 
Whereas the empirical method moves from the specif­
ic to the general (induction), the rational method 
moves from the general to the specific (deduction). 
The general solution to this issue seems to be that, 
both methods are necessary in the "scientific cycle."
i|. The two methods mentioned above (induction and de­
duction) are the only logically valid epistemologi­
cal processes. However, the writer maintains that 
certain alterations may be made in them to facili­
tate their applicability to social problems without 
destroying their scientific usefulness. The primary 
alternative suggested is the use of Verstehen or the 
person to person understanding made possible- by the 
fact that both the observer and observes in the 
social realm are human beings. This method should 
provide a great deal of insight into the formulation 
of hypotheses and the explanation of phenomena. 
Through the use of this methodology the observer is 
better able to understand the meaning an actor 
attaches to his action.
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5. Finally, it ia suggested that an appreciation of the 
usefulness of Verstehen could allow more productive 
use of ideal types. STnce general semantics ade­
quately illustrates the utter impossibility of 
knowing all there is to know about any event, the 
delineation of the most important factors and a 
concentration of effort upon them would be advan­
tageous. Thus, the advocated methodology would 
consist of several steps: a) the delineation of
important factors at work in the given problem by 
way of subjective agreement, b) logical deductions 
from the assumptions and premises established via 
(a), c) empirical test of the consequences of the 
logical process, d) expansion of the logical system 
by establishing the results as a norm and noting the 
alterations resulting from the inclusion of factors 
originally held constant in ta).
The above process is applicable to SCIENCEgoc ial not 
SCIENCEna^ura2 , and it is believed by the writer that such 
a method would obtain more productive results than are pres­
ently evidenced. Specifically, it would overcome many of the 
difficulties inherent in the either-or orientation of either 
induction or deduction.
Numerous variations may be used, as others have shown; 
but if a "general theory" is the goal of the science of 
management and organizations, strict empiricism appears 
inadequate for the accomplishment of the desired end. Only 
an elaborate deductive-inductive system based on trans-per- 
ceptual truths, developed within a logically structured frame­
work and checked by empirical fact can provide such a theory.
CHAPTER III
SYNTHESIS AND EXPANSION: INQUIRIES INTO
VALUE JUDGMENTS AND ABSTRACTION
Vague and insignificant forms of speech, and abuse 
of language, have so long passed for mysteries of
science; and hard or misapplied words with little
or no meaning have, by prescription, such a right 
to be mistaken for deep learning and height of 
speculation, that it will not be easy to persuade
either those who speak or those who hear them,
that they are but covers of ignorance and a hin­
drance to true knowledge.
--John Locke
Chapter two dealt with various philosophical issues in 
management and organizations; however, social theory possesses 
another dimension which might be referred to as the "practical 
plane." At this level there exists certain communication 
problems which result, in part, from the dynamic nature of 
the subject matter itself. Revolutionary changes have taken 
place in the past three-quarters of a century. The experi­
ments of Frederick Taylor at Midvale Steel bear little 
resemblance to the sophisticated systems analysis of today. 
This increased complexity has all but created a crisis of 
communication for students of management. Just as Newton was 
obliged to develop intergal calculus in order to explain grav­
itation, management and organization theorists are confronted 
with obsolete communicative concepts which prevent an adequate
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analysis of their subject.1 Although it is doubtful that 
extensive modifications of the magnitude of Newton’s are 
necessary, one is inclined to suggest at least some funda­
mental alterations in the dissemination of knowledge within 
the field of management.
For this reason, it becomes necessary to examine a few 
theoretical questions in order to grasp the full relationship 
between general semantics and the philosophy of science. But 
first, for reasons that will become obvious later, the assump­
tions of the chapter at hand must be made explicit. They are:
1. Science aims at the accomplishment of systematic 
transperceptual knowledge.
2. Science remains receptive to any suggestions that 
meet its general criteria and offer improvements 
over existing methods.
Recognizing these assumptions and the objectives of the presen+ 
chapter, the first step is to examine the nature of the lan­
guage of science.
The Language of Science
Inseparably bound in epistemological questions is the
■^Stuart Chase, The Power of Words, Harcourt, Brace 
and Company, New York, 195^, PP* 111-112.
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passociated issue of language's relation to reality. Science 
cannot be content with the mere recognition that the symbolic 
report of an experiment is a triadic alliance between object, 
thought and symbol. It has been the objective of the scien­
tific enterprise to develop the most precise language possi­
ble to facilitate the accuracy of its reports. Mathematics 
stands alone as the most successful of such attempts. How­
ever perfect it may be, mathematics itself faces limitations 
which can be overcome only through the frequent use of less 
perfect, yet more expressive collections of symbols. Mathe­
matics plus these expanded symbolic systems constitute the 
language of science.
Basically, this combination may be designated as a sub­
set of any total language scheme, because it is more restric­
tive than language in toto. Figure 9 should aid in explaining 
and illustrating this distinction. As some philosophers argue, 
scientific language is cognitive and performs an informational 
function, whereas non-scientific or humanistic language is 
non-cognitive containing only an emotional appeal.J This
^Peter Winch, "Philosophical Bearings," in Maurice 
Natanson, editor, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Random 
House, New York, 19t>3, p. 109.
^W. T. Jones, The Sciences and the Humanities. The 
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NOTE: Diagram adapted from W. T, Jones, The Sciences
and the Humanities. University of California, Berkely, 1965,
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FIGURE 9 
THE LANGUAGE OF SCIENCE
suggests a continuum ranging from highly scientific, con­
sisting primarily of designative symbols with a limited 
number of expressive components, to humanistic, containing 
a relatively low percentage of descriptive elements and 
numerous expressive ones. In the middle is a compromise 
or "commonsense" language where designative equals expres­
sive elements. The entire scale is language but only the 
right side is the language of science.
For an example of this idea, examine the proposition; 
"the organization reveals the dynamics of a budding flower. 
This statement is emotive and non-cognitive. Even the 
expert scholar of organizations would be forced to call 
freely upon imagination to grasp the significance of such 
an assertion. As a result, it would lie on the left-hand 
portion of the scale where the extreme is typified by vague 
terms displaying a propensity for beauty rather than utilit 
Socrates via Plato in the Apology places the poets at this 
extreme when he states:
They showed me in an instance that not by wisdom 
do poets write, but by a sort of genius and inspira­
tion. They are like diviners or soothsayers, who 
also say many fine things but do not understand the 
meaning of them,^
t̂-John G. Kememy, A Philosopher Looks at Science. D. 
Van Nostrand Company, Trinceton, N. J. , 19^, p. 7.
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Vague language is necessary to the poet, but it is not equally 
valuable to the scientist. The use of such a symbolic system 
would reduce the logical precision of science to meaningless 
rubble.
Alternatively, the proposition, "the organization is 
dynamic" falls more to the right-hand side of the continuum, 
because it can be subjected to the tests of logic and observa­
tion. It seems that organizational dynamics is a function of 
certain variables such as management and owner attitudes, 
adaptability and longevity. These factors may be tested 
directly or elaborate ^x post examination of their effects 
may be conducted. Therefore, in spite of the fact that both 
humanistic and scientific languages use identical symbolic 
codes, the manner in which each uses it distinguishes them 
as subsets of language proper. Thus, the epistemological 
arguments of the previous chapter require a specific type of 
formulation which has itself become a source of controversy.
A Posteriori and A Priori Statements
Rational arguments are formulated in terms of "analyti­
cal" statements. These statements have a rather simple sub- 
ject-predicate structure and for this reason are often 
referred to as S-P sentences. The distinguishing feature of 
these formulations is that the predicate follows logically 
from the definition of the subject so that the truth of the
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crstatement relies in no way upon experience. An example of 
this type of proposition is: "a business organization is a
collection of individuals." By virtue of the customary usage 
of the term "organization," the collection of individuals 
characteristic could be assumed. If the subject of the sen­
tence were not a collection of individuals, it would not have 
been labeled an organization.
On the other hand, "synthetic" statements are those in 
which the predicate is extraneous to the definition of the 
subject.^ Take for example the proposition, "Herzberg's 
theory was confirmed by Z Corporation's experiment." In 
this case, there is no logically necessary connection between 
Herzberg's theory and the Z Corporation's experiment. The 
relationship is an account of specific experience; and for 
this reason, it might be labeled an empirical statement.
Thus, a statement may be si priori, in which case its truth 
is not contingent on experience, or a posteriori whereupon 
it is.
Some would argue that analytical propositions only make 
explicit those meanings that have been conveniently assigned
^Merle B. Turner, Philosophy and the Science of Behavior. 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., New York, 1967, pp.-£9-50*
^Ibid.
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7to words and symbols. In short, no new knowledge is 
expounded because the contents of the statements are known 
prior to their formulation. At best, they can make implicit 
meanings explicit--never more. To this group, only theories 
based on synthetic propositions and subject to empirical tests 
have scientific significance.
The & priorists counter by asserting that the laws of 
logic are more than rules in that they describe the structure 
of the world. Therefore, logical deduction does result in 
new knowledge because it is the dynamic procedure of the 
universe itself. They see no methodological problems in 
moving deductively from the known to the unknown, because 
their procedure for doing so is the route along which reality 
progresses.
Using a little imagination, one may recognize that the 
arguments on the "practical plane" are essentially the same 
as those in process at the "philosophical" level. The identi­
cal fundamental question must be answered: Are the phenomena
of social affairs logical so as to make possible a purely 
deductive social theory? Certain theoretical conceputalizations,
^Arthur Pap, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. 
The Free Press, Glencoe, Til., 1962, p. 79 and SemantTcs and 
Necessary Truth. Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn.,
195&, p. v.
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such as the theory of consumer behavior in microeconomics, 
suggest an affirmative reply. This theory, constructed upon 
the relatively simple assumption of utility maximization, 
diminishing marginal utility and the possibility of preference 
ordering, has proved quite informative and theoretically valid. 
These assumptions are essentially the ones used to develop the 
rational choice model in chapter two which illustrates their 
applicability to organization theory. Therefore, in the 
writer's opinion, analytical statements of a priori truths 
can accomplish more than merely making the implicit, explicit. 
The advisability of looking to these statements as the 
foundation of all theories, however, is not to be implied from 
the previous argument. As was noted before, a strictly a 
priori deductive theory of management and organizations faces 
pragmatic limitations even if one insists upon its theoretical 
and exhaustive validity. This practical consideration is the 
empirical bias of contemporary social science which seems to 
establish the necessity of both synthetic and analytical state­
ments in an academically acceptable theory. Although premises 
may be adequately formulated analytically, there is a practical 
necessity for results to possess the multi-valued orientation 
and flexibility typical of the synthetic form. The presenta­
tion of results, however, brings up a more fundamental ques­
tion as to the nature of scientific meaning.
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Dimensions of Meaning
Figure I4. exposed the basic structure of meaning as a 
triadic relationship; an association that may assume one of 
several forms. For instance, the context within which a 
symbol is used is likely to influence the relationships be­
tween referent, thought and symbol. It may be safely assumed 
that the term "organizational conflict" reflects a different 
meaning to the organization theorist and the departmental 
supervisor. For the former, it is an extremely interesting 
social phenomenon that may at times be both functional and 
dysfunctional. For the latter, it is a headache requiring 
excessive time and effort. This type of variation is known 
as "contextual" meaning.
There are various other types of meaning such as prag­
matic, connotative and denotative, but one of the most trouble­
some in management is simple semantic meaning. This basically 
is the relationship between an object and the symbol or word 
used to describe it. Urwick has exposed the magnitude of the 
problem by noting twenty vague definitions of the word
g
"management" itself. Although this problem is not unique
Q
Lyndall Urwick, "The Problem of Management Semantics." 
California Management Review. Vol. II, No. 3 (Spring, I960), 
p^ JH and "The Tactics of Jungle Warfare." Academy of Manage­
ment Journal, Vol. VI, No. (Dec., 1963), p. 3^*
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0
Lyndall Urwick, "The Problem of Management Semantics " 
California Management Review. Vol. II, No. 3 (Spring, I960), 
pT and "The Tactics of Jungle Warfare," Academy of Manage­
ment Journal, Vol. VI, No. (Dec., 1963), p . 32^.
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to the social sciences, it is more acute in this area 
9because:
1. Terms used in everyday conversation are the founda­
tion terms of various social disciplines although 
their "scientific meanings" are more respective.
Take for instance, the term "rationality" which, 
when used in connection with organizations, means 
more than social conformity.
2. At times there are no observable referents to 
which the terms refer. An example of this is the 
"hierarchy of needs." In spite of the fact that
no one ever has or ever will see such a phenomenon, 
this "intangible referent" provides a vital and 
perfectly valid link in the epistemology of orga­
nizations .
3. Often there are identifiable referents relative to 
which agreement among qualified investigators is 
common; yet, there is disagreement about specifying 
a label to represent the phenomenon. Although the 
symbol "conflict" is a word used to describe a 
phenomenon, there is controversy as to whether it 
should be labeled functional or dysfunctional.
All words are subject to vagueness but some are more 
subject than others. The situation becomes quite 
evident in the normative-positive or "is-ought"
controversy to be discussed later in the chapter.
These complications lead to the communication malfunc­
tions because: a) men suppose their words to be the marks of
ideas in the minds of other men and b) men suppose words to
9Rollo Handy, Methodology of the Behavioral Science, 
Charles C. Thomas, Publishers, Springfield, til., 196£,—  
pp. 157-158.
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10represent the reality of things. Consequently, an academic 
theorist may completely bypass a practitioner in the discussion 
of functional effects of conflict if it is assumed that con­
flict means the same to each party. But what possible improve­
ments do "scientific meanings" offer that provide a more accu­
rate span of the triangle?
Little doubt exists as to a "relativity of meaning"^ 
concerning any term. However, there is a common base of 
agreement upon which language is built and because of which 
communication is possible. This relatively small domain of
■j pagreement may be called "communieatable invariance." The 
search for scientific meaning becomes a quest for this invar­
iance. But meaning is a psychological process and for this 
reason the scientific meaningfulness of any event may, and
to a large extent is, predetermined by one's epistemological 
11perspective. Previous association with the perspectives cf
■^John Locke, "Of Words," in Donald E. Hayden and E„
Paul Alworth, Classics in Semantics. Philosophical Library, 
Inc., New York, 1965, p.
Anatol Rapoport, Operational Philosophy, Harper and 
Brothers, Publishers, New York, 1953, P* 23*
12Ibid.
^^William P. McEwen, The Problem of Social-Scientific 
Knowledge. The Bedminster Press, Totowa, New Jersey, 19&3,
P. 63.
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extreme empiricism and extreme rationalism provides a justi­
fication for limiting the discussion to these two areas, 
although in reality a multitude of variations exist.
Essentially, it may be argued that one's perspective
(epistemological) is determined by three factors:1 "̂
1. A person’s value-situation or the primary preferences 
which motivate him.
2. An individual's meaning-situation which consists of 
the type of knowledge one considers to te acquirable.
3. One's knowledge-situation relating to the method by
which one constructs knowledge and the criteria by 
which it is verified.
The relativity of meaning created by these counter perspectives 
underscores the previous arguments against an epistemological 
dichotomy. Methodological tolerance requires that one con­
stantly reexamine his perspective to insure that his criticisms 
originate from a concern for the validity of theory and not 
from a dogmatic philosophical perspective that polarizes his 
thinking. Table I reveals the nature of the perspectives of 
the empiricists and rationalists which, in the absence of 
compromise, insure the impossibility of mutually agreeable 
knowledge and the objective evaluation of evidence which is 
the fundamental requirement of all science.
In spite of the need for tolerance, one philosophy of
-^Ibid.
TABLE I
THE RELATIVITY OR EPISTEMOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES
Rationalists Empiricists
Value-Situation Desire for clear and 
distinct knowledge which 
is absolutely true.
Indisputable information 
about factual events with­
out reference to an a 
priori system.
Meaning-Situation A priori system of ’uni­
versal truths not depen­
dent upon perception.
Quantitatively analyzed 
sense perception of par­
ticular events.
Knowledge-Situation Formal logical deduction 
from a priori axioms 
requiring consistency.
Inductive inferences from 
observations which are 
verified by experimental 
test under controlled 
conditions.
NOTE: William P. McEwen, The Problem of Sec Lai-Scientific Knowledge,
The Bedminster Press, Totowa, New j e/sev,-I56TT"PE^ ̂ 3-7^
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scientific meaning has developed that would completely reject 
rational analysis and label it as scientifically meaningless. 
This idea, conceived by Bridgman in The Logic of Modern Physi cs. 
is known as operationalism.
Operationalism
Many definitions of operationalism have been advanced, 
but basically they all seem to say "the proper definition of 
a concept is . . .  in terms of actual operations, thus 
denying that any assertion has meaning if the operations 
involved in accomplishing it cannot be defined."*^ The simi­
larity between operationalism and Comte's scientism hardly 
requires elaboration.^ Epistemologically, it may be said 
that operationalism is ultra-empiricism of the highest order„
An extensionally oriented concept such as this identifies the 
operations of verification with a definition of the process.
It attempts to separate the observations of the P-field from
the "imagined concepts" of the C-field (terms developed in
17previous chapter).
See Fritz Machlup, "Operationalism and Pure Theory in 
Economics," in Sherman Roy Krupp, editor, The Structure of 
Economic Science, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey, I960, p. 55, P. W. Bridgman, The Logic of Modern 
Physics. the Macmillian Company, New York, 1927, p . 30 and 
Chase, op. cit., pp. 118-119.
•^Gordon w. Allport, Becoming. Yale University Press, 
New Haven, Conn., 1955, p. 11.
^Machlup, ojd. cit. . p. $6,
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Few would deny the contributions this type of analysis
has made in physics and other physical sciences. One is
inclined to question, however, the advisability of such a
method in the social disciplines. Because of problems of
replication in management and organizations, the theorist
faces an extremely difficult task in bridging the gap be-
18tween the theoretical and operational languages. In fact, 
as the writer views it, to insist upon strict operationalism 
would in effect reject as utterly impossible anything tha+ 
approaches a science in the social sphere. Obviously, other 
writers have entertained the same notion and as a result 
efforts have been made to redefine operationalism in terms of 
degrees. The definition above describes "narrow operationalism" 
to which an alternative position has been advocated in the form 
of "broader operationalism." This "realistic alternative" is
1 Qfounded upon five salient principles. They are: 7
1. For a belief to be a knowledge claim, it must be
stated so that its implications may be communicated 
in ways that can be tested by logical reasoning and 
observable evidence.
1 OH. M. Blalock, Jr., "Theory, Measurement and Repli­
cation in Social Sciences," The American Journal of Sociol 
Vol. LXVI, No. ^ (Jan., 196lT^p. 3
•^McEwen, ojd. cit. , pp. 92, 102-125.
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2. A verifiable knowledge claim must be confirmed in 
accordance with a justified criteria before the 
assertion becomes genuine operational knowledge.
3. Regardless of how firmly established a theory may 
be, it remains operational only so long as those 
who subscribe to it "keep the door open" to further 
inquiry that might necessitate reexamination of the 
theory.
I4.. Operationalism requires that empirical testing be 
regulated by conceptual principles.
For any discipline to be operational, it must con­
sider the limitations of the subject matter in 
order to determine for its own mode of analysis; 
a) what observational techniques are applicable 
and b) what testing techniques are acceptable for 
refuting theories and therefore for making predic­
tions .
Only within the framework of "broader operationalism" 
is it possible to scientifically acknowledge social reality. 
Although extreme extensional orientation has certainly reduced 
communicative difficulties in some areas, its social science 
counterpart, narrow operationalism, would likely create a 
"scientific void" in the understanding of management and 
organizations. Obviously, this type of analysis would aline 
itself with pure behaviorism and forfeit the psychic under­
standing of the meaning of an action to an "actor" which the 
study of management seeks to discover. Thus, broader opera­
tionalism seems a worthy goal for management and organiza­
tion theory. This position lacks dogmatism, yet, it places 
upon the scholars of the field scientific responsibilities 
such as the establishment of a "justified criteria" for the
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acceptance of knowledge. Attention to these matters could 
encourage a "management m e t h o d s t r e i t which would require 
a thorough examination of management methodology. Such a 
debate could hardly establish once and for all the proper 
methods of the social sciences, but it might make explicit 
professionally recognized criteria for confirmation. This 
is precisely why management and organization theory needs 
to examine its methods. Methodology fulfills a most impor­
tant function in promoting mutual understanding among social 
scientists. The power of any argument rests upon this under­
standing; and when the foundations are too weak, it is the
21argument of power that triumphs.
Normative and Positive Theory: An Issue of
Morality and Abstraction
The argument of power exposes an important methodo­
logical issue not yet discussed. This controversy deals with 
the proper place of value judgments in the study of manage­
ment and organizations. Before going further, however, a 
definition of terms is in order. A positive science may be
pn Methodstreit refers to a methodological debate that 
took place in the last half of the previous century between 
the Austrian and German Historical Schools of Economics.
^Felix Kaufmann, Me tho do logy of the Soci al Sci ences .
The Humanities Press, New York, 195>B"7 p. 2i4.l1.-
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defined as a body of systematized knowledge concerning "what
is"; a normative science relates to "what ought" to be. The
object of a positive science is the discovery of uniformities,
while the objective of a normative science is the establish-
22ment of ideals.
Therefore, the problem of value judgments and science
assumes at least a two dimensional relationship. Dimension
one is morality and questions the justice of casting of one's
values on others. The second dimension is communication which
examines the abstract nature of judgments of value and their
effect on the communicative process.
Primary argumentation has been formulated around the
first dimension with the positivists taking the position that
science is and must be Wertfreiheit or value free. They give
two reasons for this conclusion. The first simply states
that it is futile to approach social facts with the attitude
23of a censor who either approves or disapproves of an event.
pp^John Neville Keynes, The Scope and Method of Polltical 
Economy. l+th ed., Kelley and Mi11man, Inc., New~York, 1955, 
pp. 314.-35 and Royall Brandis, "Value Judgments and Economic 
Science," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Business, Vol. 
Ill, No. 2 (Summer, 19t>3), pp.
^^Ludwig Von Mises, Human Action. Yale University Press, 
New Haven, Conn., 1914-9, p. 2.
Since the objective of science is knowledge which leads to 
prediction, an analysis of "what ought" to be is of little 
value. Only through concentration upon the actual phenomenon 
can predictive value be obtained. It is noted that the nat­
ural scientist does not approach physical processes with the 
objective of revolutionizing the actions of the elements. 
Instead, he seeks to understand why they act as they do.
This, according to the positivist, is the objective of the 
social scientist. Although the understanding of social 
phenomena might dictate an examination of the actor's values, 
it does not require an effort to reform them. The solution 
of a labor dispute may require that the negotiators under­
stand each other's value system, but arguments of how indus­
trial relations "ought" to be from one standpoint or the 
other provides little aid in resuming operations and pre­
venting the reoccurrence of trouble.
Another reason advanced in support of the positive 
position is a question of logic which purports the logical 
impossibility of deriving ethical values from natural pro­
positions. G. E. Moore in his Principia Ethica offers an 
"open question argument" to prove this logical impossibility.
^-Pap, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, op. cit., pp. laTW:
13?
Suppose that the statement "X is right" is synonymous with
"X maximizes happiness." Then the question of whether an
action that maximizes happiness is really right or whether
an action that is right really maximizes happiness is as
futile as the question of whether right is really right.
The question is always "open" because ethical predicates
have subjective meanings and cannot be duplicated in
neutral descriptive language. Any attempt to analyze such
ethical or metaphysical questions by natural or scientific
means is to commit the "naturalistic fallacy." No science,
only the subjective preferences of the individual, can
answer such questions.
Some take issue with this, however, in maintaining that
because the social sciences deal with human issues they simply
25cannot evade the necessity of pronouncing value judgments.
To them judgments of values are a necessary part of any science 
of human behavior. Fundamentally, they argue that man is mot i ­
vated by values and that he seeks a guide to what his values 
should be; thus, a science of society must satisfy this need.
In fact, some go so far as to argue that it is the concentra­
tion of the social discipline upon these desired ends that
2*W. Zajdlic, "The Limitations of Social Sciences," 
Kyklos, Vol. IX, No. 1 (1956), p. 70.
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26will provide the unification of all social sciences. It 
may be seen from this that the essential disagreement results 
from what each group views as the object of science; is it 
means and ends or is it means given the ends?
On Means and Ends
Koopmans states that disagreements in economics and 
other social sciences can be traced to one or all of the 
following.^
1. Disagreement about social objectives.
2. Argumentation concerning observed facts.
3. Failure to observe the rules of logic.
This section will argue that only the last two disagree­
ments can be solved within the framework of science. The 
first is an axiological question that must be determined 
by each individual's scale of preference.
The relationship between means and ends, science and 
values is best illustrated by the following passage from 
Alice in Wonderland.
pi■Theo Suranyi-Unger, "Facts and Ends in Economics,"
The Economic Journal. Vol. XLIX, No. 193 (March, 1939),
p. 12.
^Oscar Lange, "The Scope and Method of Economics,"
The Review of Economic Studies. Vol. XIII, No. 3 (191^5- 
19ZJ-6 ), pp. 2£-23.
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Alice asked,
"Would you tell me please, which way I ought to 
go from here?"
"That depends a great deal on where you are trying 
to get to," 
said the cat.
It seems, at least to this writer, that the cat quite ade­
quately assumes the role of the scientist. It can never be 
the task of science to provide binding norms and ideals 
from which directives for immediate activity may be d e r i v e d . ^8 
More explicitly, it is the province of science to show, 
through description of real and hypothetical events, what
would be the results of proposed lines of action or what
29lines of action would produce certain events. Science 
deals with means and merely accepts the ends as given.
Debate may take place only with respect to means relative 
to ends. Science can offer the most expedient means to an 
end or it can argue that a means chosen may lead to effects 
incompatible with the explicit goals, but the validity of 
the end itself escapes the domain of logic.
Perhaps a hypothetical macro illustration will help 
explain the distinction. Suppose that the political party
pQMax Weber, "Objectivity in Social Science and Social 
Policy," in Natanson, oja. cit. . pp. 358-360.
29Prank Knight, Freedom and Reform: Ess ays in Economi cs
and Social Philosophy. Harper and Brothers” Publishers. New 
York, 19^7, p. 2I4.3 .
llj.0
in power in a certain country desires higher living standards 
for all its population. In order to accomplish this objec­
tive it elects to nationalize all domestic industry. Economic 
and political science may be able to systematically determine 
that nationalization of industry will not accomplish the 
stated objective or that it will result in consequences incom­
patible with higher living standards. However, these sciences 
can say nothing about the end itself. This is a question that 
only political and social philosophy may discuss although even 
these areas are not likely to reach a universally acceptable 
solution. As Albert Einstein stated in Relativity--A Richer 
Truth, "for the scientist there is only being, but no wishing, 
no valuing, no good, no evil, in short, no goal." In spite 
of the fact that this appears a bit amoral its meaning is 
quite different. This simply illustrates that the scientist 
qua scientist's purpose is the search for truth. Such an 
attitude does not require that the scientist qua individual 
reject everything moral, but it does effectively separate 
science and morality as two separate entities. There is no 
identity and thus there is no contradiction. Morality pre­
cedes science in that it establishes the ends about which 
all questions are open. Answers to these questions must be 
sought on the basis of one's faith and convictions, not 
through the use of scientific and theoretical experimentation.
Ikl
As Weber points out, ’’the social scientist should confine 
himself to means while only the philosophers should lay bare 
the meaning of evaluations."^
No doubt by this time the reader has noted a fundamental 
difference between the political and social scientist and the 
business manager. Whereas the scientist has no "right" to 
create the values or ends toward the attainment of which 
science must strive, it may be argued convincingly that the 
business manager can create these ends. Within the pri­
vately owned firm the managerial function of planning does, 
in fact, do exactly this. In short, the administrator via 
planning creates the ends toward which the organization will
31move. Professor Simon explicitly argues this proposition
in the following passage:
Factual propositions are statements about the obser­
vable world which can, in principle, be tested to 
determine whether they are true or false. Decisions 
are more than factual propositions. They select one 
future state of affairs in preference to all others 
and direct behavior toward it. In other words, they 
contain ethical as well as factual elements. To
3^Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch, translators and 
editors, Max Weber On the Methodology of the Social Sciences. 
The Free Press, Glencoe, ill., 19^97 PP* IB-19.
3^-See Richard F. Barton, "Reality and Business Policy 
Decisions." Academy of Management Journal. Vol. IX, No. 2 
(June, 19o6), pp. 117-̂122.
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determine whether a proposition is correct it must 
be compared with fact or lead via logical reasoning 
to propositions which are empirically testable.
But ethical propositions cannot be derived by rea­
soning from factual ones, nor car they be compared 
with fact.32
Within the capitalistic system, the manager-administrator 
may "create the values" for his organization within broadly 
defined limits. However, the organization theorist qua 
researcher qua scientist does not enjoy the same privilege. 
Instead, he occupies a position much more similar to the 
political and social scientist. In theorizing he cannot 
dictate the objectives toward which organizations should 
work. The work of the theorist begins after the business 
managers, educational institution presidents or religious 
leaders state their objectives. Then and only then can the 
scientist of organizations formulate the most effective 
means for accomplishing the proposed goals.
Unfortunately, the literature of management and organi­
zations does not stand witness that theorists have always 
assumed the role of the scientist as opposed to the reformer. 
Classical theory was not so much interested in how organiza­
tions actually worked as in developing a body of maxims which,
-^Herbert A. Simon, Adminis trative Behavior. 2nd ed.,
The Macmillian Company, New York, 1957, pp. i+5-U. o.
11+3
33if adhered to, would secure maximum efficiency. To Taylor 
and his followers scientific management assumed an almost 
religious overtone as evidenced by his reference to soldiering
n  )
as the "greatest evil" facing America and England. Gantt
also preached of "lower moral tones" resulting from inequali-
35ties between work and pay. Human relations was no less
guilty of this false identification since it also "preached"
the virtues of the efficiency objective.
Contemporary periods have witnessed equally "moralistic"
attempts to decide what the objectives of business should be.
Perhaps the most pervasive of these deals with the social
responsibility of private firms. The normative philosophy
upon which this idea is based is illustrated in the following
statement by Gantt.
The business system must accept its social responsi­
bility and devote itself primarily to service, or 
the community will take it over and operate it in 
its own interest.36
^Renate Mayntz, "The Study of Organizations," Current 
Sociology. Vol. XIII, No. 3 (1961+) , p. 96.
^ F r e d e r i c k  W. Taylor, The Principles of Scientific 
Management. Harper and Brothers. Publishers. New York.
19237 PP. 12-11+.
35Henry L. Gantt, Work. Wages and Profits. 2nd ed., 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1913, pp. 67-6o.
-^Henry l . Gantt, Organizing for Work. George Allen 
and Unwin, Ltd., London, 1^19, p7 l£~. (Underlines added.)
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Sheldon voices a similar position as follows:
It is important, therefore, that early in our con­
sideration of management in industry to insist that 
however scientific management may become and how­
ever much the full development of its powers may 
depend on the use of the scientific method, its 
primary responsibility is social and communal.37
At another point he argues that "management must substitute 
cooperation for competition in the building of a more ideal 
society."3® However, ideals are a function of the dreamer 
and in this case Sheldon made no effort to explain what an 
"ideal society" was so that others might compare their 
conceptualization and intelligently agree or dissent. 
Therefore, this "ideal society" is far from a scientific 
concept; it is an opinion, an opinion which is perfectly 
acceptable but not a universally applicable objective of 
all men. No doubt this cooperative ideal would be a night­
mare to the competitive free enterpriser.
Thus, it becomes possible to appreciate the unusual 
circumstance of the management and organization theorist.
The objectivity of science does not require that these 
individuals have no values or opinions relative to the 
proper ends of organizations and society as a whole. It
■^Oliver Sheldon, The Philosophy of Management. Sir 




does require, however, that statements of scientific signifi­
cance be explicitly separated from propositions of value and 
opinion. No method of science can prove that the objective 
of business operations "should" be social betterment just as 
there is nothing to say it "should" be profit maximization. 
These "shoulds" become meaningful only after the ultimate 
objective is made explicit and meaningfulness is accomplished 
only within the framework of the given end.
The normative concept is manipulative in character since 
it proposes to influence behavior.^ Positive science, on 
the other hand, attempts only to explain and describe--never 
to reform. Any workable normative theory can evolve if and 
only if 1 ) the goals of the organization are explicitly 
determined, 2) tentative optimal rules are formulated, 3 )the 
rules are tested in real situations and U.) they are revised 
and retested to insure workability.^ Ironically, if this 
is done the theory is no longer normative but positive 
because it makes no reference to ends, only to means with 
respect to stated ends.
Finally, a seeming paradox must be satisfied before
39j0nes, o£. cit.. p. 160.
^■°Avery B. Cohen, "The Theory of Firm: A View on Method­
ology." Journal of Business. Vol. XXXVI. No. 3 (July, 1963), 
pp. 323-35IT
346
moving to the next topic. The proposition is simply this: 
why is not the advocation of a positive approach to organi­
zations itself a normative judgment? A few moment of reflec­
tion will now make it obvious why the two assumptions at the 
first of the chapter were necessary. At that point it was 
assumed that the objectives of science were the accomplish­
ment of systematic knowledge and the constant reevaluation 
of its methods in a search for improvement. The argument 
in favor of a positive approach is, therefore, an advocation 
of the more proper mean to be used in accomplishing the 
stated ends of science. A positive approach is a means to 
an end, not an end itself and is, therefore, not a judgment 
of value and not a normative assertion.
But when do judgments of value begin? Is it not possi­
ble to argue that selective perception itself is the result 
of value orientation? The discussion of this issue is the 
objective of the following section.
Judgments of Relevance and Judgments of Value
Two distinct schools of thought have emerged in the 
social sciences relative to the value-centric predicament.^ 
One group, that may be labeled the absolute skeptics, claims
^McEwen, 0£. cit. , pp.
1U7
that the social-scientific enterprise can never achieve 
objective knowledge because the personal preferences and 
socio-cultural environment of the investigator predetermines 
one's results. However, internal inconsistencies become 
immediately evident in this assertion. Initially, one is 
inclined to ask how these critics manage to escape their 
own condemnations. In other words, if their argument be 
valid then their distrust of social knowledge must be nothing 
more than a product of their predetermined environmental prej­
udice.^ It may also be noted that this skepticism would 
necessarily deny any type of scientific knowledge either 
physical or social since a large part of the natural scien­
tist's work is also subject to errors of selective perception.
An alternative position, known as modified skepticism, 
recognizes that scientists entertain social preferences which
I Oaccount for their interest in specific problems. However, 
this does not deny the possibility of objective knowledge of 
social phenomena as can be noted by reference to Table I .
^2Ibid.
^ J .  A. Passmore, "Can the Social Sciences be Value- 
Free?," in Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck, editors, Readings 
in the Philosophy of Science, Appleton-Century-Crofts, IncT, 
iTew York" 1953, p.~T»7^ and Morris R. Cohen, Reason and Nature, 
2nd ed., The Free Press, Publishers, Glencoe, 111. , 
p. 8l.
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Fundamentally, both groups argue that various approaches are 
developed for acquiring and verifying information which become 
known as the knowledge-situation and may assume such forms as 
empiricism and rationalism. Each method relates to some 
meaning-situation that is derived in turn from an individual's 
value-situation. The value-situation of the scientist is the 
search for objective truth which leads him to examine various 
ways of accomplishing this objective (meaning-situation) and 
finally to apply a selected method in his research (knowledge- 
situation). The question of the possibility of objective 
truth reduces to an issue regarding the point at which cul­
tural influences are introduced. The absolute skeptics argue 
that the knowledge-situation is culturally determined while 
the modified skeptics contend that it is the meaning-situation 
that is so d e c i d e d . ^  Thus, the difference can be seen; if 
the knowledge-situation is a product of the environment, all 
the methods of science are invalidated and non-universally 
acceptable. However, if the meaning-situation is determined 
in this manner true knowledge is possible, at least to those 
who share an epistemological perspective.
But, there is more to the value-centric predicament than 
the imputation of values into the final product of science.
^ M c E w e n ,  loc . ci t .
Epistemological perspectives determine to some extent what 
elements of objective events management theorists will 
abstract as meaningful. It is precisely for this reason 
that Talcott Parsons calls science "a selective system of 
cognitive orientations to reality."^ When the selection 
is deliberate, "slanting"^ occurs; but slanting and the 
selective system of science are two fundamentally different 
processes. The selective perceptual system is unconscious; 
slanting is not. Slanting involves a deliberate attempt to 
deceive, whereas unconscious selective perception has no 
such objective. Logical intuition confirms the impossibility 
of determining in advance the importance of a given factor in 
a complex situation, thus making judgments of relevance an
I n
absolute necessity. In this sense all knowledge of society 
or nature is knowledge obtained from a particular viewpoint 
and is subjective. It does not follow from this that research
^Ernest Dale, "The Functional Approach to Management," 
in Harold Koontz, editor, Toward A Unified Theory of Manage- 
ment, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. , 1%L|., p. 22.
^ S e e  S. I. Hayakawa, Language in Thought and Action.
2nd ed., Harcourt, Brace and World, Trie., Chicago, 196i;, 
p. I4.8 and Fritz J. Roethlisberger, in Koontz, op. cit., pp.
58-59.
^Fritz Machlup, "Are the Social Sciences Really Inferior 
in Natanson, 0£. cit., pp. 165-166 and Simon, o£. cit. . p. $1.
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in the social sciences can result in knowledge that is valid
for one person and not for another.^
Individual hopes and social ideals can be kept from
coloring the results of research through the self-correcting
k9mechanism of the scientific attitude.^ It must be noted 
that all the projects of the physical sciences past and 
present have not been independent of the values of man, yet 
objectivity has been maintained. Such universal agreement 
is unlikely in social areas but even in this domain the 
fundamental tenet of those who believe in scientific dis­
cussion is that matters of fact and logic can be agreed upon
50by competent men of good will. By choosing to pursue scien­
tific inquiry, the scientist enters the "corpus of science" 
and by doing so is obligated to accept what is considered to
51be established knowledge or show cause why he cannot do so.
Thus, it is not the degree of intentional or subconscious 
bias that determines the validity of a theory. This can be 
determined only through the rigor of discursive reasoning and
^8Shils and Finch, o£. cit., pp. 8l-8l^.
^Ernest Nagel, "Problems of Concept and Theory Formation 
in the Social Sciences," in Natanson, o£. cit.. pp. 199-200.
^George Stigler, The Theory of Price. The Macmillian 
Company, New York, 192+6, pp. 15-16.
^Alfred Schultz, "Common Sense and Scientific Interpre­
tation of Human Action," in Natanson, o£. cit.. p. 337.
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empirical teat. Theories and principles are not easily formu­
lated in the scientific community; first they must be scruti-
52nized and debated prior to their acceptance or rejection.
The objectivity of science arises, not because the individual 
is impartial, but because he is subject to constant test by
53impersonal and skeptical scientific colleagues and methods.
The "obligations" of scientific skepticism to insure 
objectivity is not entirely free from error because all men 
are not scientists. Students of management and organizations 
are often tempted to unquestionably accept the word of influ­
ential writers in the area. If research findings were limited 
to empirical and logical facts such a "blind acceptance" would
do no harm. However, as two writers clearly state, "the mix­
ture of factual findings and values is so prevalent in the 
literature of organizations that it is often extraordinarily 
difficult to distinguish between the t w o . " ^  It can hardly 
be denied that few theorists have openly welcomed and encour­
aged skepticism to the degree evidenced by Professors Simon,
Joseph J. Schwab, "What Do Scientists Do," Behavioral
Science, Vol. V, No. 1 (Jan., I960), p. 13.
^3joan Robinson. Economic Philosophy. Aldine Publishing 
Company, Chicago, 1962" p^ 23•
^Herbert G. Hicks and Friedhelm Gronzy, "On Methodology 
in the Study of Management and Organizations," Academy of 
Management Journal. Vol. X, No. i;. (Dec., 19&7), p. 381 •
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Smithburg and Thompson in the following quotation from the
introductory section of Public Administration;
We encourage in the reader a critical attitude 
toward evidence. In stating generalizations about 
administration we have tried to present the evidence 
on which these generalizations are based, where evi­
dence exists . . .  we hope the reader will apply the 
same standards of rigor to our unproved generaliza­
tions that we have applied to these generalizations 
of others . , . and will join the great task of sub­
stituting fact for fancy and replace ambiguous prov­
erb-like wisdom with valid propositions which will 
meet the tests of reason and e x p e r i e n c e.55
What a most refreshing statement this is to an attentive posi­
tivist. It must be conceded, however, that it is not the ele­
ment of judgment per se that is dangerous because clearly;
. . .  if behavioral knowledge is not disciplined 
by values about which considerable consensus has 
developed, somebody will use that knowledge to 
discipline all men in organizations without their 
knowledge.5°
The danger exists with respect to the confusion of fact 
and value as well as the failure to make explicit their sepa­
rate identity. Miss Robinson’s description of economics as 
"limping along with one foot in untested hypotheses and the 
other in metaphysical s l o g a n s m i g h t  apply equally well to
55nerbert A. Simon, Donald W. Smithburg and Victor 
Thompson, Public Administration, Alfred A. Knopf, New York,
1950, P . vTir.------------------
5^Robert T. Golembiewski, M e n , Management and Morali 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 19657 P* 3*
^Robinson, o£. cit. . p. 25-
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management. Positive theory is a sign of the maturity of 
science and as a science progresses, its prescriptive elements
56tend to become less frequent. Therefore, let there be judg­
ments both of relevance and value. For the judgments of rele­
vance may be scientifically debated, and any scientist who 
objects either to the inclusion or exclusion of a given ele­
ment may attack the theory on that basis. It is left to him 
to prepare his argument and present his case. The scientific 
community may then experimentally and logically test the 
validity of his claims. Thus, judgments of relevance are 
scientifically determinant and debatable constituting no 
serious problem to science.
The same cannot be said of judgments of value. The 
only expedient means of reducing problems arising from a 
mixture of fact and value is the "rule of explicit statement." 
This rule does not require that values be excluded from the 
study of management and organizations, but it does insist 
that a difference be made between scientific fact and axiol- 
ogical prescription. Compliance with this rule would alleviate 
the question of morality because the acceptance or rejection 
of the writer’s values becomes the choice of the reader.
^Rollin H. Simonds, "Toward A Science of Business 
Administration," Academy of Management Journal. Vol. II,
No. 2 (Aug., 1959), p. 1377
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However, even explicit statements of judgment, if they are
in vague forms, will not solve the communicative problems
except to the extent that the terms are less ambiguous by
virtue of their reference to a specific system of axiological 
crorules. The explanation of the nature of this problem re­
quires the use of a rather specialized technique.
The Structural Differential
The report of scientific fact is an abstraction, not
the objective occurrence itself. Although a scientific report
is the most accurate of verbal and symbolic descriptions, it
never accomplishes complete perfection. Such a description
is often referred to as an observation which concentrates on
6 0denotative meanings. Denotative meanings are those 
emphasizing word-object relationships that can be checked 
with reference to tangible reality. Note, however, that 
even this is an abstraction because facts either exist or 
do not exist--truth and falsity are meaningless relative to 
them. Observations on the other hand, may be true or false
6depending on how well they coincide with the objective event.
Kaufmann, op. cit. , p. 200.
^David K. Berio, The Process of Communication. Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, New York, 196"57 221.
61Ibid., pp. 218-219.
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Regardless of this inaccuracy, observations are associated 
with lower levels of abstraction.
Statements made on the basis of observations are known 
as inferences and assert characteristics about the unknown on 
the basis of the known. For instance, suppose it has been 
observed that closely arranged work areas in steel plants 
promote group dissention. To establish a general rule of 
plant layout on the basis of this observation is to infer 
that the results of the experiment are broadly applicable 
to yet unknown situations. But how do judgments fit into 
this scheme? Are they observations or inferences?
Judgments are a special type of inference. Unlike 
observations they emphasize connotative or emotive meanings.^ 
Thus, judgments have no referent in objective reality. More 
specifically, judgments express approval or disapproval and 
take place at any level of abstraction above observation.
When one expresses approval or disapproval the judgment is 
made on the basis of what is observed rather than the event 
or process that actually happens. Therefore, judgments lie 
within an abstraction range of greater than observation but
fi 2Hayakawa, oj>. cit., p. I4.I.
k^Pap, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. op, 
cit., p. 10.
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less than infinite inference. The degree to which judgments 
are based on the actual characteristics of a phenomenon is 
simply a function of the level of abstraction at which they 
take place. Generally speaking, the higher the abstraction 
the greater the "propensity for communicative difficulties."
*By use of a certain tool, Korzybski's structural differ­
ential, the nature of this type of problem in management and 
organizations may be illustrated. Referring to Figure 10 the 
communicative problem of value judgments is noted. The large 
triangle at the bottom of the page represents the actual pro­
cess or event. In this case it is the managerial concept of 
human relations. The numbers on the right and left refer 
respectively to the conceptual advantages and disadvantages 
of this approach. The characteristics indexed are as follows:
Briefly, this is a list of some of the advocated pros and cons 
of human relations. It is certainly not exhaustive because 
of the writer's abstraction process resulting from limited 
academic and practical exposure to the concept. For this rea­
son, along with the fact that all is never known concerning an 
actual event, the etc. is included as the final factor in 
each group.
Disadvantages Advantages
3 . High benefit cost 
Ij.. Reduced efficiency
5. Lack of discipline
6 . Etc.
1. Country-club atmosphere
2. Excessive record work
1. Job satisfaction
2. Employee-employer relations












THE STRUCTURAL DIFFERENTIAL 
(Human Relations Approach)
1*8
Hypothetically, the circle above the triangle represents 
a researcher's image of the objective concept after he has 
completed the necessary training as a foundation for his 
research. The lines running from the triangle to the circle 
illustrate the characteristics retained after education and 
individual thought concerning the subject. Thus, the re­
searcher via his preparation is separated from the concept 
so that only the following characteristics remain as his 
idea of the human relations approach.
Further experience in research and prolonged exposure to 
the human relations idea results in the abstraction of addi­
tional elements from the concept. This situation is illus­
trated by the rectangle above the circle. The lines con­
necting the two once again illustrate the fact that charac­
teristics are "lost" in the process of abstracting. For 
purposes of illustration assume that only the following char­
acteristics remain at level three.
Disadvantages Advantages
1. Country-club atmosphere
2. Excessive record work
3 . High benefit cost








2. Excessive record work
3. High benefit cost
6 . Etc.
2. Employee-employer relations




Based on this, suppose that the researcher-teacher judges 
that the advantages of productivity, low turnover and favor­
able employee-employer relations outweigh the disadvantages 
of excessive record work and high benefit costs. With refer­
ence to this evaluation the human relations approach is de­
clared to be "good.” In doing so no reference is made to 
the fact that such an assertion is opinion based on a few 
uniquely abstracted characteristics of the concept toto.
In other words, the judgment is made on the basis of a finite 
number of characteristics abstracted from an infinite set of 
all the qualities the concept possesses. It is at this point 
the danger enters. To the unsuspecting student, human rela­
tions is depicted as good; thus, solving one problem and 
freeing time to concentrate on others. Relative to human 
relations the thought process is stopped save for only the 
most ambitious scholars.^ In reaching this "conclusion" 
there is little or no further searching for truth and possi­
bly even a blindness to any contrary conditions that might 
develop. Little might the pupil know of human relations, yet, 
to him it is "good." The point to be made is that "good" is 
defined only in terms of the judge himself.
^Hayakawa, o£. cit. . p. ij.6 .
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The student qua business practitioner novice, upon 
accepting a job with a small firm, may find to his surprise 
that the human relations approach is "bad." Why? Because 
his boss says it isJ The boss has abstracted high benefit 
costs as a characteristic he cannot tolerate. Obviously, 
the boss has selected another group of qualities from the 
infinite set and assigned subjective weights to them. Once 
again it is emphasized that judgments are made on the basis 
of dominant characteristics and subjective weights, not 
relative to objective occurrences.
The example developed was selected for illustrative 
purposes only. Judgments could have taken place at other 
levels, as indicated by the infinity sign in the highest 
level, and any management concept could have been selected. 
Many complications such as a "dynamic expansion" of the 
entire structural differential resulting in new character­
istics at various levels were obviously neglected for pur­
poses of simplicity. But the point would have been the 
same, the only difference being that the higher the abstrac­
tion level at which judgment takes place, the fewer will be 
the actual characteristics of the phenomenon upon which it 
is based.
An explicit proclamation that one's judgments are merely
opinion, not empirical fact, can aid in reducing the communi-»
cative as well as moral problems of value judgments. By
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explicit acknowledgment of opinion the thought process of 
the student is not hindered and may even be stimulated 
because the door remains open to examination and concept 
formation. If, however, the door remains open to thought 
one might ask why so much disagreement exists relative to 
the various methodological issues discussed to this point.
One reason, as mentioned before, is simply that the door 
has not always been open and in addition the subject matter 
of the social disciplines display a uniqueness not typical 
of physical processes. But the fundamental reason, it must 
be conceded, is that the lack of sophistication in the 
social sciences has left the meaning-situation of the indi­
vidual more subject to the emotional influences of matura­
tion and socialization. In other words, the social scien­
tist faces a greater task in achieving objectivity, although 
to do so is by no means impossible, because many of the issues 
he must examine contribute to his personal development and the 
formation of his "self concept."
The Psychology of Self-Projection
There is little doubt that many of man's ideas and values 
result from the influence of the e n v i r o n m e n t . ^  in fact,
^Stuart Chase, The Proper Study of Mankind, Revised ed., 
Harper and Brothers, Publishers, New York, 19^6, p. 6.
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students of human behavior view the emergence of the "self”
and the activities of experiencing as a dynamic developmental
66process beginning at birth and continuing throughout life. 
According to this view, experiencing today is a function of 
funded information or background (B) which structures percep­
tion and establishes a meaningful foreground (F) to be eval-
67uated before becoming genuine experience (E). ' Mathemati­
cally, this proposition may be stated as
E = f(F, B)
so that E changes in some relation to changes in F and B.
The process is said to be dynamic because E^ in time t-̂ 
becomes part of the background to structure the new percep­
tion in t2 * This proposition, while deviating somewhat from
6 8the original formulation, can be illustrated as follows:
Time ^  E-|_ = f(F1 , B1 )
•ifTime t2 E£ = f(F2 ,B2 )
'ifTime t^ = f(F^,B^)
Etc.
k^Louis Kaplan, Foundations of Human Behavior. Harper 
and Row Publishers, New York, 1^657 PP* 127-126.
Jones, o£. cit. . p. I4.I.
/ QAlthough Jones accomplishes a more rigorous analysis 
of the process and argues that experience Ei becomes part of 
foreground F2 , etc., this illustration includes Ej in B2 , 
etc., for purposes of simplification.
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If this is true, and social research suggests that it is, 
serious implications are noted for teacher-pupil communica­
tions .
Communication Problems Involving the "Self”
The individual who initiates communication is known as
the source. Communication originating from this source is
a function of the source's 1 ) attitude toward himself,
2) attitude toward the message and 3 ) attitude toward the
receiver.^ These attitudes are formulated by Francis Bacon's
idols of the tribe, cave, marketplace and theater which include
all external influences such as culture, education, socializa-
70tion and contemporary philosophies. Thus, communication is
viewed as a psychological process best understood in terms of
71mental states. It is this proposition, founded upon the 
"thingumbob principle" which states that human organisms call 
upon previous experience and assumes that what has been most
^Berlo, op. cit. , pp. i+6-Z4.8.
7®Francis Bacon, "Novum Organum." in Hayden and Alworth, 
op. cit. . pp. 15-23*
7^T. M. Higham, "Basic Psychological Factors in 
Communication," Occupational Psychology, Vol. XXXI, No. 1 
(Jan., 1957), p . ^ T * -----
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72probable in the past will be most probable in the future.
The implications of this principle are best explained via 
two well known models of the communicative process.
The Process of Communication
Models have proven useful in the analysis of the commu­
nicative process because they permit one to isolate the parts 
of reality which are of particular interest to him. There 
are models or ideal types designed to illustrate many things, 
however, only two have been selected on the basis that they 
most adequately relate to the problem at hand.
Johnson on Projection. Figure 11a reveals a scheme
71developed by Professor Wendell Johnson in 19ij-6.'J Johnson's 
model makes several important points but primarily it illus­
trates that people always speak to and about themselves. 
Briefly, the model is explained in the following stages:
1. Stage 1 represents any external stimulation to the
sensory organs of the source (in this case the source 
is actually the receiver).
72Douglas McGregor, "The Major Determinants of the Pre­
diction of Social Events," Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology. Vol. XXXIII, No. £ (April, 1930), p7“?03 and 
Chase, the Power of Words. op. cit., p. 52.
73wendell Johnson, "The Fateful Process of Mr. A Talking 
to Mr. B." Harvard Business Review, Vol. XXXI, No. 1 (Jan.- 
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2. Stage 2 reveals the resultant sensory stimulation.
The constriction indicates the source qua receiver’s 
limited ability to respond.
3. Stage 3 is the neurophysiological channeling of the
sensory stimulation. This is still a preverbal stage.
1̂.. Stage i|. shows the first stage of symbolization. The
enlargement suggests the evaluative process which 
occurs. It is here where the background (B) struc­
tures the perception.
5. Stage 5 represents the final stage of symbolization 
with the constriction indicating the selection of a 
few symbols from among an infinite number available 
for overt expression.
6. Stage 5 becomes the stage 1 for the receiver of the
message.
The expanded infinity sign at the bottom of the diagram 
serves to illustrate the notion of self-projection. On the 
basis of one's experiences he evaluates the stimuli which 
form the framework for communication with others. Then, by 
projecting his subjective evaluations into his fellow man, 
one attempts to accomplish a transfer of meanings via verbal 
or written communications. Feedback is received and becomes 
part of the source's sum total of experience. Therefore, 
communication is a continuous and iterative process between 
source and receiver which is dynamic and ever changing. To 
better understand this proposition observe Figure lib which 
illustrates the evaluative operations of the source. The 
lower part of the diagram may be looked upon as an enlarged 
stage in Figure 11a while the happening and impact are
167
analogous to stages 1, 2 and 3. In stage ^ certain affectors 
(habits, prejudices, experiences, etc.) go to work and deter­
mine the response one will exhibit to the stimuli received.7^
The response is determined only after extensive evaluation has 
taken place. For instance, stimuli received are structured 
and assigned meaning on the basis of their association with 
the sum total of the affectors. The properties the source 
assigns to the receiver are also determined by the unique 
characteristics of the source's affectors. Thus, the entire 
communicative process is influenced by the projection of sub­
jective characteristics from one party to the other. There­
fore, evaluation and response are but one's projection of 
himself into others. This is the only means by which exper­
ience becomes meaningful. Failure to consider this self­
projection may result in less meaningful and faulty communi­
cation. It can blind one to the filtering process and cause 
him to feel that everyone thinks as he does, or, in the case 
of an instructor it may reduce his responsiveness to feedback. 
Thus, self-projection is an intergal part of all communication 
and only an awareness of the presence of such a process can 
minimize its adverse effects.
7^Willi am V. Haney, Communication: Patterns and Incidents.
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., Homewood, 111., I960, p. 3-8.
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Another model, originally designed to illustrate mass 
communication, was developed by Wilbur Schramm. This model 
is particularly useful because it is easily adaptable to a 
classroom situation.
An Adaptation of Schramm. The basic Schramm model was
developed in a book entitled The Process and Effects of Mass
Communication. ^  Essentially, it consists of three elements:
a source, a signal and a destination. Both the sender and
receiver perform the functions of decoding, interpreting and
encoding, thus creating a dynamic feedback system. Figure
12a illustrates the nature of this process. However, it is
Figure 12b that has application to the classroom environment.
For purposes of illustration, the teacher-researcher assumes
the position of the source, the results of research or a
lecture constitutes the signal, while the student is the
destination. As Berio has noted, the learning process is a
dyadic relationship between teacher and student which requires
7 Aeffective communication. In order for effective communica­
tion to take place there must be some overlap of experience 
or interest. This overlap has been referred to as "trans-
7 5'^Wilbur Schramm, The Process and Effects of Mass 
Communication, University of Illinois Press , Urloana, 111., 
1955, PP. 3-26.












Encoder ecoder Recei verSource
Signal
SOURCE: Wilbur Schramm, The Process and Effects of
Mass Communication, University of Illinois Press, Urbana
T S 5 F.------------------
FIGURE 12 
AN ADAPTATION OF SCHRAMM
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cendental presuppositions” or an "underlying unity of spirit. 
However, this paper will refer to it as the "mutually reciprocal 
communication foci11 (MRCF). It is outside this MRCF that in­
jections of value judgments create their serious communicative 
problems. The assumption that everyone views human relations 
as "good" requires a unity of value systems among all and a 
uniformity of connotation to the term. In reality, as has 
been shown above, this may be far from true because of varying 
environmental backgrounds and experiences. Although no unity 
of value systems exists, the influential source (teaeher- 
researcher) may perpetuate his beliefs through the receiver 
(student) by expressing his subjective opinions under the 
heading of scientific fact.
It is this type of value judgment injection that accounts 
for the retention of antiquated ideas in educational situations. 
Because the source "holds on" to certain ideas, the receiver 
is tempted to accept them as true and pass them on to other 
receivers when he becomes the source. In some cases this 
"injection" of judgments is not even intentional because envi- 
onmental factors have so thoroughly conditioned the source
^Ernest Nagel, Logic Without Metaphysics. The Free 
Press, Glencoe, 111., 1956, p. 3̂ 4-9.
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that he fails to recognize any alternatives are possible. 
Thus, many differences of opinion are environmentally deter­
mined and never challenged until the environment is altered.
According to the self-projection idea any belief may be 
influenced by environment and experience--even convictions 
relating to methodology. This proposition leads directly to 
the hypotheses the following empirical study proposes to 
examine. Specifically, the survey will attempt to determine 
whether or not environmental factors do, in fact, influence 
epistemological perspectives and other methodological con­
victions of management professors. But, assuming this is 
true, of what importance is such a finding?
Methodology Today and Theory Tomorrow. No timetable can 
be established for the methodological unification of manage­
ment and organization theorists. In fact, some question, as 
the writer does, if a thorough integration will ever be 
accomplished. However, there is virtue in prediction and 
the increased certainty obtained by gaining insight into the 
future. For this reason, chapter four is devoted to the 
analysis of the following major and minor hypotheses.
Major Hyp° thesis - Professional attitudes toward
methodological issues are a func­
tion of past and present environ­
mental influences of the research­
er and/or teacher.
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Minor Hypothesis - Specific environmental factors do
not influence the formation of all 
methodological convictions with equal 
intensity. Therefore, the primary 
determinant of one belief may or may 
not be the major determinant with 
respect to another.
If the two hypotheses are confirmed and if one accepts 
the notion of self-projection, the first step will have been 
taken toward gaining insight into the future of management 
and organization theory. This argument is based on the idea 
that today's academia, either consciously or unconsciously, 
will influence the theoretical exercises of future scholars 
who will Structure the course of management science. On the 
other hand, should no environmental deviations be uncovered, 
serious questions might be raised concerning the exemption of 
methodological convictions from environmental influences. But 
before continuing with the study, a summary of the present 
chapter is offered.
Summary
Chapter three has attempted to move from the philosophical 
formulations of the previous chapter to examine the practical 
aspects of methodological problems in organizations. The con­
clusions reached are itemized in the following list:
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1. The language of science Is a more restricted case of 
language in general. Science relies primarily on 
cognitive-descriptive rather than emotive verbal 
formulations. Although some propositions have been 
advanced to make definitions of the social disciplines 
more operational, only "broader operationalism" seems 
to offer real improvements in these areas.
2. It is the opinion of the writer that only those as­
pects concerning "what is" belong within the bound­
aries of organizational science. Although ideal 
formulations of "what ought to be" is an appropriate 
topic for philosophers, the subjective nature of 
these ends and the values upon which they rest defy 
scientific analysis.
3. Judgments of relevance are fundamentally different 
from judgments of value. While values escape scien­
tific analysis, questions of relevance are testable 
and subject to logical debate.
4* Korzybski’s structural differential proves to be a 
valuable tool in illustrating the dangers of dis­
guised value judgments. Judgments of value are 
made on the basis of dominant characteristics 
abstracted from an infinite array which an objec­
tive event possesses. If care is not taken to 
separate fact and value researchers may cast their 
values upon students who know very little about the 
subject being judged.
5. A fundamental tenet of general semantics states that 
self-projection plays an important role in all commu­
nicative efforts. It is further argued that the dog­
matic assumption that everyone thinks exactly as the 
source on the communication may result in serious 
problems. The conscious acknowledgment and awareness 
of this process will contribute greatly to the estab­
lishment of a "mutually reciprocal communicative foci" 
between student and teacher.
6. The foundation has been formed to empirically test 
a major and minor hypothesis relating to the deter­
minants of differences of opinion relative to var­
ious methodological concepts. The primary objective 
of the test is to provide some insight into the 
future of management theory by making use of the 
self-projection concept.
CHAPTER IV
A SURVEY OF MANAGEMENT ACADEMIA
How sharp the blade 
To trim the tree of chance?
How rich the castle where 
computers prance?
Philosopher, hand me your stone,
A tool with which the blade to hone, 
Centers? Choices small in error? 
Chaotic gods . . . retreat in
terror .'
Models Bayesian? Parallel?
How much like man?





The present chapter will attempt to report the results 
of a survey conducted among a sample of management professors. 
The survey was complex in the sense that it was accomplished 
in sequential stages. Therefore, the logical ordering of the 
many topics to be discussed will be provided by the progres­
sive phases required for the completion of the study. But 
first, a rudimentary framework for analysis must be estab­
lished.
Specific Objectives of the Survey
In line with the empiricist's tradition, it becomes
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necessary to examine some of the ideas thus far advanced. 
Specifically, an attempt will be made to empirically analyze 
the notion of self-projection among professors of management 
and organization theory. This self-projection concept will 
be tested via an examination of the hypotheses enumerated 
at the close of the preceding chapter. However, one ques­
tion deserves consideration prior to the initiation of the 
study: what, if any, contribution will such an analysis
make to the areas of management and organization theory?
Importance of the Study
To the writer’s knowledge, there has been no previous 
research associated with the issues at hand. This apparent 
lack of interest is disturbing because of the adademic ques­
tions this type of information could raise. However, rather 
than listing numerous less significant advantages, only the 
writer's idea of the primary contribution of this analysis 
will be noted. If it could be determined that certain envi­
ronmental factors are important in formulating methodological 
convictions, some conception of the future of management and 
organization theory could be obtained. For instance, if the 
study should reveal that professors in public institutions 
have opinions which are separate and distinct from those 
teaching in private schools, it would be possible to project 
the effects of these counter positions upon the concept
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formation of future students. With this in mind, the 
following section proposes to explain, in detail, the 
research design used in the survey.
The Research Design 
The research design adopted for the primary study was 
sequential in nature. The four fundamental steps involved 
provided the logical organization of the following sections. 
Elaborations on Sample Selection and Response
It was determined by numerical count that nationally 
there were approximately one thousand professors whose 
primary teaching interests were in the area of management 
and organizations. Since nothing was known concerning the 
parameters of the universe, no statistical procedures were 
available to estimate the sample size needed. In order to 
Insure a return from at least ten per cent (approximately 
100) of the total population, it was decided that at least 
one third of the universe should be surveyed (actually 380 
questionnaires were mailed). On the basis of other studies 
In the literature and subject to the constraint of cost, 
such a sample was considered more than adequate.
The professors to be included In the study were selected 
at random from two sources. The first source was the Faculty 
Personnel Directory^ published by the American Association of
1RIchard R. Weeks, editor, Faculty Personnel Directory. 
9th ed., American Association of Collegiate Schools of 
Business, 1965*
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Collegiate Schools of Business. In order to insure adequate
representation of AACSB schools, approximately 225 of the 3^0
questionnaires were sent to the faculties of member institu-
2tions listed in the 1965 directory. The remaining 155 
subjects were selected from individual school catalogs on 
file at the Louisiana State University library. Of the 380 
faculty members surveyed, teaching positions were held in 
255 different colleges and universities. Every effort was 
made to select only those teachers whose primary interests 
were in the field of management and organization theory. 
However, in some cases the extraction of the management 
faculty from the faculty _in toto was difficult and at other 
times impossible. This problem was especially evident in 
the very small schools without structured programs within 
the school of business. When this problem presented itself, 
individual course descriptions were consulted. If neither 
method provided the desired information, the school, and 
therefore the faculty, was eliminated from the sample.
Regardless of the source used, the selection procedure 
was the same; all the individual members of the management 
faculty of a given college or university were alined in a
OAlthough no exact figures were available, a survey of 
member schools revealed that they were,in general, the larger 
institutions and therefore could be assumed to produce more 
management graduates. Thus, the AACSB schools were assigned 
this larger "weight" in the sample.
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one dimensional array, assigned a number and selected through 
the use of a table of random numbers. Where the management 
faculty for a given school was large, additional question­
naires were sent in a ratio of one form per seven professors.
In addition, the sample was divided into four geograph­
ical classifications. Faculty members were then selected 
in roughly the same proportions as the population disper­
sion indicated by the I960 census. This proportionate 
matching was made on the assumption that there exists some 
relationship between college enrollment and population.
Figure 13 reveals the geographical areas that were estab­
lished. These four subclassifications will be referred to
simply as the East, Midwest, South and West.
It may also be noted from Figure 13 that public, pri­
vate and denominationally supported schools were represented 
in the sample. The first figure shown in each area is the 
total number of forms sent to that particular region. The 
three following numbers account, respectively, for the 
number of public, private and denominational schools sur­
veyed. Because the catalog of almost every existing school 
was consulted, it seems reasonable to assume that these 
figures represent the approximate proportions of the insti­
tutions situated in the four areas.
The questionnaires were placed in the mail on April 1,
1968, and no returns were included in the computations which
WCTii.
CRAM’S 
SVxll  Outline Map
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FIGURE 13 
GEOGRAPHICAL DISPERSION OF SAMPLE
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were received after June 2, 1968. Of the 380 forms posted, 
162 or 1|2.6 per cent were returned. However, 15 of these 
were not usable for the reasons listed below:
1. Professor's primary interest in area other than 
management. (8 )
2. Incomplete completion of the form. (6 )
3. Received after June 2, 1968. (1)
Thus, the "usable percentage return" was 38.6 per cent. The 






Per Cent of 
Return
East 100 32 32.0
Midwest 90 36 40.0




Type of Number Usable Per Cent of
Institution Sampled Returns Return
Publi c 200 96 46.0
Pri vate 90 29 32.2
Denominational 90 22 24.2
3&0 w ?
In total, the data were classified and the responses 
differentiated on the basis of ten environmental factors. 
These subgroupings are given in Table II. Some of the more 
interesting characteristics of the respondents can be noted 
with only a brief reference to these figures. For instance, 
65*3 P©r cent of the total usable returns came from teachers 
in public institutions. Moreover, most of the respondents 












Less than 25 18 12.2
26-1*5 59 1*0.1
1*6-60 56 38.2
















Less than 5 1*1 27.96-10 32 21.8
11-20 1*7 32.0
21-30 20 13.6
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^Two respondents possessed LLB degrees 
•JHS-This group consisted primarily of agnostics and non- 
denominational.
■JHHt-inciuded in this classification were nine sons of farmers 
and seven sons of self-employed parents.
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the ij.6-60 years category running a close second (30*2 per cent). 
Of the lit-7 professors replying, 72.8 per cent held doctorate 
degrees, and more of the highest degrees held (32 per cent) 
were earned in the Midwest than in any other single region.
In addition, the Midwest was the region where many (35>k per 
cent) of the respondents spent their early years.
In general, the teaching experience of the professors 
clustered in one of two classifications. The largest group 
(32 per cent) was composed of those with 11-20 years experience 
while the next largest category (27.9 per cent) referred to 
those with experience of less than five years. The Protestants 
exhibited a definite majority (66 per cent) relative to reli­
gious preference, and more (33*3 P©r cent) professors' fathers 
were employed in white-collar positions than in any other 
occupational classification.
Reference will be made from time to time concerning these 
characteristics, and their significance will be discussed in 
detail in the analysis to follow. But first, an explanation 
of the research vehicle used is in order.
Cons truetion of the Questionnaire
Since the study was designed to uncover psychological 
differences in the meaning of methodological concepts to 
various groups, it Immediately became evident that a special 
measuring technique was needed. The device selected was the
iQk
semantic differential (hereafter the SD) developed by Osgood, 
Suci and Tannenbaum^ as a method of measuring connotative 
meanings.
Logic of the Semantic Differential. The SD assumes the 
existence of a "semantic space" which is an area of unknown 
dimensionality and is Euclidian in character.^ The measuring 
technique defines a concept as a point in this space. Funda­
mentally, the objective is to differentiate the meanings of 
concepts or the meanings of the same concept to various groups 
or individuals.
In order to illustrate the operations of the SD, assume 
it has been determined that there are two basic dimensions of 
meaning relative to methodological concepts. These dimensions 
will be labeled EVALUATIVE (to reveal if the concept is "good" 
or "bad") and POTENCY (to define the degree of "goodness" or 
"badness"). With this in mind the geometric or spatial prop­
erties of this two dimensional space can be illustrated. Note 
the coordinates on the following page.^
If a concept, such as empiricism, has an ordered pair of 
numbers indicating its coordinates within the "space," say
^Charles E. Osgood, George J. Suci and Percy H. 
Tannenbaum, The Measurement of Meaning. The University of 
Illinois Press, Urbana, Illinois, 195/.
^Ibid., p. 25.
^Fred N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research. 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., New~7ork, 1966, pp. 6.
Potency 185









point A = (5,6), properties of its meaning are revealed by 
these numerical values. This ordered pair gives an indi­
cation of the concept's "absolute meaning" from which an 
additional property of "distance" or "relative meaning" can 
be derived. Within the semantic space those concepts whose 
ordered pairs place them near each other, such as PA (5,6) 
and PB(5,7) may be said to possess similar connotations.
As one might expect, because of the Eucledian character 
of the semantic space, the measure of distance between con­
cepts is simply the generalized geometric, linear distance 
formula. Therefore, to compute the distance (D) between the 
concepts A and C, where d is the algebraic difference between 
the coordinates on a specific dimension (evaluative or potency), 
one would proceed in the usual manner. First, square each of 
the differences between the coordinates for each dimension and
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sum the squared differences so that
= I (EA - V 2 + 2 (?A - V 2 where
E. = the coordinate measuring the evaluative dimension 
for the ith point
= the coordinate measuring the potency dimension for 
the ith point
Then extracting the square root of the sum one obtains:
However, these computations assume that quantitative values 
for the coordinates have been derived. Therefore, before con­
tinuing the necessary prerequisite steps will be analyzed.
Concept Selection. The first step in developing the SD 
was to select the concepts to be tested against a series of 
scales. As the form in APPENDIX A illustrates, six phrases 
were selected to serve as the stimuli. Although a greater 
number would have been desirable, limitations imposed by time 
and the importance of a large return made restraint an absolute' 
necessi ty.
It was recognized in the beginning that many potential 
respondents would find some of the concepts unfamiliar. To 
combat this "built-in bias" two steps were taken. The first
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attempt to minimize apprehension was to use a rather simple 
stimuli to introduce the pattern of response. Therefore, 
since it could be & priori assumed that most professors of 
management have definite opinions about the nature of their 
subject matter, the "present state of management theory" was 
placed first as an "interest getter." The second and third 
stimuli were included to test epistemological perspectives 
and were followed by two phrases dealing with value judgments. 
Finally, a concept relating to the political convictions of 
the professor was placed last, save for the page designed to 
obtain classification data.
In addition, a brief yet general explanation of the 
"stimuli phrase" was included under concepts two, three, four 
and five. This was done in an effort to establish a reason­
ably successful communicative foci. As a final attempt to 
insure uniformity of conceptualization, the instructions 
included on the form asked the respondents to answer on the 
basis of how the phrases "should" relate to management theory 
(excluding concepts one and six). This was deemed necessary 
due to the fear that one subject might evaluate the "present 
state of management theory" relative to all stimuli while 
others would answer on the basis of their subjective preference. 
The latter was concluded to be the most useful alternative for 
analysis.
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Once the concepts were selected only the scales remained 
unnamed. The process by which the scales were chosen is the 
subject of the following section.
Choice of Scales and Reversals. In the survey each per­
son was asked to judge a concept against ten bipolar adjective 
scales which had been tested in a pilot study conducted among 
a do^en graduate students at Louisiana State University. For 
purposes of the pretest, twelve scales were included, but two 
were eliminated because of disproportionately large variances 
which indicated no meaningful connotation between scale and 
stimuli existed. As a result the questionnaire in APPENDIX 
A illustrates the final form which was actually mailed. The 











The E or P which precedes each adjective pair refers to the 
dimension they were designed to measure, i.e., evaluation or
^These scales were selected from both lists offered by 
Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum, ojc. ci t. , pp. I4.3 and 53-58,
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potency. These bipolar adjective pairs were selected on the 
basis of two criteria: factor representativeness and rele­
vance to concepts used. The relevance choice was purely
intuitive, but the factor representativeness was an objec-
7tive measure obtained via Osgood's factor analysis.
When a subject was asked to judge a concept similar to 
the following,
"Empiricism"
Good X :_____:____ :____ :____ :____ :____  Bad
Pair ____ :_____ : X :____ :____ :____ :____  Unfair
each judgment served to locate the stimulus as a point in the
semantic space. Each meaning thus developed had two essential
properties--direction from the origin of the space (depending
upon the polar adjective checked) and distance from the origin
8(relating to the extremeness of the scale position marked).
Prior use of the SD has noted a tendency of respondents 
to develop a "system" or "pattern" of replying which resulted 
in a failure to think and consciously choose various alterna­
tives along the scales. In order to minimize this inclination, 
four of the scales (one, two, seven and nine) were reversed
?Ibid.. p. 26. 
QIbid.. p. 100.
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placing the "positive" alternative at the extreme right instead 
of the left. The rotation was accomplished in a purely random 
manner making use, once again, of a table of random numbers.
After the scale selection, elimination and rotation had 
been completed, all the necessary components were available 
for the construction of the questionnaire. It can be noted 
that Osgood's Form II, with each stimuli occupying a separate 
page, was adopted.
In addition, seven "spaces" were positioned between the 
bipolar adjective pairs. For computational convenience a 
number ranging from seven to one was assigned to each block 
beginning with seven at the most extreme positive adjective 
and reducing successively by one to one at the most extreme 
negative adjective. Thus, if the respondent checked the 
space nearest "good" on a good-bad continuum, his reply was 
assigned a numerical value of seven. On the other hand, if 
he marked the space nearest "bad" it was assigned a value of 
one. Each space in between was designated as an incremental 
value of one throughout the seven space range. Thus, a reply 
to any bipolar adjective scale was assigned a value from one 
to seven depending upon the extremeness and direction of the 
response. The significance of this explanation will become 
evident later when reference is made to the mean values of 
the various scales for different groups.
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The complete questionnaire consisted of ten pages (one 
page cover letter, two pages of instructions, six concepts, 
and a classification data page). Each form was accompanied 
by a return envelope to be mailed under a business reply 
permi t.
Uniqueness of the Problem. The above discussion relating 
to the logic of the SD is general and can be applied to any 
instrument so constructed. For this reason, it was described 
in terms of the differentiating of two concepts relative to 
a given group. However, in an effort to investigate the 
hypotheses of the proposed study a somewhat different approach 
was required. Rather than noting differences relative to con­
cepts, it was necessary to examine the divergency between two 
groups (say Eastern and Western professors) with respect to 
the meaning of a single concept (i.e., empiricism). In doing 
this, one would essentially be analyzing the relative positions
of the central tendencies of two uncorrelated "clouds" of points
9in the semantic space. Therefore, although this analysis was 
approached from a different angle, it too dealt with the dis­
tance between two points in a semantic space.
After all the replies were received, the data were pro­
cessed on the Louisiana State University IBM 701̂ 0 research
9Ibid., p. 90
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computer system. In an effort to confirm or disconfirm the 
hypotheses, a statistical analysis of the data was required.
Statistical Procedure
In considering the quantitative comparisons of similarity 
and difference, one's thoughts immediately anticipate the use 
of product-moment correlation analysis as an index of similar­
ity. However, as Osgood notes, the possibility of consistent 
covariance, which definitely proved a factor in the study,
can result in intercorrelations approaching r = 1.00 despite
10gross absolute discrepancies. For this reason the general­
ized distance measure (D) and a commonly used test of signifi­
cance were used as the primary analytical methods.
Test of Significance. Although the D measure provides
an adequate index of relative difference, it reveals little
11with respect to statistical significance. To insure that 
1QIbid.
■'■^Because of this limitation, the "t" test was employed. 
Since the standard deviation (o) of the universe was not 
known, it was necessary to estimate its magnitude via sample 
information. Initially, the null hypothesis p.̂ = ^2 and 
alternative hypothesis p. ̂  ^ M-2 were established and the "t" 
test applied using the relationship
t - (D - H^J/s^ where
D = Xi - Xj
= hypothetical difference between two population 
means (M>i - M- j) which in this case is zero
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the differences involved were significant, a null hypothesis, 
stating that M-i = M-j, or the mean of population^ equaled the 
mean of populationj was established. If the null hypothesis 
proved probabilistically false on the basis of sample informa­
tion at or = .05 for a sufficient number of scales, the groups 
were considered to think significantly different with respect 
to the concept.
Procedurally, this was accomplished by sequentially 
stratifying the respondents with respect to the factors to 
be scrutinized. The test of significance was then applied 
to the mean values by scales for each combination of two 
groups. Therefore, for each combination, sixty tests (6 con­
cepts x 10 scales each) were required. Based on this analysis 
a decision rule was established for the determination of 
statistical difference.
The Fundamental Decision Rule. The basic criterion for
(continued)
sd 4 which is the estimated standard
^error of the difference between two means.
s^ = (n-j.3^2 + r^Sp^/n^ + - 2) or the weighted
average of the individual sample estimates of 
the variances of the populations based on 
sample size.
Additional information on the specific aspects of the "t" 
test can be found in any basic statistical inference text such 
as Samuel B. Richmond, Statistical Analysis, 2nd ed., The Ronald 
Press, New York, 196i^, pp. 190-193*
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determining the significance of the difference between groups 
was as follows:
If at least one of the five scales measuring a given 
dimension (first five evaluative and second five po­
tency for each concept) discredited the null hypoth­
esis so that probabilistically j the entire
concept was considered different with respect to the 
i and j groups.
Since the rationale for such a rule is not immediately obvious,
a brief explanation is offered. At a = .05 (this level of
significance was used throughout), one would expect five out
of every 100 scales to show a significant difference as the
result of pure chance. If, however, more than five scales
out of 100 show a significant difference ( |a,± ^ M'j), some
force can be assumed at worx other than random variation. In
the present study a single significantly different scale for
a dimension of a given concept would actually be 20 per cent
(one out of five) significant or, on the average, the same
as 20 out of 100. Thus, as Osgood points out, the significant
difference of one dimension insures the difference of the en- 
12tire concept. If one cannot accept this explanation, it 
may be noted that even one significant scale out of ten 
(total for both dimensions) is twice the number expected due 
to chance at a = .05'.
■ ^ O s g o o d ,  Suci and Tannenbaum, ££. cit., p. 100.
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An Example. It is often easy for a writer, enthusi­
astically involved in a topic, to assume universal familiar­
ity with his subject. Lest this criticism be applied, a 
brief example will now be given to illustrate the testing 
procedure. Referring to the questionnaire in APPENDIX A one 
can note that each question on the last page is designed to 
subclassify the respondents with respect to a factor Judged, 
by a consensus of knowledgeable persons in the field, to be 
influential in the formation of methodological convictions.
For simplicity, note question one in which all respondents 
fell into one of three alternative classification choices 
(members of the faculties of public, private or denominational 
schools). Because of the mutually exclusive character of this 
classification scheme, sorting with respect to the alternative 
possibilities presented no problem. Once the groups were 
sorted, mean values were computed for each scale and every 
concept by substratified groups. The result of these compu­
tations was an array of sixty means (6 concepts x 10 scales) 
for each group. The mean values were then tested by combina­
tions of two groups to see if significant differences existed 
with respect to any scales. In other words, private school 
faculties were tested against public school faculties, private 
against denominational and denominational against public. The 
number of combinations tested for each question (environmental 
factor) is given by the following formula:
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= _m * where
[Xj ~ 3cl (m - x) 
m = number of alternative classifications possible 
x = number of groups to be analyzed per comparison
In the above example ^  ^ >■ = 3*
After the tests had been conducted the decision rule 
was applied to determine if any two groups showed a statis­
tically significant difference with respect to sample means. 
The results of the tests were then listed in APPENDIX B,
Table VI. After the tests of significance were completed, 
additional analysis was possible via computation of D values 
and the use of visual profiles.
Analysis Relative to Hypotheses
Although examples such as the one above may be offered, 
the full importance of the tests can be appreciated only
with respect to the hypotheses to be investigated. There­
fore, the hypotheses will be reiterated and examined in the 
following sections.
The Major Hypothesis
The major hypothesis advances the proposition that:
professional attitudes toward methodological issues 
are a function of the past and present environmen­
tal influences of the researcher and/or teacher.
Initially, one might ask what would be required to con­
firm this hypothesis. Fundamentally, it is necessary to test
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all subclassifications with respect to the environmental
factors noted in each question on the classification page of
the questionnaire. If, upon testing, it can be noted that
significant differences exist relative to the substratums
present, the factor indicated by the question can be said to
be a determinant of difference. In the interest of brevity
the concepts will be coded as follows:
Concept A - The Present State of Management Theory 
Concept B - Rnpiricism in Management Theory 
Concept C - The A Priori in Management Theory 
Concept D - Posi~Hive-Descriptive Methodology 
Concept E - Normative-Prescriptive Methodology 
Concept F - Political Conservatism
In addition, environmental factors will be referred to by
the following numerical values:
Category 1 - Type of institution in which professor 
teaches
Category 2 - Age of teacher
Category 3 - Highest degree held
Category Ij. - Geographical area where degree received
Category j? - Teaching experience
Category 6 - Religious preference
Category 7 - Geographical area where professor was
reared
Category 8 - City size where professor was reared 
Category 9 - Parent's occupation
Category 10 - Geographical area of present residence 
Therefore, the necessary condition for the confirmation 
of the major hypothesis is the existence of differences-- 
differences resulting from environmental factors. In order 
to show this, however, some indicator of gross difference 
must be constructed which will measure total variation in 
me ani ng.
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The Ratio of Comparison. The ratio of comparison is 
given by the following relationship.
Cr = d/ 2̂  ̂ where
Cr = ratio of comparison
12) = number of combinations (comparisons) possible with 
V / respect to a given factor where m is the number of
classification alternatives possible and the two (2 ) 
illustrates that all comparisons take place between 
two groups
d - the number of combinations of two groups showing 
a significant difference
Therefore, if, as in question one, the respondent could select 
one of three types of institutions in which he taught, m would 
assume a value of three (3 ) so that = 3* Assuming further 
that of the three comparisons (public-private, private-denomi­
national, and denominational-public), only one (public-denomi­
national) showed a significant difference with respect to a 
given concept (empiricism). Therefore, the ratio would 
equal
Cr = d /(“ ) = 1/3 = -33- 
This result could be interpreted as revealing that 33 per 
cent of the combinations showed a significant difference in 
thinking with respect to epmiricism.
One can easily see that the same comparison could be 
made for all subclassifications relative to each of the ten 
environmental factors by concept. The maximum value that Cr
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for a given concept could assume would be one (Cr - 1). Such 
a value is possible if and only if all stratifications thought 
significantly different relative to the concept so that
If each concept exhibited a Cr = 1 relative to a given environ­
mental factor, it would be possible to derive an
The Sr is this case represents the "summed" or "super" com­
parison ratio and is used as a measure of overall difference 
among groups with respect to a given environmental factor.
An Sr-+6 would obviously be quite unusual and certainly 
unnecessary for confirmation of the major hypothesis. As a 
matter of fact, an S -► 3 appears sufficiently large to allow 
an inference that the connotative meanings of the concepts 
to the various combinations of subgroups with respect to an 
environmental factor are different. Two reasons are advanced 
in support of this position. The first relates to the fact 
that only statistically significant differences were considered,. 
Therefore, probabilistically there was always the chance that 
the null hypothesis (p.̂  = p.j) might have been accepted when 
in fact it was false. Such an erroneous acceptance of a false 




could have prevented an extremely large value of Sr was a 
bias within the classification alternatives themselves. Some 
factors such as "city size where a professor was reared," 
tended to have alternatives that "fused" together in the cen­
ter. Thus, it may have been difficult to separate differences 
in groups such as those containing professors reared in cities 
with populations of 50,000 as opposed to those from cities of 
125,000. On the other hand, very definite variations might 
have existed between professors reared in extremely large as 
opposed to extremely small cities. In this case, an environ­
mental factor could arise as influential only in extreme cases 
with a large "gray" area in between. To combat the elimination 
of any such "influential extremes" an S -+■ 3 was considered to 
be an indication of sufficient difference to allow a confirma­
tion of the major hypothesis.
Analysis of the Data. Table III is a "macro summation" 
of the information contained in APPENDIX B which contains the 
significant results of the individual "t" tests. To illustrate 
how the individual values in Table III were obtained, turn to 
APPENDIX B, Table VI. The tables in APPENDIX B correspond 
respectively to the successive columns of Table III. In 
addition, each exhibit in the appendix lists first the various 
groups to be compared followed by a value. Each comparison







THE SUMMED COMPARISON RATIO
Categories
cr
1 2 3 k 6 7 8 9 10
A .33 .00 1.00 .67 .60 .17 .30 .10 .00 • 33
B .33 .33 1.00 .50 .ifO .17 .50 .10 .17 .83
C .33 .17 1.00 .67 .IfO .17 .60 .10 .00 .67
D .00 .33 1.00 • 33 .20 .17 .ifO .20 .00 .33
E .00 .00 1.00 .50 .10 .17 .80 .IfO .00 .67
F .00 .if 0 1.00 .17 .20 .50 .ifO .30 1.00 .50
S = r .99 1.23 6.00 2.8if 1.90 1.35 3.00 1.20 1.17 3.33
Note: See page 197 for code of concepts and categories.
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of degrees of freedom and the critical values of Mt." The 
calculated "t" values are then listed, by scale, for each 
concept with respect to the groups which exhibited a signifi­
cant difference. Any scale which possessed a calculated "t" 
whose absolute value was greater than the critical "t" was 
signifi cant.
In the case at hand, public and private school faculties 
(see column one) thought significantly different relative to 
concepts A, B and C. However, the public-denominational and 
denominational-private comparisons revealed no significant 
differences relative to any concept. Therefore, since the 
meaning of concept A was tested by three comparisons and had 
a significantly different meaning to only one combination of 
the three compared, its Cr = d/ = 1/3 = *33* This was
entered as the first figure in column one of Table III. The 
remaining columns were constructed in a similar manner by
dividing it into the number of times a combination of two 
groups showed a significant difference relative to a concept. 
To insure the procedure is understood, note one more example. 
Column four of Table III corresponds to Table IX and relates 
to the geographical area where the respondents' highest 
degrees were received. Note that there were six possible
noting the values of for each environmental factor and
combinations of two groups (given by the value) from
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the four groups used as a basis for stratification. Out of 
these six combinations of two, four (East-West, West-Midwest, 
East-South and Midwest-South) showed a significant difference
entered as the first value in column four of Table III.
Now that the analytics of the "summed comparison ratio" 
table have been explained, the table's function in analyzing 
the major hypothesis may be expounded. Reference to the 
final figure in each column gives a value for Sr or the over­
all measure of difference with respect to each environmental 
factor tested. A brief look at the Sr values reveals that 
three factors assumed a value of Sr-*- 3 and could be considered 
overall determinants of difference. In addition, one factor 
(geographical area where highest degree was received) was 
sufficiently close to 3 (2 .8t|.) as to be included in the over­
all determinant classification. But what does this say rela­
tive to the major hypothesis?
A Suggested Interpretation. The only factor resulting 
in Sr = 6 was the comparisons based on highest degree held. 
Because of the extremely small number of respondents falling 
into classes one (bachelors degree) and four (all other 
degrees), only masters and doctorate degree holders were 
compared. A significant difference was shown with respect 
to every concept. As the assumed positive signs before all
with respect to concept A. Thus, 67 was
calculated "t" values in Table VIII, APPENDIX B illustrate, 
the holders of masters degrees reflected more favorable and 
stronger connotations relative to all issues. This propo­
sition can be advanced because the mean value for each scale 
was computed by groups and the mean of scale^ for group three 
(doctorate) was subtracted from the corresponding scale for 
group two (masters). Hence, ^  " ^3 could assume a positive 
value if and only if the means for group two were numerically 
larger than the corresponding means for group three (i.e.,
^2 “ ^3 > 0 or ^2 > ^3 *̂ These larger mean values for group 
two could only result from the selection of more extreme 
spaces toward the positive bipolar adjective. Perhaps the 
only explanation for this result is that one of the effects 
of doctoral education is the development of a more "scien­
tifically skeptical" attitude that prevents one from favoring 
extreme "black" and "white" alternatives.
A rather interesting situation developed relative to 
the other major determinants of difference. Every major 
determinant, with the exception of the highest degree held, 
related directly to a geographically influenced factor. 
Specifically, geographical area where the highest degree was 
received (Sr - 2.8^), geographical area where respondent was 
reared (Sr = 3*00) and present residence (Sr = 3*33) showed 
the greatest number of significant differences with respect 
to all methodological beliefs.
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In view of this, it seems that environmental factors
do influence methodological convictions for if this were not
true, there would be no explanation for the existence of the
significant differences. In effect an S^-^3.00 says that
relative to at least fifty per cent of the concepts tested
the groups compared entertained significantly different
opinions. If the respondents were stratified on the basis
of geographical area where they presently resided, an
S -*3 would illustrate that at least one half of the total r
comparisons made, among the various stratums, showed a 
significant difference. From this it could be inferred that 
geographical residence is a determinant of difference with 
respect to methodological beliefs.
The fact that some factors assumed an value greater 
than three while others did not provides the sufficient con­
dition for confirmation of the major hypothesis. Such a 
finding is sufficient for it does, in fact, say that method­
ological convictions are influenced by varying environmental 
conditions. Admittedly, the hypothesis would have been more 
directly confirmed if it had stated, "geographical factors 
influence professional attitudes toward methodology." Be 
that as it may, the confirmation of the major hypothesis 
was important because it provides the necessary condition 
for further analysis of the minor hypothesis. Therefore, the 
conceptual simplicity of the major hypothesis should not
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depreciate its value for without its prior confirmation the 
minor one would be meaningless and entirely unnecessary.
Minor Hypothesis
The minor hypothesis states:
Specific environmental factors do not influence 
the formation of all methodological convictions 
with equal intensity. Therefore, the primary 
determinant of one methodological belief may or 
may not be the major determinant of another.
The macro analysis employed in the confirmation of the major 
hypothesis contributes only partially to the confirmation of 
the minor one. As with most macro investigations, the pre­
ceding analysis leaves much to be desired concerning micro 
elements. It is especially tempting to ask if, perhaps, 
some of those environmental factors elevated to the status 
of overall determinants might prove unimportant relative to 
any given concept. This situation appears to have developed 
in column four of Table III. Although the geographical area 
where the respondent's highest degree was received appeared 
important as an overall influence (Sr = 2 .8I4.}, it was exposed 
as quite uninfluential relative to concept F (Cr = .17). 
Obviously, this raises questions which require additional 
analysis of the individual values comprising Sr . Such ques­
tions can be answered by a closer examination of the relation­
ship between each concept and the various environmental factors.
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Concept A. This concept relates to the "present state 
of management theory" and its highest ratio of comparison 
(Cr = .67) is shown in the first row of column four. One 
could infer from this that the geographical area where the 
respondent's highest degree was received (as indicated by 
column four) constituted the primary influence on his 
appraisal of contemporary management theory. Figure lij. 
provides a visual profile of the mean responses of the pro­
fessors educated in the areas specified by the legend at 
the bottom of the diagram.
It may be noted that professors educated in the Southern 
schools felt that management theory was in a "better" state 
than did any other group. Such a conclusion was reached by 
noting the deeper penetration of the purple line toward the 
positive (left) side of the bipolar adjective pairs. An 
additional observation may be drawn from the overall pattern 
of responses by all groups. This pattern indicated that the 
greatest differences were relative to absolute gross magni­
tudes on the evaluative scales rather than diametrical oppo­
sition of connotative meanings. For instance, the evaluative 
D scores in Table IV show that the largest linear separation 
in the semantic space with respect to concept A existed be­
tween Southern and Midwestern educated professors (Dg = 1.21). 
The second largest relative difference was between those
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Legend: (By geographical area where highest degree was received)
East_____ __
West --
Mi dwe s t ___
South ---
FIGURE ll;
SEMANTIC PROFILE ON CONTEMPORARY THEORY
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TABLE IV
EVALUATIVE D MATRICES CORRESPONDING TO 
THE PRIMARY DETERMINANTS OP DIFFERENCE 
WITH RESPECT TO TESTED CONCEPTS
Concept A
2 3 4
.40 . 66 . 66
.00 1.02 .53.00 1.21
.00
(By geographical area where highest degree was earned)
Concept B 
1 2  3 k
1 .00 1.08 1.09 1.74
2 .00 .67 .84
3 .00 .914 .oo
(By geographical area of present residence)
Concept c
1 2 3 4
1 .00 1.04 1.15 2.052 .00 .33 1.11
3 .00 .92
4 .00




1 2 3 k 5
1 .00 .71 1.06 .96 .80
2 .00 .72 .91 1.27
3 .00 1.09 l.k2
k .00 .005 .00
(By geographical area 'where reared)
Concept E 
1 2  3 k 5
1 .00 .51 .82 .66 2.25
2 .00 .51 .95 2.53
3 .00 1 .23 2.7k
k .00 1.9$
5
(By geographical area where reared)
.00
Concept F
1 2 3 k
1 .00 .k5 .65 1.10
2 .00 .28 1.38




Note: The alternative subclassifications are referenced by
the numbers indicating the row and column. For in­
stance if the distance between group^ and group3 
is desired, move horizontally across the row^ and 
vertically down column^ until the desired cell is 
obtained.
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teachers educated in the Midwest as opposed to the West 
(I>E - 1 .02). In each of these cases, however, only one of 
the five evaluative scales on the visual profile measuring 
concept A had a mean value which was located to the right 
(negative) side of the bipolar continuum. This result 
clearly indicates that all groups had a relatively "good" 
connotation of the present state of management theory. It 
is interesting to note that the one negative tendency was 
relative to the complete-incomplete scale. Once again it 
seems the groups were in agreement that although the "present 
state" was good, it was not complete and requires continued 
improvement. No astounding differences were noted on the 
potency scales, as evidenced by the D scores in Table V.
Concepts B and C. Collectively, concepts B and C con­
stituted the epistemological issues examined in chapter two. 
Because both concepts were related to the same issues they 
provided an automatic consistency check on the factors exam­
ined. For instance, it was assumed that if any environmental 
factor proved to be an insignificant determinant of difference 
with respect to empiricism, it should likewise be unimportant 
relative to ji priorism. A look at Table III shows consistently 
large and small Cr values in each column of the rows representing 
concepts B and C (rows 2 and 3). This truly amazing consistency 
adds a degree of reinforcement to the confidence with which the
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TABLE V
POTENCY D MARTICES CORRESPONDING TO 
THE PRIMARY DETERMINANTS OF DIFFERENCE 
WITH RESPECT TO TESTED CONCEPTS
Concept A
1 2 3 4
1 oo• .62 .34 • 492 .00 .75 .60
3 .00 • 444 .00 
(By geographical area where highest degree was earned)
Concept B
1 2 3 4
1 .00 .80 .78 2.00
2 .00 .65 1.30
3 .00 1.814 .00 
(By geographical area of present residence)
Concept £
1 2 3 4
1 00• .57 .59 1.162 .00 .73 1.10
3 .00 .754 .00 















2 3 4 5
.38 .75 .79 1.47
.00 • 74 .87 1.70.00 .25 1.68
.00 1.47
.00
(By geographical area where reared)
Concept E
2 3 4 5
.79 .89 1.45
.00 .74 1.18 1.99.00 .81 1.37.00 1.83
.00
(By geographical area where reared)
Concept P
1 2 3 4
1 .00 .76 1.12 .43
2 .00 .50 .94
3 .00 1.32J+ .00
(By parent's occupation)
Note: For instructions on use of this table, see note at
end of Table IV.
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results are reported. Without such consistency one might ask, 
quite validly, why an environmental factor would cause differ­
ences of opinion relative to one epistemological issue and 
not with respect to the other.
Now that the criterion of consistency has been estab­
lished, it may be noted by reference to column ten that the 
geographical area of present residence was the primary 
"influencer” of epistemological perspectives. Both the pro­
files (Figures 15 and 16) and objective D measures indicated 
that professors residing in the South and East thought most 
differently concerning these issues (Dg = 1.714- and Dp = 2.00 
relative to empiricism while Dg = 2.05 and Dp = 1.16 with 
respect to the a priori). Although all four groups viewed 
empiricism as good (indicated by the penetration of all groups 
toward the left-hand polar extreme in Figure 15), the same 
agreement was not noted relative to a. priori theory. Professors 
residing in the South seemed to favor both epistemological alter­
natives while the Eastern professor held a less favorable conno­
tation of the a priori alternative. This is easily noted by 
the mean scale values traced by the red line which tends 
slightly toward the negative (right) side of the fourth posi­
tion between the bipolar adjectives in Figure 16. Both the 
Western and Midwestern professors exhibited a neutral position 
relative to a priorism and showed no significant difference in 
their thinking on the matter.
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Thus, three rather interesting inferences can be drawn 
concerning the epistemological perspectives of the respondents. 
First of all, the geographical area in which the professor 
resided appeared to be the most influential environmental 
factor in the formation of methodological beliefs. In addi­
tion, all groups with the exception of the Southern professors 
exhibited an exclusive empirical orientation. The professors 
who resided in the South, although entertaining a favorable 
connotation concerning empiricism, showed a greater apprecia­
tion of _a prioristic methods than any other group. Finally, 
the epistemological concepts displayed a rather active potency 
dimension that was not evident on concept A. As a matter of 
fact, Table V illustrates that some of the largest linear 
separations between groups took place on the potency scales.
In the writer's thinking, this situation indicated that more 
definite and established opinions existed concerning epi3te- 
mology than was evident with respect to the present state of 
management theory.
Concepts D and E. Proceeding onward, concepts D and E 
may be labeled the value judgment issues. Once again the 
initial step was to note the consistency between the influence 
of each factor on the opinions formed relative to each concept. 
Unfortunately, the various factors did not show the same as­
tounding consistency toward value judgment concepts as they
did toward epistemology. The inconsistencies were noted in 
columns seven and ten of Table III. Of the ten combinations 
of two groups compared relative to geographical areas where 
the respondents were reared (column seven) only four (.I4.0 ) 
showed significantly different connotations relative to posi­
tive methodology. Of this same series of combinations, eight 
out of ten (.80) were significantly different with respect to 
the normative issue. One should note, however, that the .I4.O 
was the largest percentage difference evidenced by any single 
factor for concept D (i.e., .I4.O was the largest value con­
tained in the row designating concept D). Thus, there exists 
a valid question as to whether or not this actually constituted 
an inconsistency. Another discrepancy developed in column ten 
(place of present residence) where the values were .33 and .67 
respectively. It is the opinion of the writer that this situ­
ation resulted from a less familiar "cognitive framework" on 
the part of professors relative to the alternative value judg­
ments positions.
In any event the two questionable cases did not con­
stitute a large enough percentage of the total factors 
examined (20 per cent) to seriously affect the validity of 
the following analysis. Therefore, noting rows four and five 
of Table III one may observe that the geographical area where 
one was reared (column seven) was the most important determinant
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of difference in a professor's attitude toward the issues 
dealing with value judgments. Undoubtedly, the most obvious 
difference existed in the form of the "good" and "strong" 
connotations held by foreign born teachers (note Figure 18). 
However, the number of individuals falling into this category 
was so small (n = l±) that no analysis was attempted with re­
gard to it. Certainly, these data could be objected to as 
unrepresentative and useless. For this reason, only the 
four "domestic" groups were investigated in detail.
The responding professors who were reared in the Mid­
west distinguished themselves as the most oriented toward 
positive-descriptive methods. It can be noted from Figure 
17 that the mean scores by scale for this group resulted in 
a "more favorable" pattern of response on the profile indi­
cating this concept than did the mean responses for any other 
group. Alternatively, Figure 18 reveals that this Midwestern 
group entertained a "less favorable connotation" of normative 
methods.
In general, the Eastern and Southern reared professors 
seemed to be the primary advocates of the normative approach 
to management. Both value judgment profiles indicate that 
the mean values by scale for the two groups trace a pattern 
that penetrates more toward the positive side on the concept 
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respect to the positive concept.
None of the domestic groups revealed a very active 
potency dimension as evidenced by the D matrices relating 
to concepts D and E in Table V. This observation tends to 
reinforce the previous statement which speculated the exis­
tence of a less familiar "cognitive framework" relative to 
value judgment issues. However, the evaluative D matrices 
in Table IV support the existence of the alliances uncovered 
via examination of the visual profiles. For instance, the 
Dg values between Eastern and Midwestern reared professors 
(dE = 1,06) and Midwestern and Southern (Dg = 1.09) confirm 
that the various groups were separated with respect to con­
cept D. Corresponding values, Dg = .82 and Dg = 1.23, sug­
gest a similar separation relative to concept E.
Thus, a rather distinct segmentation appears to have 
developed. The Midwestern reared respondents supported the 
idea of positive methodology and exhibited an almost neutral 
connotation toward the normative approach. The East and South, 
on the other hand, entertained a somewhat reversed attitude.
Concept F. The final concept, political conservatism, 
although not directly related to methodology, was included 
primarily because it was considered useful in the examination 
of the overall idea of environmental determination. It was 
found that parent's occupation was the primary determinant
of difference relative to this concept. As illustrated by 
Figure 19, children of professional parents revealed a more 
favorable connotation of political conservatism. Group four, 
labeled "all others-*' but made up mostly of farmer's children, 
had the least favorable connotation. Initially, this came as 
a surprise to the writer until an interesting similarity was 
noted. Visual analysis showed that blue-collar workers, 
although entertaining a favorable connotation, were less in 
favor of conservatism than professional groups. In the end, 
the blue-collar group was "less" conservative than the pro­
fessional and white-collar groups. This might indicate, as 
some convincingly argue, that recent legislative trends have 
resulted in the support of agriculture and labor groups and 
resentment from the professional and managerial classes. 
Certainly, the above results could be interpreted as support­
ing the existence of such a "class" alienation. However, 
since this bears no direct relationship to methodological 
convictions no further observations will be made concerning 
the subject.
A Brief Digression on Highest Degrees Held. It was
y
mentioned earlier that significant differences in connotative 
meanings were revealed between holders of masters and doctorate 
degrees with respect to every concept. In addition, it was 































took stronger although similar positions to those who possessed 
doctorates. Because such a general observation could be made 
with reasonable validity, the minute details required no elabo­
rate presentation. This result, however, will be incorporated 
in the synthesis and theoretical propositions to be advanced 
in the following section.
A Summary of Opinion and a. Theory
One thing the survey of management academia made abun­
dantly clear was the importance of geography in the formation 
of methodological convictions. Such an observation obviously 
confirms the minor hypothesis since it suggests that certain 
factors influence the development of methodological beliefs 
and others do not. In addition, specific influences such as 
geographical area of present residence appear to be more 
important determinants of one opinion than of another. The 
confirmation of this hypothesis and the prior confirmation of 
the major one can now be interpreted in light of the implica­
tions they carry for the future of management and organizations.
Epistemologically, professors residing in the East, Mid­
west and West emerged as exclusive empiricists while the 
Southern professors, although entertaining a more favorable 
attitude toward empiricism, showed an appreciation of & priori 
methods. In view of this, there seems to be little doubt that
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tomorrow's students of management will continue to be exposed 
to the "virtues" of empiricism via the self-projection process 
of today's academia. Therefore, the theory of the future will 
likely reveal a greater emphasis upon empirical investigation.
As a matter of fact, empiricism seemed to be so favorably 
advocated by all groups that one would expect little episte­
mologi cal disagreement to develop in the immediate forth­
coming years.
Such a parallelism cannot be predicted with respect to 
the value-centric predicament of management and organizations.
The fact that professors reared in the Midwest and those 
reared in the East and South exhibited opposing preferences 
relative to the question of value judgments is sufficient rea­
son to forecast that controversy will continue in this area.
Such an obvious diversity will require that students of manage­
ment continue their skeptical surveillance with respect to fact 
and value. The absence of uniform academic opinion profession­
ally favoring one alternative or the other will encourage intel­
lectual acceptance of research utilizing either or both approach­
es and insure continued controversy relative to the issue.
In addition, the increased sophistication of the disci­
pline and accelerated interest in general systems theory intro­
duces more opportunities for the injection of subjective judg­
ments. For instance, management and organization theories
227
are no longer formulated within the framework of a single 
firm. Instead, they incorporate political and social assump­
tions which in turn influence the theoretical operations of 
the private corporation. The result of this increased sophis­
tication is the creation of incremental pressures upon students 
to critically analyze not only assumed objectives of the firm 
but political and social ideals as well.
Academia likewise is confronted with increased responsi­
bility to explicitly state which parts of their theoretical 
labors are based on subjective preferences and which findings 
are the result of scientific investigation. In all, the 
methodological future of management and organizations promises 
to be an interesting period of debate, not so much relative to 
traditional epistemological controversies, but with respect to 
the place of judgments of value within its structure.
The data obtained in this survey support the contention 
that today’s management academia takes pride in the progress 
the descipline has experienced in recent years. In spite of 
this pride, none appear disillusioned relative to the work 
that remains to be done. With more and more terminally quali­
fied faculty members entering the field, future theory will 
likely be scrutinized with increased skepticism. Consequently, 
acceptance will require greater perfection and longer debate. 
But this is as it should be in any area aspiring to scientific
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status; for where there is controversy there is hope, but 
where there is only complacency all is lost.
A Concluding Comment
Now that the data have been presented and an interpreta­
tion offered an ex post facto observation seems in order. No 
doubt the reader has noticed that the mean responses on the 
visual profiles exhibited a pronounced tendency toward neu­
trality. Specifically, many of the mean values were located 
along various points on the neutral or fourth position be­
tween a set of bipolar adjectives.
Several reasons may be advanced to account for this situa­
tion. Perhaps the most important factor relates to the nature 
of the subject under consideration. It is likely that very 
few of the respondents had any previous experience with the 
concepts they were asked to judge. An extensive examination 
of graduate management programs in leading universities 
revealed that practically none offered structured courses 
which in any way related to the methodological foundations of 
the discipline. It is the opinion of the writer that this 
lack of acquaintance bred uncertainty and uncertainty encour­
aged the cluster toward neutrality.
In addition, there was evidence that the respondents were 
somewhat unfamiliar with the semantic differential as a re­
search device. This unfamiliarity was, to some extent, expected
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since previous use of the SD has been primarily in the area 
of psychology. However, it is likely that this factor was 
considerably less important than the previously mentioned 
uncertainty.
Therefore, the "neutrality tendency" was definitely a 
limitation of the analysis and in this sense it was dis­
appointing. But disappointment turned to challenge when it 
was recognized that uncertainty based on lack of acquaint­
ance indicates promise and potential. Perhaps this study 
will help to reduce this uncertainty and clear the way for 
future investigations dealing with methodology of manage­
ment and organizations.
EPILOGUE
Speculations on methodology are famous for plati­
tude and prolixity. The barrenness of methodo­
logical conclusions is often a fitting complement 
to the weariness entailed In the process of reach­
ing them.
--R. P. Harrod
Methodologically, management and organization theory 
occupies a rather strange position. It is concerned with 
physical processes, yet it is not a physical science. More­
over, it deals with the purposeful action of human beings, 
yet it is not entirely psychological in nature. For this 
reason, it is granted the privilege of choice between the 
best, and unfortunately at times the worst, of both "worlds" 
of methods.
In spite of this preferred position, the methodology of 
management and organizations has failed to keep pace with 
theoretical speculations. As has been the case in the devel­
opment of many sciences, one is inclined to wonder if perhaps 
the theoretical development of management is not reaching a 
limit imposed by contemporary methods. No doubt, many inves­
tigations in the area remain nothing more than sophisticated 
exercises in data collection for want of commonly accepted 
methods of synthesis.
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The Methodologi cal Problem
Methodology is first of all a problem of philosophy and 
is, therefore, best handled under the auspices of academia.
The action-oriented management practitioner can be depended 
upon for little assistance in the systematic analysis of this 
type of problem. Perhaps the feature practitioners find most 
disturbing is that conclusions rarely result from methodolog­
ical discussions. Therefore, the academician is often alone 
in his recognition that conclusions are not prerequisite to 
increased understanding. However, it is the intention of the 
writer to confine the present comments to a brief summary of 
the opinions and research findings offered in the preceding 
analysis lest this study lend support to the introductory 
quotation.
Epis temology
Chapter two dealt with epistemology, or the theory of 
knowledge. It was argued that the basic problems of all 
sciences, organizations being no exception, are epistemolog- 
ical in that they deal with the relationship between per­
ceived and objective reality. The writer accepted the posi­
tion of the epistemological dualists who contend that the 
mental ’'filter1' of man prevents an identity between an object 
or event and one's perception of it. Because of this dualistic
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character of science, it was noted that the "principles" of 
general semantics provide a dynamic framework for the analy­
sis of epistemological questions. In short, the acquiring 
of knowledge is nothing more than a triadic relationship 
between object*>thought>*symbol. When a scientist, be he 
physical or social, observes a phenomenon or creates a 
theoretical idea, he abstracts at successive stages of 
analysis on the basis of hi3 unique experiences and beliefs. 
Because of this the scientific report is similar to all other 
reports, save for more rigorous checks on accuracy, and can 
be quite successfully analyzed making use of the tenets of 
general semantics.
Subclassified under dualism two additional epistemolog- 
ical positions were noted. The first, and most influential 
in recent years, is known as empiricism and claims that 
experience is prerequisite to all knowledge. In other words, 
man may know only what he perceives. The literature of organi­
zations has been dominated by the ramifications of this 
epistemological perspective. Herzberg and Likert are perhaps 
the names most often associated with this type of analysis 
although Ernest Dale was undoubtedly the empirical pioneer 
in management.
The alternative position was referred to as rationalism 
and contends that universal and empirically unverifiable
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truths exist concerning human behavior. This method is 
deductive whereas empiricism is fundamentally inductive. 
Although management and organization theory has produced 
no extreme a priorists t such as Von Mises and Robbins in 
economics, it has been subjected to a prioristic influences 
nonetheless. Perhaps the most influential a priori works 
are the theories built around Maslow's need hierarchy, 
especially McGregor’s Theory X and Theory Y.
Basically, the deductive and inductive methods are 
the only valid epistemological processes. However, this 
does not exclude, in the writer's opinion, the possibility 
of minor alterations in the processes in an effort to 
facilitate understanding in specific areas. One such alter­
ation was referred to as Verstehen or man to man understand­
ing, possible only in the social disciplines where both the 
observer and observee in the social-scientific relationship 
are human beings. This method provides great promise for 
the formulation of hypotheses and intuitive explanation of 
phenomena. The inclusion of Verstehen in the methodology 
of organizations could provide a more productive utilization 
of ideal types. Since general semantics exposes the utter 
impossibility of knowing all there is to know about any 
event, the delineation of the most important factors and 
concentration upon them seems worthy of the status of
23k
"second best."
Although epistemology was noted as the most basic of 
methodological considerations, other problems definitely 
exist. One such difficulty relates to the proper role of 
value judgments within the confines of science.
Normative Versus Positive Theory
It is the opinion of the writer that only aspects con­
cerning "what is" belong within the boundaries of organiza­
tional science. Although ideals of "what ought to be" are 
appropriate topics for philosophers, the subjective nature 
of the ends and values upon which they rest defy scientific 
analysis. De_ quatibus non est disputandum.
Regardless of the contention that the scientist qua 
scientist is prohibited, by virtue of his position, from 
advocating proper ends, the scientist qua individual qua 
human being is not. Thus, the scientist, like anyone else 
may properly entertain social preferences. It is only when 
these preferences are disguised and offered under the heading 
of scientifically established fact that he seriously damages 
the validity and acceptability of his subject. Insurance 
against such a mixture of fact and value can be provided only 
from within the scientific community itself. Through the 
perpetual examination and challenge of his colleagues the 
scientist can be encouraged to explicitly specify which
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portion of his work constitutes systematically determined 
fact and which portion is opinion. Neither element should 
be omitted but the separation must be accomplished if manage­
ment and organization theory is to significantly progress 
toward scientific status.
Some view the necessity of the separation of fact and 
value from the viewpoint of scientific morality. While the 
writer recognizes this as a most important aspect, another 
dimension is considered equally important. This dimension 
deals with the abstract nature of judgments of approval or 
disapproval. Events and processes are categorized as "good" 
or "bad" on the basis of dominant characteristics abstracted 
from the infinite array of qualities which the phenomenon 
possesses. Because there is no uniformity of intersubjective 
abstraction, the probability that two individuals will ab­
stract identical characteristics when passing a judgment is 
infinitesimally small indeed. Therefore, if care is not 
taken the researcher may cast his subjective values upon 
students who know little and skeptically inquire even less 
about the subject being judged.
The influence of teacher on student is a situation common 
to all communicative relationships and is known as self-projec­
tion. This conceptualization postulates that various environ­
mental factors contribute to a greater or lesser extent to the
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formation of one'8 system of beliefs which permiates every 
aspect of his communication with others. It was with respect 
to this idea that the empirical portion of this study was 
undertaken.
The Empirical Analysis
Fundamentally, the objective of the survey of manage­
ment professors was to determine the general consensus of 
academia toward the methodological issues discussed above. 
Then, making use of the results so developed, a speculation 
into the future was offered.
Major Findings
Geographical factors emerged as the most important over­
all determinant of different connotations with respect to 
methodological concepts. Factors such as the geographical 
area where a respondent was reared, received his highest 
degree, and place of present residence were found to be 
extremely important. Paradoxically, the most important con­
clusion derived from the analysis of the differences was the 
existence of an epistemological similarity. Nearly all the 
epistemological differences were differences of absolute 
magnitude not of direction, ergo, contemporary thinking in 
management and organization theory reveals an astounding 
propensity toward empiricism.
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However, differences relative to the issue of value 
judgments are sufficient to insure continued controversy.
This issue is considered by the writer to be the primary 
methodological battleground of the future. Only time can 
tell the victor.
A Look Into the Crystal Ball
If the results of this analysis truly exhibit the 
thinking of management academia, the future will likely 
witness greater emphasis on empiricism. The acceptance of 
this epistemological alternative will necessitate continued 
concentration upon quantitative methods and basic research 
tools as integral parts of management curricula. However, 
debate will likely be quite acute with respect to the pros 
and cons of normative versus positive theory. Such a trend 
will also require greater cooperation between academician 
and practitioner. The function of the former will be the 
formulation of hypotheses and the scientific analysis of 
data. To accomplish this the academician must depend upon 
the practitioner to supply him with the framework for 
analysis and the experimental situations in which investi­
gations may be conducted.
Regardless of the somberness with which the methodologi­
cal picture has been painted, it is unlikely that such diffi­
culties will prove the coup de grace for management and
organization theory. Certainly, any subject area whose 
academicians are concerned and interested, to the extent 
evidenced by the magnitude of the response to this partic­
ular study, can cope with any problem. In fact, it is with 
respect to these "impossible" problems that academia pro­
vides its most valuable contribution. In any event a stu­
dent of management cannot help but note the willingness 
with which encouragement and cooperation were given to him 
by established individuals in the area. For this considera­
tion, the writer is sincerely grateful.
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L o u i s i a n a  S t a t e  U n i v e r s i t y
A N D  ADRICULTURAI. A N D  M B C H A N I C A L  C O kL I O I  
BATON KOUGt • LOUISIANA . 70i0»
College of Business Adm inistration
D E P A R T M E N T  O F  M A N A O E M E N T  A N D  M A R K E T I N G
March 2£, 1968
Dear Professor:
When you think of the term "methodology," what thoughts 
come to your mind— "empiricism"? . . , "positivism"? . . .
"i* Priori reasoning"? What do such terms really mean to 
practlcing management professors in their teaching and 
research?
I am attempting to answer these types of questions in 
my doctoral dissertation research at Louisiana State 
University and I need your help. Basically, I am trying 
to relate certain factors in a professor's environmental 
background with his convictions on selected methodological 
issues.
Enclosed is a questionnaire designed to provide data 
for my research. Will you please take ten minutes of your 
time to complete this form and return it to me? I can 
assure you that my analysis of the data will be completely 
statistical and there will be no attempt to identify any 
respondent. Also I will gladly share my results with you 
upon request.
Perhaps, with your help, I will be able to make a 
positive contribution to the field of management. Your 







The purpose of this study is to measure the meaning of 
certain concepts to various professors. In order to accomplish 
this objective you are asked to judge these concepts against a 
series of descriptive scales. Remember that these propositions 
all deal with the methods used in teaching and/or researching 
the area of management.
It is important that you mark the scales on the basis of 
how you think the concepts should relate to management theory 
and methodology {except concepts one and six). On each page 
you will find a different concept and beneath it a brief expla­
nation and a set of scales. The scales should be marked as 
follows:
If you think the concept at the top of the page is very 
closely related to one end of the scale, place your mark in 
the following manner:
Good X : : : : : : Bad
or
Good •* : : : : : X Bad
If you think 
end of the scale
the 
(but
concept is quite closely related to one 
not extremely), mark as follows:
Good •« X : : : : : Bad
or
Good : : : : : X : Bad
If
(but is
the concept seems only slightly related to 
not neutral), mark as illustrated below:
one side
Good : : X : : • • • « Bad
or
Good : : : : X : : Bad
2£6
The extreme toward which you mark depends upon which 
extreme seems the most characteristic of the proposition being 
judged. It you think the concept is neutral with respect to a 
particular scale or that a given scale is completely irrelevant, 
place your mark in the middle space.
Good : : : X : : : Bad
IMPORTANT:
(1) Please mark in the center of the 3 pace. 
This : : : X : :
Not this : : : : X
(2) Please mark every scale for every concept--do not 
omit any.
(3) Never put more than one mark on a single scale.
None of the concepts will be repeated so please do not 
look back and forth through the items and do not try to remem­
ber how you marked associated items earlier in the question­
naire. Make each itern a. separate and independent judgment.
You are encouraged to work at a fairly high rate of speed.
Do not be puzzled over individual items; it is your first impres­
sion that is important. On the other hand, please work carefully 
so that the true impressions may be revealed.
The concluding page of the questionnaire is designed to 
obtain some extremely important classification data.
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"EMPIRICISM IN MANAGEMENT THEORY"
Empiricism emphasizes experimentation and the use of induc­
tive reasoning in an effort to draw inferences regarding 























"THE A PRIORI IN MANAGEMENT THEORY"
The a priori position states that certain premises and axioms 
of management are self-evident requiring no empirical testing. 
Theory in this sense is the logical deduction of theoretical 























Positive-descriptive methodology refers to the analysis of 
managerial issues concentrating on "what is" while remain­
ing neutral relative to the value judgments of "what ought 























Normative-prescriptive methods do not remain neutral relative 
to value judgments but include the criteria of "what ought to 






















































In what type insitution do you presently teach?
a. Public (State or Municipal) _____
b. Non-public (Other than Denominational) _____
c. Denominational _____
What is your academic rank?
a. Instructor   c. Associate Professor
b. Assistant Professor ______  d. Professor
What is your age? ____
What is the highest academic degree you hold?
a. Bachelors _______ c. Doctorate_______________ ____
b. Masters _______ d. Other (Please Specify) ______
In what year and from what institution did you receive your 
highest degree? ________________________________________________
Approximately how many years have you been employed as a 
full-time teacher?
a. Less than 5 c. 11-20 e. More than 30
b. 6 - 1 0    d. 2 1 - 3 0  ___
Which of the following most nearly describes your religious
preference?
a. Catholic ________ c. Protestant ____
b. Jewish ________ d. Other (Please Specify) _________
In what state were you reared? ________________________________
Approximately what was the size of the city (or town) in 
which you were reared?
a. Less than 25,000 c. 100.001-500,000
b. 2 5 ,0 0 1 -1 0 0 , 0 0 0  d. 5 0 0 ,0 0 0 -1 ,0 0 0 , 0 0 0  _____
e. More than 1,000,000 ____
In which of the following categories would you place your 
father's (or guardian's) occupation?
a. Blue-collar ____  c. Professional______________ ____




SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN CONNOTATIVE MEANINGS OF
METHODOLOGICAL CONCEPTS BY TYPE OF INSTITUTION AT
a = .05
Possible Comparisons:
Group 1 - Public 
Group 2 - Private 
Group 3 - Denominational
Possible Combinations of Two Groups:
Groups compared: Public - Private
Degrees of freedom: nj + n2 - 2 = 123
Critical "t" values: -1.98 <t <1.98
Computed Values of "t" by Scales
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0
A 1.15 .81 1.98 1 . 8 8 2.25 2.05 1.13 2.69 .90 1 . 0 0
B 1.31 .30 1.16 2 . 6 6 1.98 2.51 1 . 2 2 1.34 2.31 1.44
C 1 . 6 8 1.77 2.05 . 8 8 .33 1.08 2.45 - .25 - .28 - .50
Note: Public and private school faculties showed no significant difference
with respect to concepts D, E and F. In addition, the public - 
denominational school comparison and private - denominational 




SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN CONNOTATIVE MEANINGS OF
METHODOLOGICAL CONCEPTS BY AGE AT a * .05
Possible Comparisons:
Group 1 - Less than 25 years 
Group 2 - 26-40 years 
Group 3 - 41-60 years 
Group 4 - More than 60 years
Possible Combinations of Two Groups: 
(:)■•
Groups compared: (Less than 25) - (26-40 years)
Degrees of freedom: nj + n2 = 75
Critical "tM values: -2.00 £ t <2.00
Computed Values of "t" by Scales
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
B .24 1.06 - .10 - .81 - .10 - .53 -1 . 0 0 -2.17 - .34
C 2 . 2 1 1.90 .95 1.16 1.06 1 . 1 2 2.03 .89 .89
D .49 .32 - .05 - . 1 0 .40 . 1 0 2 . 6 6 - .24 - . 1 0
F - . 8 6 - .12 -1.25 - .84 -1.75 - .24 - .20 -2.85 - .85
Groups compared: (26-40 years) - (41-60 years)
Degrees of freedom: n2 + n3 - 2 = 113
Critical "t" values: -1.98 £ t < 1.98
B -1.10 .15 2.00 .00 -1.00 - .44 1.98 .37 - .71
Groups compared: (Less than 25 years) - (41-60 years)
Degrees of freedom: n^ + n3 - 2 « 72
Critical "t" values: -2.00 <; t £ 2.00










Groups compared: (Less than 25 years) - (Over 60)
Degrees of freedom: n^ + n^ - 2 = 30
Critical "t" values: -2.02 < t < 2.02
Computed Values of "t" by Scales
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
D - .42 -1.70 -1.00 - .46 .19 - .55 -2.21 - .33 -1.16 -2.02
Note: No significant differences were revealed with respect to various
group comparisons and concepts. The insignificant differences 
by group combinations were:
Groups Concepts
1-2 A, E
2-3 A, C, D, E, F
1-3 A, B, C, D, E
1-4 A, B, C, E, F
2-4 A, B, C, D, E, F
3-4 A, B, C, D, E, F
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TABLE VIII
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN CONNOTATIVE MEANINGS OF
METHODOLOGICAL CONCEPTS BY HIGHEST DEGREE HELD
AT a = .05
Possible Comparisons:
Group 1 - Bachelors degrees 
Group 2 - Masters degrees 
Group 3 - Doctorate degrees 
Group 4 - All other degrees
Possible Combinations of Two Groups: 
= 1 (only one comparison made)
Groups compared: Masters - Doctorate
Degrees of freedom: n2 + n3 - 2 = 143
Critical "t" values: -1.98 £ t ^.1.98
Computed Values of "t" by Scales
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0
A 1.42 4.23 1.28 1.78 2.23 1.98 1.58 . 1 0 .96 1.34
B 1.75 2 . 0 1 .42 .92 .52 .50 .80 .93 . 2 0 .38
C 1.56 1 . 1 1 .64 2 . 2 2 1.75 1.38 1.77 1.53 .41 .63
D .49 .30 1 . 1 1 .40 .40 .50 1.99 . 2 0 .76 . 2 0
E .52 2 . 2 1 1 . 0 0 . 2 0 . 1 0 . 1 0 .43 .92 . 2 0 . 2 0
F 1.58 1.44 .89 1.65 1 . 1 2 2 . 1 0 2 . 0 0 . 2 0 . 2 0 .30
Note: Groups one and four were so numerically small that comparisons
requiring their participation were not attempted.
TABLE IX
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN CONNOTATIVE MEANINGS OF
METHODOLOGICAL CONCEPTS BY GEOGRAPHICAL AREA
WHERE HIGHEST DEGREE WAS RECEIVED AT o * .05
Possible Comparisons:
Group 1 - East 
Group 2 - Midwest 
Group 3 - South 
Group 4 - West
Possible Combinations of Two Groups 
(;)•«
Groups compared: East - West
Degrees of freedom: nj + n4 - 2 = 74
Critical "t" values: -2.00 £ t £2.00
Computed Values of "t" by Scales
i
8 9 10
A . 6 6 .12 -1.00 - .62 - .34 - .40 -2.37 .72 -1.12 - .41
B -1.27 -2.12 -1.00 -1.69 -1.50 -1.68 -1.09 - .15 -2.61 - .50
C - .67 - .77 1.32 2.37 1.61 .94 1.64 1.28 1.15 1.88
Groups compared: West - Midwest
Degrees of freedom: n4 + n2 - 2 = 81
Critical "t" values: -2.00 £t £ 2.00
A -2.00 1.10 2.66 1.32 1.00 1.64 2.30 - .64 1.16 .57
Groups compared: East - Midwest
Degrees of freedom: + n2 - 2 = 85
Critical "t" values: -2.00 £t £ 2.00
B .93 1.82 .45 1.00 ‘.73 .94
C - .38 .39 - .65 -1.76 2*00 -1.08
.40 1.13 2.00 - .20
.40 - .20 - .29 - .05
TABLE IX (continued)
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Groups compared: East - South
Degrees of freedom: n^ - n* - 2 = 61
Critical "t" values: -2.00 < t £  2.00
Computed Values of "t" by Scales
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0
A - .38 1 . 1 2 1.45 1 . 0 0 - . 2 0 - .43 2.05 - .90 .03 - .55
B .53 1.84 .83 1 . 0 0 .18 .65 2.08 . 1 0 1.60 - .96
E 1 . 1 0 1.42 1.18 1 . 6 8 1.93 1.75 2.24 2.25 1.18 2.74
Groups compared: West - South
Degrees of freedom: n4 + nj - 2 = 57
Critical "t" values: -2.00 £ t £ 2.00
C - .24 .45 2.75 1.24 .02 1.90 .74 .15 .31 1.60
D - .75 - .64 - .43 -2.03 - .42 - .30 - .45 -1.29 .71 .58
E .71 .82 .92 1.23 .56 1.82 2.63 2 . 2 1 1.87 2.85
Groups compared: Midwest - South
Degrees of freedom: n2 + n3 - 2 = 6 8
Critical "t" values: -2.00 t i 2.00
A .67 2 . 2 1 2 . 8 8 1.63 .31 .55 1.65 - .76 - .0 0 , -1.18
C - .82 .64 .57 2.60 1 . 0 0 .74 2 . 0 2 - .24 -1.46 .43
D .05 2.18 - . 2 0 -1.09 -1.46 .57 - .35 -1 . 8 8 -1.30 .15
E .65 1.60 1.08 1.06 1.17 2 . 2 0 1.28 2 . 0 0 .84 1.40
F 2.64 1.05 .98 .58 1 . 1 2 . 2 0 . 2 0 .80 . 2 0 1.50
Note: The following group combinations showed no significant difference
with respect to the concepts listed.
Groups Concepts
1 - 2 A, D, E, F
2-3 B
1-3 C, D, F
1-4 D, E, F
2-4 ii, C, D, E
3-4 A, B, F
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TABLE X
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN CONNOTATIVE MEANINGS OF
METHODOLOGICAL CONCEPTS BY TOTAL TEACHING EXPERIENCE
AT Of * .05
Possible Comparisons:
Group 1 - Less than 5 years 
Group 2 - 6-10 years 
Group 3 - 11-20 years 
Group 4 - 21-30 years 
Group 5 - More than 30 years
Possible Combinations of Two Groups: 
(")■ 10
Groups compared: (Less than 5 years) - (6-10 years)
Degrees of freedom: n^ + n2 - 2 = 71
Critical ”t" values: -2.00 £ t £ 2.00
Computed Values of "t" by Scales
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
D -1.86 -2.72 -1.83 -2.01 - .91 - .81 - .54 -1.83 - .52 - .38
Groups compared: (6-10 years) - (11-20 years)
Degrees of freedom: n2 + n3 - 2 = 77
Critical "t" values: -2.00 < t <  2.00
A .41 1.29 .08 - .05 - .57 .70 .70 1.74 2 . 0 0 1 . 2 2
B - .64 1 . 6 8 1.28 . 0 0 .44 . 0 0 2.18 1.08 -1.45 .48
C 1.62 .32 .87 1.08 - .60 - .69 .88 . 2 0 .36 2.17
Groups compared: (Less than 5 years) - (21-30 years)
Degrees of freedom: n^ + _ 2 = 59
Critical "t" values: -2.00 i t <2.00
A -1.18 - .96 - .00 - .55 -1.41 -1.32 -1.20 -1.70 -2.00 - .47
F -1.48 - .83 .10 -1.23 - .05 -2.01 -1.50 - .20 -1.00 1.29
TABLE X (continued)
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Groups compared: (Less than 5 years) - (Over 30 years)
Degrees of freedom: n^ + ns - 2 = 46
Critical "t" values: -2.02 < t < 2.02
Computed Values of "t" by Scales
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0
A .63 .81 .51 .65 2.09 1.47 - . 1 0 1.28 1 . 0 2 1 . 0 2
B .77 - .29 -1.36 .31 1.50 1 . 2 0 - .43 2.46 2 . 0 2 1.40
C 2 . 2 1 1.58 2 . 2 0 1.51 - .28 2.03 .56 1.16 2.15 1.25
Groups compared: (6-10 years) - (Over 30 years)
Degrees of freedom: n2 + n$- 2 = 37 
Critical "t" values: -2.02 ^ t < 2.02
A .95 .52 .66 1 . 1 2 2.54 2.06 .32 1.30 1.50 .48
B 1.18 - .83 -2.16 - .05 2.16 1.16 - .33 1 .20 1.14 .95
C 1.23 1.58 1.24 1 . 1 2 .27 2.05 »»90 1,.10 2.35 .83
D -1.08 -2.03 .97 - .96 - .63 -1.13 -1.15 -1.,10 - .07 1 . 2 0
E 2.18 - . 8 6 2.18 .05 -1 . 2 0 .88 . 1 0 - ,.10 1.48 .30
Groups compared: (11-20 years) - (Over 30 years)
Degrees of freedom: n^ + nj - 2 + 52
Critical "t" values: 2.02 <L t < 2.02
A 1.26 1.28 .58 .94 .81 2 .03 .73 2 . 1 0 2.03 1 . 2 0
B - .86 . 1 0 -1 . 2 2 - .30 2.19 1 .04 1 . 0 0 2 . 0 0 2 . 8 6 1 . 2 0
C 2.36 1.62 2.15 1.81 - .10 1 .92 1.32 1 . 1 2 2.08 .94
Groups compared*. (21-30 years) - (Over 30 years)
Degrees of freedom: n4 + n$ - 2 = 25
Critical "t" values: -2.04 < t < 2.04
A .70 . 6 8 .93 1.03 2.17 1.73 .51 1.91 1.48 .43
Note: The following combinations showed no significance with respect to
the concepts listed:
Groups Concepts Groups Concepts
1 - 2 A, B, C, E, F 3-4 A, B, C, D,
2-3 D, E, F 1-5 D, E, F
1-3 B, C, D, E 2-5 F
1-4 A, B, C, D, E, F 3-5 D, E, F
2-4 A, B, C, D, E, F 4-5 B, C, D, E,
TABLE XI
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN CONNOTATIVE MEANINGS OF
METHODOLOGICAL CONCEPTS BY RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE
AT a = .05
Possible Comparisons:
Group 1 - Catholic 
Group 2 - Jewish 
Group 3 - Protestant 
Group 4 - All Other
Possible Combinations of Two Groups: 
6
Groups compared: Catholic - Protestant
Degrees of freedom: nj + n3 - 2 = 119
Critical "t" values: -1.98 £ t < 1.98
Computed Values of "t" by Scales
E - .89 -1.71 - .71 - .43 .00 -1.57 -2.26 - .41 -1.65
F .71 .59 . 8 8 .08 2.50 .69 .00 -1.00 1.05
Groups compared: Catholic - All Other
Degrees of freedom: n^ + n̂. - 2 = 43
Critical "t" values: -2.02 < t £2.02
F -1.51 - .95 - .84 - .33 -1.27 - .02 -1.23 -2.02 -1.63
Groups compared: Protestant - All Other
Degrees of freedom: n^ + n^ - 2 = 116
Critical "t" values: -1.98 £ t  < 1.98
A -1.90 -3.02 - .48 -1.47 -1 .99 - .87 -1.74 -1.29 - .78
B - . 1 0 - .32 .84 -2.56 - . 2 0 - . 8 6 .40 -1.44 - .55
C -1.17 -1.89 - . 8 8 -2.06 - .60 -1.98 -1.46 - .79 -1 . 2 2
D - .63 - .42 - .15 -1.38 - .84 -1.53 -2.29 - .69 -1 . 6 8












Note: Significant differences did not exist between groups in the
following categories.
Groups Concepts
1-2 A, B, C, D, E, F
2-3 A, B, C, D, E, F
1-3 A, B, C, D
1-4 A, B, C, D, E




SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN CONNOTATIVE MEANINGS OF
METHODOLOGICAL CONCEPTS BY GEOGRAPHICAL AREA
IN WHICH RESPONDENT WAS REARED AT a = ,05
Possible Comparisons:
Group 1 - East 
Group 2 - Midwest 
Group 3 - South 
Group 4 - West 
Group 5 - Foreign
Possible Combinations of Two Groups 
(:) ■»
Groups compared: East - West
Degrees of freedom: n. + n4 - 2 = 56
Critical "t" values: -2.00 < t <. 2.00
Computed Values of "t" by Scales 
3 4 5 6 7
.30 .44 .75 .00 .63 3.21 2.08 2.65 .32
Groups compared: West - Midwest
Degrees of freedom: n4 + n2 - 2 = 74
Critical "t" values: -2.00 ^ t  ^ 2.00
B .03 .10 -1.05 .50 - .56 -1.24 -2.77 .65 -1.94
C -1.50 -1.46 .55 - .74 -1.10 -2.37 -3.09 -2.15 - .51
Groups compared: East - Midwest
Degrees of freedom: nj + n2 - 2 = 84
Critical "t" values: -2.00 £t <2.00
B .53 .74 .28 1.29 1.32 1.32 1.42 2.03 2.30
D 1.15 1.05 .82 1.29 2.11 .73 .81 .52 1.23









Groups compared: East - South
Degrees of freedom: + n-j - 2 = 64
Critical "t" values: -2.00 < t £ 2,00
Computed Values of "t" by Scales
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0
A - .80 -1.46 -2.16 -2 . 0 2 -1 . 6 6 -1.28 -2.31 -1.27 -1 . 0 2 - .61
B -1 . 0 0 -2 . 1 2 -1 . 2 0 -2,56 -1.72 -1.93 -2.04 -1.93 -1.75 -1.08
C - .31 -1.75 -2.27 - .81 .92 -1.35 - .78 -1.09 - .18 -1.24
D - .80 - .29 .58 - .01 -2.40 -1 . 0 0 - .63 . 0 0 -1 . 0 0 -1.39
E - .45 . 1 0 - .30 -1 . 1 0 -1.47 - . 6 8 - .38 - .18 - .73 -2 . 0 1
Groups compared: West - 
Degrees of freedom: n^ 
Critical "t" values: -2
South 
+ nj - 2 = 54 
. 0 0 ^ t i 2 . 0 0
A .45 1.42 2 . 1 1 - .82 -1.89 .31 1.34 .95 - . 1 2 .75
C 1.02 1.79 2.60 2.40 .53 1.40 .82 1 . 8 6 . 6 6 2.41
E .32 1.10 .31 1.68 1.42 1.08 1.47 .60 .36 2.03
F .59 .10 . 2 0 .10 2.19 - .84 - .58 1.45 - .33 .70
Groups compared: Midwest - South 
Degrees of freedom: ^  + n, - 2 = 82 
Critical "t" values: -2.00 < t < 2.00
A .84 2.00 2.53 2.13 2.25 1.37 2.42 .42 . 2 0 - .28
D -2.03 - .75 -1.50 -1.19 .38 .34 . 0 0 - .78 - . 6 6 . 2 0
E 1.08 ,76 1.25 1.70 2.02 .94 33 - .82 - .55 1 . 8 8
Groups compared: East - 
Degrees of freedom: 
Critical "t" values: -2
Foreign Reared 
+ n5 - 2 = 37 
. 0 2 < t < 2 . 0 2
C - .93 - .83 .50 2.12 .90 .48 -1.40 . 6 8 - .41 - .62
E -1.15 .00 1.62 2.94 - .20 - .75 1.29 2.08 - .26 - .26
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TABLE XII (continued)
Groups compared: West - Foreign Reared
Degrees of freedom: n^ + ng - 2 = 27
Critical "t" values: -2.06 i t  <2.06
Computed Values of "t" by Scales
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
c - .38 - .58 .84 2.84 .51 1.01 -1.05 1.07 - .08 .22
E .32 .71 1.62 2.95 - .10 .42 2.17 2.31 . 12 - .12
F - .84 -1.42 -2.16 - .20 -1.74 -1.00 -2.30 .00 -1.05 - .09
Groups compared: Midwest - Foreign Reared
Degrees of freedom: n2 + ng - 2 = 55
Critical "t" values: -2.02 i t i  2.02
B 1.18 - .96 .80 1.36 - . 1 2 - .72 - . 1 0 -2.59 - .26 -1.08
C -1.56 -1.55 - . 1 2 2.26 - .36 .64 -2 . 1 0 .05 1.36 -1 . 1 0
D -1.09 -1 . 1 2 - .09 -1 . 2 1 - .54 .69 - .30 -3.05 -1.58 - .05
E 1.82 1.14 2.35 3.48 .12 - . 6 8 - .04 1.40 .12 - .43
Groups compared: South - Foreign Reared
Degrees of freedom: n^ + n$ - 2 = 35
Critical "t" values: -2.04 < t <2.04
B .69 -1.58 . 2 0 .22 - .18 -1 . 0 2 - .28 2.33 . 0 0 -1.46
E .89 . 2 0 -1.46 -2.24 -1 . 0 2 -1.14 1.49 1.97 - .17 -1.34
F -1.16 -1.48 -2.15 .22 . 15 .62 -1 65 -1.04 - .85 - .33
Note: The following groups showed no significant difference relative
to the concepts listed below.
Groups Concepts Groups Concepts
1 - 2 A, C, F 3-4 B, D
2-3 B, C, F 1-5 A, B, D,
1-3 F 2-5 A, F
1-4 A, B, C, D, E 3-5 A, C, D
2-4 A, D, E, F 4-5 A, B, D
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TABLE XIII
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN CONNOTATIVE MEANINGS OF
METHODOLOGICAL CONCEPTS BY CITY SIZE WHERE
RESPONDENT WAS REARED AT a *  .05
Possible Comparisons:
Group 1 - Less than 25,000 
Group 2 - 25,001 - 100,000 
Group 3 - 100,000 - 500,000 
Group 4 - 500,001 - 1,000,000 
Group 5 - Greater than 1,000,000
Possible Combinations of Two Groups:
Groups compared: (Less than 25,000) - (25,001 - 100,000)
Degrees of freedom: n̂  + ^  - 2 = 58
Critical "t" values: -2.00 ̂  t < 2.00
Computed Values of "t" by Scales
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0
B 2.70 2.56 1.45 1.37 .35 .35 1.27 1.13 .71 .00
D .36 .46 .50 .50 1.25 . 15 -2.90 1.50 - .50 1.55
E 1 . 6 6 .50 1.60 .71 2.39 .81 - .58 - .24 - .15 - .44
Groups compared: (25,001 - 100,000) - (100,001 - 500,000)
Degrees of freedom: n2 + nj - 2 » 50
Critical "t" values: -2.02 St 1 2.02
D 1.50 .90 -1.10 .24 1.08 .00 .27 1.52 2.15 1.00
E - .30 - .35 2.08 1.18 .77 1.12 .40 .08 1.36 - .35
Groups compared: (Less than 25,000) - (100,001 - 500,000)
Degrees of freedom: nj + nj - 2 = 84
Critical "t" values: -2.00 ̂  t < 2.00
E -1.40 -1.25 .50 -1.82 -2.13 -2.30 - .03 - .25 -1.64 .13
F - .10 - .24 1.56 .00 - .72 - .53 -2.92 -1.24 -1.37 -1.32
TABLE XIII (continued)
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Groups compared: (Less than 25,000) - (Greater than 1,000,000)
Degrees of freedom: + n5 - 2 = 83
Critical Mt" values: -2.00 < t < 2.00
Computed Values of "t" by Scales
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
A -2.02 -1.98 -2.44 -2.33 -1.54 -2.15 -1.28 -1.06 -1.29 - .95
E - .75 -2.24 - .6 6 - .35 -1.40 -1.97 .00 -1.42 -1.57 -1.28
Groups compared: (25,001 - 100,000) - (Greater than 1,000,000)
Degrees of freedom: n2 + 115 - 2 = 49
Critical "t" values: -2.02 £ t £ 2.02
F -1.77 -1.45 -1.77 - .21 -1.36 -1.15 -1.95 -2.06 -1.78 -1.83
Groups compared: (100,001 - 500,000) - (Greater than 1,000,000)
Degrees of freedom: nj + ng - 2 = 45
Critical "t" values: -2.02 ̂  t ^ 2.02
C - .62 -1.34 -1.52 -1.60 - .92 -1.18 -2.18 -2.12 - .78 -1.33
F -1.17 -1.87 .42 - .05 -1.13 -2.61 -1.55 - .S6 -1.32 -1.66
Note: No significant differences were revealed among the following
groups with respect to the concepts listed.
Groups Concepts
1 - 2 A, c, F
2-3 A, B, c, F
1-3 A, B, c, D
1-4 A, B, c, D, E, F
2-4 A, B, c, D, E, F
3-4 A, B, c, D, E, F
1-5 B, c, D, F
2-5 A, B, c, D, E
3-5 A, B, D, E
4-5 A, B, c, D, E, F
TABLE XIV
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN CONNOTATIVE MEANINGS OF
METHODOLOGICAL CONCEPTS BY PARENT’S OCCUPATION
AT a * .05
Possible Comparisons:
Group 1 - Blue-collar 
Group 2 - White-collar 
Group 3 - Professional 
Group 4 - All others
Possible Combinations of Two Groups:
Groups compared: Blue-collar - White-collar
Degrees of freedom: n^ + ^  - 2 * 8 8
Critical "t" values: -2.00 £ t £2.00
Computed Values of "t" by Scales
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
F .20 .28 .83 .54 1.62 .56 1.48 2.09 1.28
Groups compared: White-collar - Professional
Degrees of freedom: n2 + nj - 2 = 89
Critical "t" values: -2.00 < t < 2.00
B 2.35 1.00 2.41 1.60 .59 1.48 1.13 .30 .30
F .12 -3.55 - .57 - .40 - .62 - .50 -2.00 - .58 - .13
Groups compared: Blue-collar - Professional
Degrees of freedom: n, + n3 - 2 = 81
Critical "t" values: -2.00 £ t < 2.00
F - .35 - .55 - .79 - .90 '-1.08 -1.18 -2.13 -1.18 -1.47
Groups compared: Blue-collar - Others
Degrees of freedom: n^ + n* - 2 = 55
Critical ”t” values: -2.00 £t < 2.00










Groups compared: White-collar - Others
Degrees of freedom: n~ + n. - 2 = 63
Critical "t" values: -2.00 < t £ 2.00
Computed Values of "t" by Scales
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
F -1.32 -1.47 -2.43 -2.11 -1.57 -1.26 -2.12 - .69 - .39 - .53
Groups compared: Professional - Others
Degrees of freedom: n, + n - 2 = 56
Critical "t" values: -2.00 i t  < 2.00
F 1.07 2.88 2.55 1.89 1.61 2.03 2.13 .75 1.29 1.51
Note: No significant differences were exposed relative to the following
groups and concepts.
Groups Concepts
1-2 A, B, C, D, E
2-3 A, C, D, E
1-3 A, B, C, D, E
1-4 A, B, C, D, E
2-4 A, B, C, D, E
3-4 A, B, C, D, E
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TABLE XV
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN CONNOTATIVE MEANINGS OF
METHODOLOGICAL CONCEPTS BY PRESENT RESIDENCE
AT a s .05
Possible Combinations:
Group 1 - East 
Group 2 - Midwest 
Group 3 - South 
Group 4 - West
Possible Combinations of Two Groups: 
(:)■•
Groups compared: East - West
Degrees of freedom: n. + n4 - 2 = 69
Critical "t" values: -2.00 £ t 2.00
Computed Values of "t" by Scales
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0
B .99 1.35 .03 2.42 1.24 1.75 .08 . 6 6 1.27 .63
C 1.38 2 . 0 0 1.65 .47 . 8 6 .47 1.14 .74 1.49 .94
D 1 . 0 0 1.40 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 1 . 0 1 .77 2.81 .32 . 0 0 .36
E .33 . 6 8 .53 1.54 2.79 1.59 .63 .73 .43 .47
F . 0 0 . 0 0 2.25 .87 . 0 0 .87 1 . 2 1 . 0 0 1.79 1.46
Groups compared: East - Midwest 
Degrees of freedom: + n2 - 2 = 6 6  
Critical "t" values: -2.00 i t < 2.00
B - .39 .00 .00 2.11 1.83 1.16 .00 . 0 0 1.77 - .56
C 1.14 2.05 1.67 1.28 .00 .37 .76 .46 .57 .47
Groups compared: Midwest - South 
Degrees of freedom: n2 + n, - 2 = 77 
Critical "t" values: -2.00 < t < 2.00
A 2.00 2.18 2.00 1.77 1.83 2.84 2.14 1.34 1.74 1.77
B .80 1.90 .57 1.17 1.16 2 . 0 0 3.23 2.90 .80 2.70
E 1.27 1.35 .10 1.74 2.37 2 . 2 2 .46 . 2 0 1.32 2 . 2 0
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TABLE XV (continued)
Groups compared: East - South
Degrees of freedom: nj + n3 - 2 = 70
Critical "t" values: -2.00 £ t  ^  2.00
Computed Values of "t" by Scales
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0
A 1.96 1.75 2.29 2.47 2.65 2.82 3.08 1 . 8 8 1.95 .80
B .42 1.64 .39 -3.29 2.83 1.53 4.69 2.26 2.23 2.38
C 2.65 3.51 1.94 .67 2.38 . 8 8 .70 1.39 1.32 1 . 2 2
D .41 - .53 - .26 2.37 - .06 . 8 6 1 . 0 0 .65 1.58 .82
E .84 - .04 -1 . 2 0 1.92 .83 -1 . 0 0 .73 .04 1.52 2.09
F 1 . 1 1 1.84 1.94 2.58 2.31 1.24 2.55 -2 . 0 2 3.17 2.07
Groups compared: West - South
Degrees of freedom: + n3 - 2 = 77
Critical "t" values: -2.00 £ t  <.2.00
B .45 .59 .40 1.81 1.87 1.44 2 . 6 6 2.07 1.56 1.56
C 1 . 0 0 1.34 1.55 2 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 1.05 2.78 1.30 .76 1.47
E .48 1.24 .57 1.74 2 . 2 1 2.38 2.35 1.16 2.19 1.47
F .77 1.32 1 . 2 2 .01 .04 2.08 1.64 2 . 0 1 1.28 .44
Note: No significant differences were noted with respect to the following
groups and concepts.
Groups Concepts
1 - 2 A, D, E, F
2-3 C, D, F
1-3 A, B, C, D, E, F
1-4 A
2-4 A, B, C, D, E, F
3-4 A, B, D
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